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The rapid pace of product development in the IT sector has led to a volume surge of 
product returns, giving rise to critical environmental threats that can potentially have 
significantly adverse ecological effects. One possible avenue to mitigate these 
negative effects pertains to the establishment of robust secondary markets for these 
products, so that their useful life can be enhanced. My dissertation seeks to study 
multiple aspects aimed at enhancing the efficiency of online secondary markets for 
durable IT products, using economic and behavioral theories. The first essay 
examines the extent to which firm policies in the primary market mitigate 
inefficiencies caused by adverse selection in the secondary market for IT products. I 
find that policies implemented by firms in the primary market with respect to their 
products can have beneficial effects in addressing adverse selection in the secondary 
markets. The second essay studies how adding a marquee seller to a B2B secondary 
  
market platform for IT products affects other sellers, in terms of the prices they obtain 
for comparable products. I show that the entry of a marquee seller has a positive 
effect on the prices obtained by other sellers on the platform. I further show that this 
positive effect on final prices is moderated by bidders multi-homing activity, and 
their level of involvement in the marquee seller’s site. Finally, through behavioral 
experiments performed on Amazon MTurk, my third essay examines the extent to 
which the use of behavioral interventions, in the form of green nudges, can enhance 
the propensity of used IT products being purchased in the secondary market, thereby 
increasing the lifetime of these products. I find that the efficacy of using green nudges 
to impact consumer behavior depends on the kind of motivation (i.e., internal versus 
external motivation) the nudge is delivering. I further find that the effectiveness of 
green nudges can vary based upon product price and perceived quality, and consumer 
demographics and latent personalities. Collectively, the findings from these studies in 
my dissertation provide valuable theoretical as well as practical insights about the 
effectiveness of different mechanisms for enhancing the efficiency of online 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
Economic, technological, and social trends have led to rapid growth in the market for used and 
remanufactured goods. In particular, online platforms have facilitated the rapid growth of the 
secondary market by reducing the cost of connecting sellers directly to buyers who are interested 
in used products (Hristova 2019). Secondary markets have attracted interest from both 
theoretical and empirical scholars. The prominent benefit of secondary markets lies in allowing 
durable goods to be efficiently reallocated to the people who value them most (Lee and Whang 
2002). However, a number of existing factors can affect the performance and efficiency of 
secondary markets – mostly associated with types of information asymmetries and pathologies 
(Sweeting 2019). Reducing the efficiency of secondary markets leads to negative ramifications 
on consumer surplus and social welfare, and critical threats to the environment that can result in 
major adverse ecological effects. 
 Within the domain of secondary markets, those for used IT products have a particularly 
noteworthy role to play for several reasons. Due to the rapid pace of product development in the 
IT sector (Mendelson and Pillai 1999), enhancing the efficiency of secondary markets for 
durable IT products is desirable since they retain value, but also has ecological and market value. 
From an economic perspective, improving the efficiency of secondary markets can help support 
new product prices in the primary market (Bester 1998, Zhao and Jagpal 2006). Furthermore, 
from an ecological perspective, e-waste is a global ecological issue. E-waste that ends up in 
landfills causes significant environmental damage, which can be avoided by extending the life of 
these products (Elmaghraby et al. 2018). It raises concern about air pollution, water pollution, 
soil pollution, information security, and even human exploitation (Weiss et al. 2016). Hence, 




efficiency of secondary markets for durable IT products is imperative and remains a central 
concern for policy makers and managers alike. 
 Secondary markets for durable IT products exist in both physical and virtual formats, and 
allow for different types of transactions, i.e., business-to-business or business-to-consumer. 
There are multiple characteristics of these market exchanges. They can be public or private, 
auction or direct, and one-to-many or many-to-many, which includes numerous sellers and 
numerous buyers (Lee and Whang 2002). Sellers in secondary markets are heterogeneous, e.g., 
large recyclers, liquidation players, mom-and-pop stores, individual resellers, and flea markets. 
The pricing model in these markets also exists in multiple forms, e.g., auctions, bulk purchases, 
and posted prices. Products in secondary markets vary in terms of quality and condition. The 
variation in product quality and extant information asymmetry in these markets lead to issues of 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Lewis 2011, Klein et al. 2016). These issues have become 
more salient in the last decade due to the large increase in volume, reduction in product life 
cycles, and concurrent presence of multiple generations of IT products (Camarda et al. 2019). 
 The volume surge of IT product returns urges retailers to liquidate their excess inventory 
through existing online liquidation platforms in the secondary market. The online liquidation 
market promises to grow in the coming years, with the amount of returns expected to exceed $1 
trillion within the next few years (PYMNTS 2019). In my dissertation, I focus on this subsector 
of the secondary market – liquidation markets for used IT products. The liquidation market 
includes B2B auctions, posted price B2B sales, and B2C sales on sites like Amazon and eBay. 
These liquidation markets are mostly online, so they suffer from similar factors that affect online 
platforms and sellers and need to be managed effectively. Their efficiency is of importance, since 




significant amount of e-waste. Addressing the efficiency of these markets, in their diverse forms, 
requires the use of multiple theoretical and empirical perspectives in order to generate insights 
for both managers and policy makers. Therefore, my dissertation consists of three essays that use 
different theoretical lenses to study aspects of secondary markets for IT products as a way to 
enhance their functioning and efficiency. My work reported here aims at enhancing the 
efficiency of online secondary markets from (1) an information asymmetry perspective, (2) 
platforms perspective, and (3) a behavioral economics perspective. In the following paragraphs, I 
briefly describe these essays, each of which forms a chapter in my dissertation. 
 The first essay in my dissertation examines the extent to which firm policies in the 
primary market mitigate inefficiencies caused by adverse selection in the secondary market for 
IT products. Online B2B auctions are afflicted by the same challenges facing other electronic 
markets for used products; specifically, they are significantly affected by adverse selection, since 
uncertainty about product quality from their first life remains in place. I study how these adverse 
selection costs may be identified and reduced in online B2B auctions for mobile phones using a 
proprietary data set for pallets of iPhone devices. In particular, I identify a clear method by 
which these adverse selection costs may be reduced – through policies implemented in the 
primary market. I argue that policies implemented by firms in the primary market with respect to 
their products can have beneficial effects in addressing adverse selection in the secondary 
markets. While extant literature has studied how secondary markets affect demand in the primary 
market (Arunkundram and Sundararajan 1998; Chen et al. 2013), I consider the reverse by 
focusing on how decisions in the primary market can affect market efficiency in the secondary 
market. This essay has significant implications for enhancing the efficiency of secondary 




secondary markets. It also adds to the literature on platforms by showing how adverse selection 
continues to affect platforms for the resale of IT products.  
 The second essay studies how adding a marquee seller to a B2B secondary market 
platform for IT products affects other sellers, in terms of the prices they obtain for comparable 
products. Prior research has focused on factors that impact prices on two-sided platforms, 
including network effects and switching costs, demand interdependency and cross-side trust 
within a platform (Eisenmann et al. 2011, Farrell and Klemperer 2007, Rochet and Tirole 2003, 
Wilbur 2008, Evans 2009). Scholars have furthermore shed light on the effects of new entrants 
on prices for either side of the platform, and showed that market prices reduce as a result of the 
increase in competition (Wright 2004, Chandra and Collard-Wexler 2009, Zhu et al. 2019). 
Despite the increase in competition resulted from adding new sellers, the entry of a “marquee” 
seller could possibly result in positive network effects across both sides of the platform as well as 
serve as a price anchor. Using proprietary data of secondary market auctions for IT products 
hosted by a leading online B2B platform, I examine how the entry of a marquee seller influences 
prices of other sellers for comparable products on the platform. Drawing on theory in reference 
prices, I show that the entry of a marquee seller has a positive impact on the prices obtained by 
other sellers on the platform, while controlling for increased supply and demand. I further show 
that this positive effect on final prices is moderated by the extent to which bidders are active on 
multiple seller sites on the same platform, and the extent to which bidders participate in the 
marquee seller’s site. I explain these effects using theory in multi-homing and involvement, in 
terms of how reference prices are set. Thus, beyond the presence of network effects on the 
platform per se, this essay extends the literature by showing that adding new sellers to the 




While the first two essays explore different mechanisms that make secondary markets 
more effective, the third essay seeks to enhance the efficiency of secondary markets by studying 
how consumers may be induced into purchasing durable used IT products, rather than new 
products. Cannibalization of used IT products is increasingly being viewed as an economic 
problem. However, from an environmental and social perspective, there are many different social 
as well as ecological benefits that can be gained from enhancing the cannibalistic impact of used 
products in the secondary market. Within the realm of durable IT products, I study whether 
sellers could possibly enhance the likelihood of used IT products being purchased through the 
use of behavioral interventions, in the form of green nudges. The need to better understand what 
motivates people to adopt pro-environmental behaviors has taken a new urgency with the 
increasing emphasis on sustainability. E-waste has received limited attention in spite of being the 
fastest growing segment of household waste (Dao et al. 2011, Saphoresa et al. 2012). The global 
E-waste annual report shows that the world dumped a record of 53.6 million tons of e-waste in 
2019, of which only 17.4% was recycled (Reuters 2020).  
In order to test how highlighting the negative externalities of e-waste could possibly 
enhance the chances of used electronic products being purchased in the B2C secondary market, I 
conduct experimental studies using subjects recruited from Amazon MTurk. I examine the extent 
to which the use of green nudges can alter consumer preferences towards purchasing used IT 
products, relative to the counterpart new products. My results show the efficacy of using a green 
nudge depends upon the type of motivation the nudge delivers to the average consumer. Drawing 
on theories in conspicuous conservation and emotional empathy, I show that providing an 
external motivation via the green nudge can be very effective in impacting the likelihood of used 




vary based upon the used product price and perceived quality. Moreover, consumer 
demographics and latent personality traits can play a significant role in moderating the efficacy 
of green nudges, depending upon the type of motivation they deliver to consumers. This essay 
provides guidance and proposes different methods for sellers in secondary markets to apply in 
their marketplaces as they create offers of used IT products in the B2C marketplace. 
Collectively, the findings from these studies in my dissertation will provide valuable 
theoretical as well as practical insights about the effectiveness of different mechanisms for 




Chapter 2: Adverse Selection in B2B Secondary Market Online Auctions 
for IT Equipment: An Empirical Analysis 
2.1. Introduction 
Consumer spending on new IT products in the United States in 2019 was estimated to be $1.69 
Trillion, according to IDC, representing an increase of 5.3% over the previous year.1 A large part 
of this spending goes into mobile phones, computers, and communication equipment that are 
largely durable and can provide value for many years. However, as these are replaced by newer 
models, these used technologies enter business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer 
(B2C) secondary or liquidation markets. These markets process the resale of products that have 
passed through the primary market in some form (Elmaghraby et al. 2018; Lee and Whang 
2002), either as customer returns, unsold inventory, or from buyback programs (Tibben-Lembke 
2004).  The efficient functioning of these secondary markets is desirable, since these ‘older’ 
products are functional and continue to provide value (Pilehvar et al. 2017). Moreover, their 
second life prevents them from ending up in landfills where they can cause environmental 
damage (Tibben-Lembke 2004).  
 A recurring issue faced by secondary markets for IT products, such as computers and 
mobile devices (Pilehvar et al. 2017) pertains to uncertainty about product quality (Ghose 2009). 
Specifically, secondary markets are prone to adverse selection, due to uncertainty about the 
quality of products sold therein, as shown by a significant body of evidence in the context of 
used durable goods (Akerlof 1970, Garicano and Kaplan 2001; Overby and Mitra 2014). 
Uncertainty about quality manifests as adverse selection costs: reduced prices relative to 
conditions where full information is provided to buyers (Dewan and Hsu 2004). Adverse 





selection can also lead to market failure, which in the case of IT equipment leads to greater e-
waste and environmental degradation (Tibben-Lembke 2004) as well as lost opportunities for the 
sale of equipment in other settings where demand exists (Neto et al 2016). 
Potential solutions to adverse selection in secondary markets have largely focused on 
providing information at the point of sale – these include quality attestations, warranties, third-
party certifications, signals, and relational measures that build trust (Overby and Mitra 2014; 
Ozpolat et al. 2013; Klein et al. 2016; Pavlou et al. 2007). However, this focus on the point of 
sale misses the influence of factors from the primary market that can help reduce uncertainty in 
the secondary market. Arguably, information from the primary market can have a positive effect 
on prices in the secondary market as well. Prior literature on the interconnectedness between the 
primary and secondary markets (Arunkundram and Sundararajan 1998; Chen et al. 2013) have 
discussed how the secondary market negatively affects demand in the primary market. However, 
the reverse is also possible – decisions in the primary market taken by critical players, such as 
the makers of original equipment or firms that are important value-added resellers, as a way to 
enhance their value in the primary market, can positively affect market efficiency and prices in 
secondary markets. My empirical research question therefore is: to what extent do product design 
and feature decisions by key players in the primary market (such as original equipment makers 
and telecom service providers) reduce adverse selection in the secondary market for the same set 
of IT products? In this essay, I provide empirical validation of this effect within B2B secondary 
markets for iPhones. 
 In the typical B2B secondary markets for IT products, pallets of equipment are sold to a 
set of pre-registered business buyers through an online auction platform. The auction platform 




products from their shelves / warehouses, to buyers who bid for these pallets. The platform does 
not handle any of the pallets, since they are shipped directly from the retailer to the eventual 
buyer. Bidders are themselves resellers, and include flea market operators, eBay power sellers, 
and independent stores that vary in bidding activity and purchase volumes (Pilehvar et al. 2017). 
Since this equipment is sold “as-is” by retailers, they rarely come with clearly specified quality 
assurance in terms of functionality and appearance (Elmaghraby et al. 2018), leaving residual 
uncertainty about the devices in the pallets.  
 In my empirical analysis, I focus on how policies implemented in the primary market 
impact the residual uncertainty about one specific aspect of the products being sold, thereby 
reducing adverse selection costs. I focus on Apple iPhone devices; in the U.S. alone, secondary 
market auctions for mobile phones were roughly $25 billion in 2017. In the secondary markets, 
the quality of mobile phones remains uncertain on many dimensions – software, physical 
condition, presence of warranties, and feature sets. In this essay, I focus on one source of 
uncertainty – whether the device runs the risk of being jailbroken. Jailbreaking is an 
(unauthorized) process by which the user is able to gain root access to the phone. Users jailbreak 
iPhones for two main reasons (Cheng 2010) – to gain greater control over the device and bypass 
the “walled garden” model used by Apple (Wolk 2009), and to untether the device from a 
specific carrier (“unlocking” the device). Unlocked phones can thus operate on any carrier that 
offers similar technology (such as GSM). Unlocked phones are more valuable as they are not 
“locked-in” to a single carrier, and command higher prices in the primary market.  
In the US market, both locked and unlocked iPhones are sold in the B2B secondary 
markets in pallets. However, unlocked iPhones can manifest in these markets in multiple ways. 




may have been unlocked by the specific carrier (such as Verizon or AT&T). Finally, they may 
have been unlocked as a result of jailbreaking. Jailbreaking is not uncommon - 5% of all iPhones 
in 2010 were found to be jailbroken (22.8M devices), rising to 11.2% in 2013 in the US alone 
(NY Times 2010; CoderProof 2013). While factory-unlocking and carrier-facilitated unlocking 
do not affect the intrinsic quality of the phone in any way, jailbreaking-to-unlock results in the 
loss of manufacturer warranties and maintenance support from the device maker and renders the 
jailbroken devices more susceptible to malicious software, resulting in potential future software 
issues (Miller 2011).2  Thus, while all iPhones may be jailbroken for reasons of control, the risk 
of obtaining a jailbroken phone is amplified for unlocked devices that cannot be verified as 
factory-unlocked or carrier-facilitated unlocked. When a potential buyer in the secondary market 
encounters a pallet of unlocked iPhones, she cannot verify if the pallet is free of jailbroken ones. 
This uncertainty introduces adverse selection costs, i.e. buyers will reduce their bids for such 
pallets (Dewan and Hsu 2004).  Detailed information about the phones and their provenance may 
help but are rarely provided in these markets (Pilehvar et al. 2017). As a result, the usual 
mechanisms by which adverse selection may be resolved, such as warranties, signals, and 
certifications, do not apply here.  
 Interestingly, some of the adverse selection costs associated with unlocked phones would 
reduce if it were established that all such devices were safely unlocked, without the need for 
jailbreaking. As part of a deal with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Verizon 
announced in 2012 that all 4G LTE devices (starting with iPhone 5 models) would be “factory-
unlocked”, i.e., they would be operable on other networks as well. Other carriers did not adopt 
this policy. This policy implemented in the primary market inadvertently resulted in eliminating 
                                                
2	Apple discourages jailbreaking, directly stating that ‘Unauthorized modification of iOS can cause security 




the need to jailbreak these phones for the purpose of unlocking them, thereby alleviating some 
residual uncertainty in the secondary market. I empirically examine how this exogenous policy 
change affects prices for Verizon phones, relative to those offered by other carriers, and the 
magnitude of adverse selection costs. The empirical analysis addresses two questions: first, is 
there evidence of adverse selection costs associated with jailbreaking-to-unlock, reflected in the 
prices of unlocked iPhones? Second, does the policy change reduce these adverse selection costs 
for unlocked Verizon phones, as would be expected from a reduction in uncertainty?  
My analysis finds that, unlike the traditional literature in adverse selection which 
emphasizes signals, certification, return policies and seller reputation to tackle adverse selection 
(Ozpolat et al. 2013; Ghose 2009; Overby and Mitra 2014; Klein et al. 2016), appropriate 
policies from the primary market can have a salubrious effect in the secondary market. I conduct 
the analyses using a proprietary dataset on B2B auctions obtained from a leading online 
intermediary B2B secondary market platform. My sample contains auction data of iPhone pallets 
spanning the period from January 2014 to July 2017. I restrict the sample to auctions of two 
different iPhone generations that span the policy change – the iPhone 4 and iPhone 5 models, 
leading to a sample of 8,179 unique auctions.  
A model-free comparison of prices shows the presence of adverse selection costs – 
unlocked phones are priced lower than locked phones ($46. 90 versus $63.70 for iPhone 4 
models; $88.30 versus $94.50 for iPhone 5 models) when the phones cannot be guaranteed to be 
factory- or carrier-facilitated unlocked. This price ordering stands in stark contrast to the 
ordering found in the primary market, where unlocked phones command a price premium to 
locked phones. However, this is not the case with Verizon iPhone 5 models, which are 




price of $137.40. Based on this preliminary evidence, I investigate auction-level prices across all 
of the iPhone auctions hosted by sellers on the B2B auction platform. I first test for the presence 
of jailbreaking-to-unlock adverse selection costs, by comparing pallets where the 
locked/unlocked status of the phones is not disclosed to those where this information is provided. 
Subsequently, I consider prices for Verizon iPhone 5 pallets, where phones need not be 
jailbroken for the purpose of unlocking, to see if prices are higher, relative to similar models 
offered by other carriers where the uncertainty from jailbreaking-to-unlock remains.  
The regression results, reported later, provide clear support for the presence of adverse 
selection costs (Dewan and Hsu 2004) – locked phones generate higher prices when the risk of 
jailbreaking-to-unlock remains in unlocked phones. These risks remain in place when the pallet 
is marked as unlocked and when no information is provided about the status of the phones in the 
pallet. However, when the uncertainty pertaining to jailbreaking-to-unlock is removed through 
Verizon’s policy change, prices for unlocked phones are significantly higher, matching the price 
structures observed for unlocked phones in the primary market (Felin and Zenger 2014).  
 This essay makes two primary contributions to the literature. First, I extend prior work 
studying adverse selection in secondary markets, especially for IT products, by showing that the 
ill effects of information asymmetry may be partially handled by policies from the primary 
market. In my case, the policy may not have been specifically implemented for the benefit of 
secondary markets, but capitalizes on the extent to which primary and secondary markets are 
interlinked (Lee and Whang 2002; Ghose 2009). Second, I contribute to the literature on 
secondary markets of durable goods that create environmental problems. Well-run secondary 
markets as well as programs to refurbish and remanufacture products remain critical to reduce e-




complete lifecycle of IT products, can help ensure robust secondary markets, while also limiting 
e-waste (Kumar and Putnam 2008).  
From the perspective of implementing policy that can help create sustainable reverse 
logistics programs, I show the value of forward-looking policies that can benefit both primary 
and secondary markets. For carriers like Verizon and AT&T, the essay primes them to consider 
the downstream implications of their strategic decisions, and the benefits thereof. For online 
secondary market auctioneers like my research partner, the essay shows how they benefit from 
providing complete information, thereby ensuring better market outcomes (Pilehvar et al. 2017). 
In the next section, I provide details about two important aspects of this essay – the B2B 
secondary market context and jailbreaking, before delving into the empirical analysis. 
2.2. Related Research and Theoretical Background 
My work here draws from prior research in B2B secondary markets for IT products as well as 
from theory on adverse selection in the context of durable goods. I start with reviewing prior 
work in secondary markets in IT products below. 
2.2.1. Secondary Markets for IT Products 
The rapid rate of new product development of IT products and their quick adoption has led to 
contexts where multiple generations of the same technologies are available to users concurrently 
in the market (Carrillo 2005; Mendelson and Pillai 1999). For instance, it is easy to observe sales 
of new iPhone devices as well as a robust marketplace for multiple generations of used but 
functional previous-generation iPhones. Even in the context of corporate IT infrastructure, it is 




are functional and valuable.3 In other cases, IT equipment can be returned to the retailer or 
remain unsold in the primary market (Guide et al. 2003). The process of managing these 
products in their after-market, whether returned, unsold, or in their second life, remains the focus 
of secondary markets and reverse logistics (Guide and Wassenhove 2001; Ghose 2009).  
 The efficient functioning of secondary markets, especially in the context of IT products, 
is particularly desirable. The rapid rate of new technology introduction ensures that products that 
no longer represent the latest technologies are still useful, and can satisfy demand for computing 
services in alternative markets (Neto et al. 2015). Furthermore, “throwing” away IT equipment 
such as mobile phones and computers creates harmful e-waste (Robinson 2009; Oteng-Ababio 
2010). Over 40 million tons of e-waste is generated every year, leading to over 70% of the toxic 
waste created in the world.4 The use of secondary or liquidation markets helps address both these 
concerns – they process the resale of products that have a useful lifespan beyond their first lives, 
while also preventing them from being dumped in landfills. IT products that reach the secondary 
markets can come from customer returns, unsold inventory, buy-back programs run by retailers, 
as well as firms migrating to newer technology (Guide et al. 2003; Thibodeau 2013).  
 The linkages between primary and secondary markets have been a topic of considerable 
research. Interdependencies between these markets exist for both IT products (Lee and Whang 
2002; Arunkundram and Sundararajan 1998) as well as for non-IT products like books (Ghose et 
al. 2005), cars (Purohit 1992), and tickets for sporting and cultural events (Sweeting 2012; 
Bennett et al. 2015). The first-order interdependency is, of course, cannibalization of demand 
(Waldman 2003), wherein sales in the primary markets are affected by the presence of a 
secondary market (Debo et al. 2005; Ferguson and Toktay 2006). For example, a firm’s pricing 






decisions in the primary market can be influenced by sales and quality of products in the 
secondary market (Ghose et al. 2005; Moorthy and Png 1992), which in turn can affect sales in 
the primary market. Furthermore, the current move to “return-to-manufacturer” regulations being 
considered in many settings are designed to promote an appropriate closed loop mindset when 
selecting product design, distribution and end-of-life decisions across both the primary and 
secondary markets (Souza 2008; Miao et al. 2018; Alev et al. 2019). Thus, for firms offering 
products in the primary market, the influence of the secondary market is not trivial and can 
inform their decisions in the primary market.  
 The sale of second-hand or used electronic and computing equipment has garnered the 
attention of researchers, particularly during the early days of research into eBay and Amazon 
(Bapna et al. 2004; Arunkundram and Sundararajan 1998), but has primarily focused on the B2C 
sector. More recently, researchers have studied the larger and more impactful B2B secondary 
market for IT equipment, where large volumes of equipment are sold in the form of pallets to 
business buyers (Pilehvar et al. 2017). The B2B channel is of particular importance since this is 
the first stage where products enter the secondary market, before being sold as individual 
products in the subsequent (secondary) B2C markets (Thibodeau 2013). B2B secondary markets 
for IT products can exist in several forms, but a particularly visible form is the B2B online 
auction (Pilehvar et al. 2017), wherein pallets of equipment are auctioned to a set of pre-
registered buyers. Since many pallets in secondary markets are idiosyncratic and non-standard, 
auctions are a preferred market mechanism to facilitate price discovery (Pinker et al. 2003).  
 A recurring source of inefficiency within the secondary markets for durable goods, 
particularly with IT products, pertains to uncertainty about the quality of the products on sale 




specified quality information with regard to functionality and appearance. They are typically sold 
in an “as-is” condition by the sellers (Pilehvar et al. 2017), whereby quality uncertainty affects 
their valuations, and hence bidders’ willingness to pay (valuation). This is analogous to quality 
uncertainty studied in the B2C market for IT products as well (Ghose 2009). Some of this 
uncertainty could be resolved by disclosing more product information (Lu et al. 2017). Extant 
literature has demonstrated that it would be beneficial for the seller to provide more information 
(Milgrom and Weber 1982) and reduce uncertainty for buyers (Goeree and Offerman 2002). 
However, retailers looking to dispose their products quickly tend to not invest time in generating 
this detailed information (Pilehvar et al. 2017). Thus, pallets are assembled with roughly similar 
products, with neither the retailer nor the auction platform bearing responsibility for the contents, 
leading to residual concerns about quality given the paucity of information. Hence, sellers are 
often unable to provide the level of detail about the condition and prior use of the products on 
sale in B2B secondary market.  
 As a result, these auction markets are characterized by significant information 
asymmetry, which affects their functioning as a result of adverse selection (Akerlof 1970). While 
some models of adverse selection may include the strategic withholding of information about 
sellers or products so as to benefit from the resulting information asymmetry (Klein et al. 2016), 
this is typically not the case here. Rather, information asymmetry emerges from the context, 
where information on the first life of the products is incomplete by definition. I next review the 
literature on adverse selection, while also outlining the specific form I study here.  
2.2.2. Adverse Selection in the B2B Secondary Market for IT Products 
Adverse selection occurs when buyers of products cannot identify the true quality of the product 




unwilling to pay for the true but unknown quality of the product and instead, are only willing to 
pay the lowest prices in the market. This forces out sellers of high-quality products, thereby only 
leaving an “adverse selection” of products and sellers in the market. To the extent that “true” 
quality is observable to sellers, there may be strategic behavior on their part to pass their 
products off as high quality. However, in other settings, true quality may be unknown even to the 
sellers and may be structural to the context. In extreme cases, markets characterized by adverse 
selection can lead to market failure, where no market exchanges are possible (Akerlof 1970).  
 As mentioned earlier, several mechanisms can be used to reduce the effects of adverse 
selection. Third-party quality attestation or certification is one mechanism by which the seller’s 
or product’s quality can be verified prior to purchase (Ozpolat et al. 2013). Alternatively, quality 
signals can be issued by the seller to the market, thereby reducing the perceived risk for buyers 
(Ghose 2009; Overby and Mitra 2014). Signals can provide information about sellers (Klein et 
al. 2016), products (Dewan and Hsu 2004), and the processes within the firm (Gao et al. 2010). 
Sellers can also offer warranties, trial periods, generous return policies, and post-sales service 
contracts as ways to reduce information asymmetry (Overby and Mitra 2014; Peterson and 
Schneider 2014). Finally, intangible assets like brand, reputation, and trust can reduce the effects 
of adverse selection in markets (Dimoka et al. 2012; Pavlou et al. 2007; Kirmani and Rao 2000).  
 Early work on adverse selection was based on empirical data from the used car leasing 
and sales markets (Bond 1982; Genesove 1993; Garicano and Kaplan 2001; Johnson and 
Waldman 2003). The quality of the product is hard to gauge in such markets, and a similar 
dynamic exists with IT equipment in the secondary market (Ghose 2009; Elmaghraby et al. 




resolved these information asymmetries in full, as shown in multiple papers (Ghose 2009; 
Resnick et al. 2006; Klein et al. 2016).   
The impact of adverse selection in secondary markets can show up on multiple market 
outcomes. First, it can lead to the exit of high-quality sellers and products, thereby reducing the 
average quality of products in the market (Akerlof 1970). Adverse selection can also lead to 
higher quality products taking longer to sell, even in the presence of signals (Ghose et al. 2009). 
Finally, average prices for products are likely to be lower since buyers cannot distinguish the 
quality of the product; therefore, they tend to systematically pay lower prices (Ghose 2009; 
Dewan and Hsu 2004). When the resulting information asymmetry is lifted, even partially, 
average prices increase in the market – scholars have termed this difference adverse selection 
costs (Dewan and Hsu 2004; Garicano and Kaplan 2001).  
 The mechanisms for reducing information asymmetry in the market, as discussed above, 
can help reduce these adverse selection costs; their benefits are likely even more relevant in B2B 
secondary market contexts since sellers are unlikely to provide detailed information (Pilehvar et 
al. 2017). Paradoxically, the typical mechanisms to reduce information asymmetry are less likely 
to be used in B2B auctions that I study due to the minimal oversight and investment made in the 
flow of goods from the primary to secondary market. In the case of IT equipment, where 
replenishment cycles are fast and generations of technologies overlap in good measure, I argue 
that adverse selection costs in the secondary markets may be significantly reduced by policies 
instituted in the primary markets by original equipment manufacturers. Specifically, policies 
from the primary market that serve as free and informative signals of quality to all players in the 




2.2.3. Jail-breaking and Adverse Selection Costs in Mobile Phones 
The market for used iPhones is large and active, with multiple generations of phones being 
available in the market at the same time (Elmaghraby et al. 2018). As mentioned above, pallets 
of similar devices are bundled together and sold in auction lots in an “as-is” state. Since the 
phones that go into these pallets can come from several sources (buy-backs, returned products, 
unsold inventory), there is significant variability in their quality. Retailers provide some baseline 
information about the state and generation of the phones in the pallets; retailers are asked to 
‘self-report’ the quality of the phone along generic quality classifications (e.g., A, A/B, B, B/C, 
C, D or salvage; details are in Figure 2.1.). These quality classifications are meant to capture the 
level of functionality and cosmetic issues with the devices and are broad in scope so as to 
minimize the burden on sellers as they create similar pallets, without providing details about 
specific devices. Thus, there are several sources of uncertainty that buyers face with respect to 
product quality (Dimoka et al. 2012) – technical quality of the phone, cosmetic appearance, 
reliability of the software and applications, issues in functionality, and the presence of warranty 
include some of the features that remain unspecified (Pilehvar et al. 2017).  
 Among these factors, one such important source of uncertainty pertains to whether the 
pallet contains phones that are jail-broken-to-unlock. Mobile devices in the US are typically 
characterized by their ability to operate on multiple network carriers or be restricted to a single 
carrier. Devices that are locked to a single carrier can only be used with that carrier, such as 
Verizon or AT&T, and represent a closed platform ecosystem at the carrier level (Boudreau 
2010). Alternatively, devices can be unlocked, and usable on multiple carriers, depending on the 
user’s preference. From a platforms perspective, unlocked phones are more attractive since they 




the primary market.5 In contrast, locked phones tend to lock the customer into one carrier, 
thereby increasing switching costs and reducing consumer surplus (Cho et al. 2014). In an ideal 
secondary market, the price premium on unlocked phones should remain in place, since these 
allow the buyer greater choice in terms of carriers, all else being equal.  
However, from a quality perspective, all unlocked phones are not the same. As mentioned 
earlier, phones can be safely factory-unlocked or carrier-facilitated unlocked. Original equipment 
manufacturers (such as Apple) typically coordinate with carriers (such as Verizon or AT&T) to 
facilitate the carrier-unlocking procedure. Phones that are unlocked in this manner retain all 
relevant warranties and generally provide a baseline level of system performance that is 
associated with an untampered smartphone. However, this is not the case when a phone is 
unlocked through jailbreaking. Jailbreaking is a process by which restrictions placed on the 
phone by the device maker, in terms of “root” access, installation of non-compliant apps, 
security and privacy restrictions, and carrier access, are removed. Jailbroken phones can thus be 
freed from carrier restrictions imposed by the manufacturer (Apple, for instance) and the carrier 
(Verizon, for instance) (Miller 2011). Whether the device is jailbroken for the purposes of 
greater control or to unlock it, it results in the loss of manufacturer warranties and maintenance 
support from the device maker, thereby lowering its value. Jailbroken devices are also more 
susceptible to malicious software resulting in potential future software issues  
 When a buyer encounters an unlocked iPhone pallet, it is not clear how the devices were 
unlocked. To be clear, not all unlocked iPhones are jailbroken, and not all jailbroken phones are 
unlocked, since many users jailbreak their phones in order to exert greater control over the 
device per se (Cheng 2010). However, unlocked phones carry a heightened risk of having been 
                                                
5	When iPhone 5 was introduced, a closed phone of this generation was priced at $199 for the 16GB model, whereas 




tampered with due to the possibility of jailbreaking-to-unlock. The potential presence of jail-
broken unlocked phones within a pallet of unlocked phones thus creates an additional adverse 
selection problem. This problem manifests in two ways in this domain. First, if the status of the 
phones (whether or not they contain locked or unlocked phones) in a pallet is not disclosed, the 
buyer is uncertain with regards to the composition and hence the degree of jailbreaking risk, 
leading to reduced valuations and bids for the pallet (Akerlof 1970; Klein et al. 2016; Ghose 
2009), and lower final prices (Pilehvar et al. 2017). This is akin to the lemons problem where no 
information is provided to the market (Akerlof 1970). 
 Second, if the pallet is clearly labeled as including unlocked phones, here again, the 
buyer cannot be sure whether the phones are jail-broken, factory-unlocked or carrier-facilitated-
unlocked. In the first case, there is the possibility of additional damage to the device, which is 
less likely with the other two contingencies. Therefore, final prices are likely to be lower for 
unlocked pallets. While the risk of jailbroken devices exists even in locked pallets, there is no 
such residual uncertainty about jail-breaking-to-unlock per se. Thus, the adverse selection costs 
that result are likely to be higher in auctions where no information on locked or unlocked status 
is provided, and for unlocked phones. Interestingly, this is contrary to the primary market where 
unlocked phones generate the highest prices, while locked phones are cheaper.  
 The traditional mechanisms for reducing adverse selection are not available here – seller 
reputation is largely constant while detailed information on the pallets is not available. Online 
reviews and third-party warranties are largely infeasible in this context. Therefore, at the point of 
sale, adverse selection continues to be a source of inefficiency (Neto et al. 2016; Ghose et al. 
2009). However, the incremental uncertainty associated with unlocked devices would be 




This would reduce the jailbreaking-to-unlock component of residual uncertainty faced by 
unlocked phone pallets, thereby reducing adverse selection costs.  
 Such an exogenous change occurred in 2012 when Verizon announced that all of their 4G 
LTE devices, starting with the iPhone 5 models, would be factory unlocked. Other carriers, in 
contrast, continued to offer a mix of locked and unlocked phones. Thus, this exogenous policy 
change allows me to gauge firstly, the presence of adverse selection costs arising from a 
reduction in the need to jailbreak-to-unlock, and second, the extent to which this adverse 
selection cost may be reducing the efficiency of the information-starved secondary market. I 
explore these adverse selection costs empirically by studying iPhone pallets offered by Verizon, 
as well as other carriers who did not change policies. In lieu of formal hypotheses, I allow the 
empirical analysis to provide us with guidance. Since the B2B secondary market auction setting 
is rather unique, I describe the context and the research site in some detail next, before moving 
on to describe the dataset and empirical analyses. 
2.3. Research Context 
The research site is a leading online intermediary platform that specializes in running online 
auctions. The platform serves as a shopfront for big-box retailers who create their own virtual 
“shopfronts” on the platform where auctions are hosted. In order to maintain a consistent look 
and feel for the platform’s bidders, all the retailer’s “shopfronts” are generated by the platform 
using a consistent user interface. In contrast to prior research where auction sites took possession 
of merchandise (Elmaghraby et al. 2018; Pilehvar et al. 2017), the auction platform here only 
hosts and manages the auction process. 
 Neither the platform nor the bidder determines what goes into a pallet, and the platform 




contains a bundle of products that are typically of the same category (e.g. mobile phones, 
laptops), but not necessarily identical. More importantly, neither the platform nor the seller is 
required to or expected to invest any effort in restoring any of the technology items on sale to 
factory conditions. While such practices may exist in the B2C context, the current lens through 
which retailers view the B2B secondary market is that such efforts are generally not worthwhile 
for their bottom line. Bidders are not able to physically inspect the pallets in advance and have to 
rely on whatever information is disclosed on the auction site as well as relevant information 
gleaned from the primary market.  
In the specific case of mobile phones, pallets are typically formed of devices that are of 
the same operating system, brand, and generation (for instance, Android, Samsung, Galaxy) with 
occasional exceptions. Since I focus on iPhones, pallets in this case are typically formed of a 
number of iPhones of the same generation (iPhone 4 or iPhone 5), but with varying feature sets. 
However, all phones in a pallet typically are either unlocked or locked to a particular carrier, in 
order to facilitate easy processing of the merchandise for the retailer as well as the bidder.6 This 
sorting is carried out at the retailer’s site, and is part of the pallet preparation process agreed 
upon between the platform and retailer firms.  
While the general template of auction information is similar across different retailer sites, 
and information pertaining to the contents of the pallet7 is often included in the auction 
information, the specific information attributes shown can vary from one auction to another 
based upon what the retailer provides. Table 2.1 illustrates several examples of auctions and their 
                                                
6 Occasionally, pallets can include mixed-generation devices, as opposed to pallets with only one generation of 
products. For example, a pallet may contain a combination of iPhone 4 and iPhone 6 models. In most cases, retailers 
would keep pallets limited to a specific generation of iPhones (for instance, only unlocked iPhone 7 models). Within 
these pallets, the individual physical conditions of the devices may vary, as would their storage capacities.  
7	 Pallet information listed on the auction page may include product type, model, memory size, carrier, 




associated information content. In the data set, I observe product type, units and condition of the 
devices present in all auctions; the carrier of the devices is available in 70% of auctions, and the 
locked/unlocked status of the devices is available in 16% of the auctions. Figure 2.2.A illustrates 
an auction listings sample where none of the auctions disclose the locked/unlocked status of the 
auctions, whereas Figure 2.2.B displays an example auction page where the locked status of the 
phone is provided. 
All auctions use the second-price auction format, where winners pay the second-highest 
bid plus a bid increment (Pilehvar et al. 2017). To prevent sniping, the platform automatically 
extends the auction’s end time if they receive a last-minute bid, i.e., popcorn bidding rule. 
Bidders register separately for each retailer site, with no restrictions on cross-participation. The 
specific details of the dataset used for the analyses are described next. 
2.4. Data and Methodology 
I use a proprietary dataset obtained from the research site described above. I focus on pallets of 
pre-used iPhones that include devices of a single generation so as to minimize extraneous 
variation in the pallets and concentrate on the specific effects of interest around locked and 
unlocked pallets. These devices can vary in terms of their physical conditions, which are 
captured in broad terms and a relatively coarse scale. All iPhones in such pallets are either 
locked to a specific carrier or unlocked, with no mixed pallets. However, there is variation across 
pallets in terms of the physical condition of the phones and other attributes such as memory size 
and carrier. I only use pallets containing iPhone 4 and iPhone 5 models (separately) in the 
analyses for reasons pertaining to policy changes in the primary market described below.  
I have data on a sample of 8,179 unique auctions for iPhones across the time period 




unique bidders. For each auction, I collect information pertaining to the retailer, the number of 
units in each pallet, the starting and final prices of the auction, the number of bidders, and the 
date and time of the auction. Additional information on the products in the pallet is available on 
the auction listing, such as the physical condition of the devices, their models and storage 
capacities, and the network carrier. The sample includes phones from four carriers: Verizon, 
AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint. The largest number of pallets is from Verizon (39.61%) with the 
other three carriers making up the remainder. All four carriers are also associated with locked 
and unlocked device pallets in the sample. Since my interest is in evaluating the implications of 
Verizon’s new policy on unlocked versus locked devices, I describe the sample through this 
variable in some detail.  
The sample consists of auctions where the locked or unlocked status of the devices in the 
pallet is disclosed by the retailer, as well as auctions where this information is simply not 
disclosed. When the status is disclosed, all phones in a pallet are either unlocked or locked with 
respect to a particular carrier, as mentioned earlier. However, in the majority of the cases, no 
information on this status is provided: 6,907 auctions do not provide any information on whether 
the devices are locked or unlocked, while the remaining 1,272 auctions provide this information. 
The distribution of the pallets across these three conditions (no information, locked, unlocked) in 
the sample is depicted in Figure 2.3 for clarity. The omission of status information in the auction 
listing could either be a result of retailers simply not having that information easily available, or 
a conscious choice to withhold the information. However, this propensity to not disclose is 
observable across all carriers as well as both generations of iPhones in the sample. All four 
carriers are also associated with locked and unlocked device pallets in the sample. While I cannot 




since the identification is provided by the external policy change enacted by Verizon, as 
discussed later in this section.   
The unit of analysis here is the auction, while the dependent variable of interest is the 
auction final price, normalized by the number of devices in the pallet, i.e. final price per unit, 
consistent with prior research (Pilehvar et al. 2017; Elmaghraby et al. 2018). The main 
independent variable is the status of the pallet, which can take the value of locked, unlocked, or 
undisclosed. The average final price per device in the sample is $116.01, with standard deviation 
of $68.80. The distribution of auction final prices in the sample is positively skewed. Therefore, I 
take the natural logarithm of final price to symmetrize the residuals. A description of the all the 
variables in the dataset is shown in Table 2.2, while summary statistics and correlation tables are 
provided in the Appendix (Tables A2.1–A2.3). 
Since my goal is to understand the extent to which adverse selection costs are present in 
this context with respect to the locked/unlocked status of the devices, a simple comparison of 
final prices across the three types of pallets (locked, unlocked, no information) could be carried 
out. However, the results I obtain from a simple comparison are likely biased since I cannot fully 
account for unobservable factors that may drive the presence of locked or unlocked (or 
undisclosed) pallets in the market. Therefore, from an identification perspective, I require an 
exogenous shock that removes the influence of any strategic decisions by the retailers with 
respect to the locked/unlocked status of pallets on auction. Such an exogenous shock is provided 
by the policy change implemented by Verizon discussed earlier. Thus, in addition to representing 
the core of my theoretical argument for the beneficial effects of primary market policies on 
secondary market efficiency, this policy change also provides me with a clean identification 




provided or not, the policy change significantly reduces the uncertainty faced by buyers for all 
Verizon iPhone 5 models, compared to devices sold by other carriers, ceteris paribus. Since the 
policy change occurs with iPhone 5 phones, I restrict the dataset to two specific iPhone 
generations (iPhone 4 and iPhone 5) that span the exogenous policy change. In the case of 
iPhone 4, all four carriers carried and sold both locked and unlocked phones. I capitalize on this 
policy change to construct the analyses in stages, as described below.  
2.5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
Recall that I aim to answer two empirical questions – whether adverse selection costs with 
respect to jail-breaking-to-unlock exist, and the impact of the policy change in reducing these 
costs. I present models to test the two empirical questions in order below.  
2.5.1. The Presence of Adverse Selection Costs 
Before I establish the positive effects of Verizon’s policy change, I first test for the presence of 
adverse selection costs in the sample. I do this in two ways – first, I compare pallets where 
information is disclosed to those where no information is provided. Second, I compare across 
(disclosed) locked and unlocked pallets. My intuition is as follows: when no information on the 
status of the pallet is provided, the bidder faces greater uncertainty surrounding the phones and 
their status (locked or unlocked), since some proportion of the phones could easily be jailbroken. 
If the pallet is unlocked, here again, this source of uncertainty concerning jailbreaking-to-unlock 
the phone remains. It is only in locked pallets that no residual concerns about jailbreaking-to-
open exist, all else being equal. Thus, I would expect pallets where no information is provided to 
generate lower prices, all else being equal, compared to those pallets where some information is 




where jailbreaking-to-open can exist, I expect lower prices for unlocked pallets. I thus proceed 
with the analysis along these two lines of reasoning.  
 To estimate the effect of lack of information about the pallets, I propose the following 
model, to be estimated on the full sample of 8,179 auctions: 
                   𝑙𝑛 (𝐹𝑃!") = 𝜆! + 𝜆!𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑!" + 𝜆!𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙!!" + 𝜆!𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛!" + 𝜗𝑋!" + 𝜏! + 𝜋! + 𝜂!"   (1) 
In equation (1), ln (FPij) is the natural log of the final price per unit of auction i of seller j. 
The main independent variable is Undisclosedij, indicating whether the status of the devices is 
provided. I do not differentiate here between locked and unlocked pallets; I differentiate between 
those that have information from those that are unspecified, in the interest of interpretation.8 The 
variable Model5ij is 1 if the pallet contains iPhone 5 models, 0 otherwise, in order to capture 
premiums attached to iPhone 5 models, relative to iPhone 4 models. I also include a dummy 
variable Verizonij to designate pallets offered by Verizon. I include Xij as a vector of control 
variables. To account for the unobserved heterogeneity among sellers, I include seller fixed 
effects (𝜋!). I also control for seasonality by including time fixed effects in the model (𝜏!). 
Finally, 𝜖!" are independent and identically distributed random errors.  
I use OLS to estimate this model shown in equation (1). To account for the possible issue 
of heteroscedasticity, I run a Breusch-Pagan test and find it to reject the hypothesis that errors are 
homoscedastic across auctions (p-value < 0.001). I accordingly use heteroscedastic-robust 
standard errors clustered at the auction level (Angrist and Pischke 2008), which allows for 
heteroscedastic errors across auctions. I also test for multicollinearity in my models by 
calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF). None of the variables has a VIF greater than 10 
(Petter et al. 2007), indicating no serious multicollinearity (Mason and Perrault, 1991; O’Brien, 
                                                
8 In unreported regressions, I have separated the auctions into all three cases (open, close, undisclosed) with fully 




2007). The results, shown in Column 1 of Table 2.3, show a negative and significant coefficient 
of the undisclosed variable (–0.70, p<0.05). Final prices are thus lower when no information is 
disclosed in the auction, consistent with the presence of adverse selection costs, since providing 
no information enhances the perception of risk and reduces prices.9 
I now consider the effect of locked versus unlocked pallets. I use a similar regression 
model, estimated only on 1,272 auctions where locked/unlocked status is provided: 
ln (𝐹𝑃!") = 𝛿! + 𝛿!𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑 + 𝛿!𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛!" + 𝛿!𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙!!" + 𝛾𝑋!" + 𝛼! +  𝜆! + 𝜖!"  (2)                
In equation (2), Lockedij indicates whether the devices are locked to a certain network. Similar to 
equation (1), I add a variable Verizonij to denote Verizon pallets.10 I include 𝑋!" as a vector of 
control variables and use time and seller fixed effects (𝛼!and 𝜆!). The econometric specification 
is identical to that shown in equation (1). The OLS results are shown in Columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 2.4 for iPhone 4 and iPhone 5 models respectively. Since I only want to demonstrate the 
presence of adverse selection costs here, I focus on iPhone 4 models only (In the next section, I 
expand my analysis to include iPhone 5 models and Verizon’s policy change). As shown in 
Column 1, the results show that unlocked devices are priced lower (1.33, p<0.05), since they 
incorporate the risk of jailbreaking-to-open. Interestingly, final prices here are markedly different 
from those in the primary market where unlocked phones are more expensive. I see no premium 
attached to Verizon iPhone 4 models, relative to the other carriers. Consistent with prior work, I 
see significant effects of the number of units in the pallet and the number of bidders in the 
auction (Elmaghraby et al. 2018). The model fit is high, with a R-squared value of 0.77.   
                                                
9 I also conducted a Heckman two-stage analysis to account for the endogeneity of the Undisclosed variable. The 
first stage was instrumented for by the total number of auctions initiated by the retailer in that week. The variable 
measures how busy the retailer was in terms of disposing merchandise into the secondary market, capturing the 
extent to which they may be willing to provide detailed information about pallets. The results are fully consistent 
with those reported here and are available upon request from the authors.  




In summary, I provide evidence for adverse selection costs, which affect auctions for 
pallets of unlocked phones where no information is provided. I now consider the impact of the 
Verizon policy change. 
2.5.2. The Impact of Verizon’s Policy Change on Adverse Selection Costs 
In studying the effects of the policy change, I return to equation (1), where undisclosed pallets 
are compared to those where information is provided. As per the new policy, all Verizon iPhone 
5 devices are factory-unlocked, thereby eliminating an important reason to jailbreak them. 
Therefore, post-policy change, for B2B buyers considering Verizon iPhone 5 pallets, lack of 
disclosure should have no effect on bidders’ willingness-to-pay, thereby reducing the discounting 
of prices associated with unlocked phones. As a result, the final prices for Verizon iPhone 5 
pallets should be higher than final prices for unlocked iPhone 5 pallets offered by other carriers, 
which should continue to see some price discounting since jailbreaking-to-unlock continues to be 
a risk. The policy change allows the identification of information disclosure on final prices by 
exogenously reducing information asymmetry in the market for Verizon iPhone 5 devices.  
 To test this, I introduce an interaction term between Modelij, Verizonij, and Undisclosedi 
to the specification in equation (1). This provides a way to establish how prices for Verizon 
iPhone 5 pallets may deviate from the norm, consistent with differences-in-differences models 
(Bertrand et al. 2004). Since the regression includes a three-way interaction, I include all two-
way interactions in the model, with the results shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.3. In 
Column 2, the two-way interactions show a consistent effect associated with lack of disclosure; 
the net effect of lack of disclosure on final prices is negative. Since my main interest is in the 





To understand the effect of the new policy on Verizon iPhone 5 pallets, I look at the 
three-way interaction in Column 3. This three-way interaction is part of the “cube view” of eight 
possible cells that exist when interpreting three-way interactions of categorical or dummy 
variables (Aral et al. 2012); here, I am interested in the coordinates (1,1,1), which maps to the set 
{Verizon, iPhone5, undisclosed}. Paradoxically, this three-way interaction is negative (–0.458, 
p<0.05), showing that prices are lower when no information is provided. To calculate the true 
marginal effect of the Undisclosed variable here, I contrast predicted prices across different sets 
of relevant iPhones pallets here. Using the coefficients from Column 3, I see the predicted price 
for a Verizon iPhone 5 device, where information is disclosed, is $163, while a comparable 
Verizon iPhone 5 device where no information is provided is $134. This $29 difference in final 
prices is counter-intuitive, since disclosing the status of the phones has no diagnostic value. 
These results are also shown in diagrammatic form in Figure 2.4.  
A possible explanation for this counter-intuitive finding could be that bidders are not 
fully aware that Verizon iPhone 5 devices are factory-unlocked. If so, this effect may fade over 
time through information diffusion or observed behavior on the auction platform. I therefore 
examine final prices over time to examine this possibility. I split the sample into a Verizon 
(2,818 auctions), and non-Verizon subsample (5,361 auctions). Further, to see if bidding 
behavior changes over time, I divide these subsamples into two periods of two years each. 
Within each subsample, I interact the Undisclosed variable with Model 5 to examine price trends 
for iPhone 5 models when no information is provided. The results are shown in Table 2.5, with 
the first two columns for Verizon and the remaining for non-Verizon carriers.  
The results in Column 1 for Verizon in 2014-2015 show the counter-intuitive negative 




device from Verizon causes the predicted price to significantly increase from $152 to $181 (a 
difference of $29, statistically significant). However, in the second time-span of 2016-2017, this 
negative coefficient loses significance entirely, showing that bidders bid similarly for iPhone 5 
models whether or not their status is disclosed. The effect size in this time-period is roughly $8 
($127 to $135) and not significant. In contrast, the results for the non-Verizon carriers retain the 
negative interactions, in significance and magnitude (Columns 3 and 4). The difference in 
predicted prices per unit in 2014-2015 is $23 and remains roughly equivalent in 2016-2017 
($20). These results show that bidders learn about the Verizon iPhone 5 policy change, and its 
implications, over time and respond as expected. 
I now consider the policy’s effect in the sample where the status of the devices is 
provided, using equation (2). Recall that Column 1 in Table 2.4 showed the effect of the locked 
status for iPhone 4 models – I augment this analysis with results for iPhone 5 models across all 
carriers. All Verizon iPhone 5 devices are factory-unlocked while other carriers produce a mix of 
locked and unlocked devices. Given the high proportion of Verizon pallets in the sample, I 
would expect the marginal effect of the Locked variable to change. As expected, the results in 
Column 2 of Table 2.4 now show higher final prices for unlocked devices (1.28, p<0.05). I also 
observe a small but significant premium for Verizon iPhone 5 pallets (0.12, p<0.05). To further 
establish this difference, I estimate the same regression model with only non-Verizon iPhone 5 
pallets, in Column 3. As expected, the original positive marginal effect for locked phones re-
emerges (1.167, p<0.05), supporting the thesis that lower valuations for unlocked pallets reflect 
the uncertainty associated with jailbreaking-to-unlock.  
Since the policy change generates unlocked devices without compromising the integrity 




adverse selection costs are mitigated specifically for Verizon iPhone 5 pallets. I therefore 
consider a subsample of only unlocked devices across both iPhone 4 and iPhone 5 generations 
(N=910), and add an interaction term between Verizonij and Model5ij. These results are shown in 
Table 2.4 in Columns 4 and 5. As shown in Column 5, the interaction between Verizon and 
Model 5 is positive and significant (1.55, p<0.05). In terms of predicted prices, the difference 
between Verizon and non-Verizon iPhone 4 models is small at $5 ($48 versus $43, respectively). 
This difference, however, is significantly higher with iPhone 5 models, at $66 ($164 versus $98). 
While a portion of this premium can be associated with the Verizon brand, the remainder of the 
price difference can be attributed to the reduction in uncertainty for Verizon iPhone 5 models. 
This finding further reinforces my argument that new policies from the primary market could 
reduce adverse selection costs for unlocked phones in the secondary market.   
The positive implications of the policy change can be shown graphically as well by 
plotting the predicted final prices using the coefficients reported in Table 2.4. Figure 2.5 shows 
Verizon unlocked iPhone 4 devices to have approximately similar values to those of the other 
carriers, prior to the new policy. However, after the policy change, the value of Verizon iPhone 5 
phones increases considerably, relative to similar unlocked iPhones from the other carriers. This 
positive effect of Verizon’s iPhone 5 on final prices can thus be attributed to reducing the 
adverse selection costs pertained to unlocked phones. The predicted price of an unlocked iPhone 
5 sold by non-Verizon carriers is $75.2, while the price of a locked iPhone 5 devices from the 
same carriers is higher at $107.8. At the same time, the predicted price for an unlocked Verizon 
iPhone 5 is $141.2, representing a $66 price difference. This price differential is approximately 




The value of the policy change in the primary market can be gleaned by this difference in prices 
for unlocked Verizon iPhone 5 models versus similar non-Verizon models. 
2.5.3. Placebo Tests For Falsification 
The analysis reported above relies on the exogeneity of Verizon’s policy change, and changes in 
the associated risks of jail-breaking-to-unlock. Therefore, I consider Verizon Model 5 phones to 
be “treated”, with the “control” sample composed either of Verizon Model 4 phones or all 
phones offered by the three other firms. The observed effects of the Undisclosed variable in 
Table 2.3 and the Locked and Model 5 variables in Table 2.4 therefore form the core of my 
analysis. However, it is possible that I capture spurious correlations here that are not linked to the 
Verizon policy change per se but represent other unobservable factors (Bertrand et al. 2004). To 
test for these spurious correlations, I conduct a set of placebo tests to examine how robust the 
estimated treatment effects are with respect to the results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, specifically with 
respect to the Undisclosed, Locked and Model 5 variables. 
 I follow prior work (Burtch et al. 2018) in conducting the placebo tests through random 
implementation of the treatment variable. I start with the estimates shown in Table 2.3, Column 
1, where the estimates of Undisclosed on final prices are shown for the full sample. I then 
generate a set of new pseudo-treatments by randomly assigning the Undisclosed status to 
auctions within the sample of 8179 auctions, but retaining the ratio of treated to untreated 
(control) observations. By definition, these new random treatments should be unrelated to final 
prices. The results from this analysis are shown in Table 2.6, Column 1. As expected, the 
coefficient of the placebo variable Undisclosed_Rand is insignificant. I repeat this random 
assignment process 1000 times and store the estimated beta coefficients for the Undisclosed 




coefficients estimated is close to zero, with standard deviation of 0.016, relative to the coefficient 
estimated originally (–0.707, p<0.01). Subsequently, all interaction terms with this randomly 
generated treatment variable are also insignificant and close to zero. This placebo test allows me 
to establish some robustness for the estimated effect of lack of disclosure on final prices. 
 I now focus on the results in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4, which show the variation in 
the effect of the Locked variable across locked and unlocked phones within Models 4 and 5 
respectively. The differences in the coefficients was attributed to the fact that Model 5 Verizon 
phones were less risky since they were all factory-unlocked. I apply the same placebo analysis by 
randomizing the Locked variable, with the results shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.6. As 
expected, both coefficients are close to zero. The plots of the estimated coefficients, in Figures 
2.7 and 2.8, also show no systematic effect. I thus conclude that the coefficients estimated in the 
original analyses were not based on spurious correlations or other unobservable factors. 
 I finally consider the results in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.4, where I showed that 
unlocked Verizon iPhone 5 models enjoy a premium due to the change in Verizon’s policy. 
Thus, the focal result here is the interaction term between Verizon and Model 5 variables (0.155, 
p<0.01). As a placebo test, I randomly generate values of the Model 5 variable, and include this 
variable as well as interaction with Verizon in the regression. The results are shown in Columns 
4 and 5 of Table 2.6 - both the direct effect of Model 5 and the interaction term are insignificant 
and close to zero. The plots of the coefficients of the interaction term across 1000 random draws, 
shown in Figure 2.9, also show no significant effect. In summary, the placebo tests across the 
important specifications in my analysis provide clear support for the fact that the Verizon policy 




2.5.4. Robustness Checks: Bidder-Level Analysis 
The results reported thus far are centered at the auction-level, but do not provide visibility into 
bidder-level behavior. As robustness, I consider bidder-level analysis; I study bidders who bid 
for both disclosed and undisclosed iPhone pallets within the same time-period and contrast their 
bidding behavior across these pallets. Bidder-level analysis helps dispel concerns about bidder 
self-selection and unobservable biases (bidders choosing to participate in only disclosed or only 
undisclosed auctions) while accounting for bidder idiosyncratic behavior that is not fully 
observable in auction-level analysis. I first identify bidders who issued a bid on comparable 
auctions within the same calendar month, i.e. bidders who participate in auctions where the pallet 
status (locked or unlocked) is disclosed as well as those where this information is omitted. 
Intuitively, this resembles a quasi-experimental setup where the same bidder’s behavior is 
observed across pallet types. To simplify the analysis, I consider three periods where the sample 
of bidders identified in this manner is large enough for statistical analysis: January, May, and 
November 2016. Across these months, I have 8,912 observed bids by bidders across auctions. If 
a bidder submitted multiple bids in a single auction, I only include the last submitted bid 
reflecting maximum willingness-to-pay. I include control variables that are similar to those used 
in equations (1) and (2) as well as bidder fixed effects and a variable that indicates the order of 
each submitted bid within an auction, to capture potential order effects (Pilehvar et al. 2017). 
Finally, to capture time trends, I separately estimate models for each of the three months, to 
examine the effects of information diffusion. The dependent variable is the natural log of the 
value of each submitted bid; I estimate an OLS regression. 
 I separate the analyses for Verizon (Table 2.7) and non-Verizon carriers (Table 2.8), to 




remaining three columns provide month-wise results. A three-way interaction for Verizon (non-
Verizon) iPhone 5 models is included, as before. Across both tables, I see the negative effect of 
non-disclosure of status information, as expected. Interestingly, the three-way interaction 
showing the specific impact of the Verizon policy change is significant and negative, but smaller 
in magnitude for the Verizon analysis (-0.533, p<0.05) than the non-Verizon analysis (-0.993, 
p<0.05). As before, the Verizon results are counter-intuitive, since providing this information is 
non-diagnostic given the new policy. However, when I consider the three months separately, this 
effect for Verizon auctions fades away; in November 2016, the interaction term is largely 
negligible indicating that information about the policy change has diffused completely. However, 
the effect remains in place for non-Verizon auctions, suggesting that the adverse effects of lack 
of information remains in place. Effectively, individual bids across Verizon and non-Verizon 
iPhone 5 pallets clearly diverge over time as information about the policy change diffuses within 
the community, as shown in Figure 2.10. These results provide additional support for the 
beneficial effects of primary market policies in reducing adverse selection costs, but at the bidder 
level. 
2.6. Conclusion and Implications 
Secondary markets are a significant station in the lifespan of electronic equipment – they are 
instrumental in putting durable products into their second life as well as reducing e-waste 
(Thibodeau 2013). However, these markets suffer from adverse selection, i.e. residual 
uncertainty about the quality and functionality of the products that are sold there. Resolving 
these uncertainties has often needed mechanisms at the point of sale, such as guarantees, 
warranties, and certifications. However, there is an alternate way in which adverse selection can 




definition, primary and secondary markets for durable goods are linked (Guide et al. 2003). 
These links can be used to incentivize manufacturers and retailers of technology products into 
consider adopting policies in the primary markets that can continue to benefit the secondary 
markets. In this essay, I provide an example of such a salubrious effect by showing how a policy 
change in the primary market for iPhone devices by Verizon reduces adverse selection in 
secondary market, by reducing the uncertainty associated with jailbreaking-to-open. Adverse 
selection costs reduce significantly for iPhone devices in their aftermarket as a result of 
Verizon’s policy change, consistent with prior theory in information asymmetry in durable 
products (Dewan and Hsu 2004, Ghose 2009).  
The analysis allows me to estimate the extent to which adverse selection may be 
mitigated, based on the specific iPhones market I study. In 2014, the unit price for a used 
Verizon unlocked 16 GB iPhone 5 was approximately $200 in the B2C secondary market.11 In 
my models, the predicted price for a similar device in the B2B secondary market to be $141. 
These devices are factory-unlocked, and hence devoid of risk due to jailbreaking-to-unlock. It is 
reasonable for B2B prices to be lower than those in the B2C market, so as to allow B2B buyers 
to generate margins. The comparable iPhone 5 predictive price from non-Verizon carriers in my 
model, where factory-unlocking is not guaranteed, is $75. The price differential of roughly $66 
($141 versus $75) represents an indirect measure of adverse selection costs borne by sellers.  
Beyond these costs, it is also evident from my analysis that B2B buyers continue to leave 
value on the table. In 2013, 11.2% of the phones in the US were jailbroken; since this figure 
includes all phones, it serves as a conservative estimate of the proportion of a pallet of unlocked 
phones that may have been jailbroken. The average cost to repair an iPhone is approximately 
$89, including, for example, battery replacement and fixing screen responsiveness that are 





common device performance issues that could result from jailbreaking.12 Therefore, when faced 
with a pallet of unlocked devices and rounding up this proportion of jailbreaking to 15%, a 
reasonable reduction in willingness-to-pay for a pallet of such devices should reflect this partial 
discounting (price reduction proportional to 15% of pallet size x $89 in repairs). However, 
bidders systematically underbid by $66 per unit, thereby over-estimating the risk of jailbreaking 
and creating inefficiencies in the market.  
Do bidders who actual win pallets realize that they may be underbidding for pallets by 
overestimating the risks of jailbreaking? Possibly, bidders who win unlocked iPhone 4 or non-
Verizon iPhone 5 pallets can examine the actual pallet and re-evaluate their bidding strategy. I 
run some model-free analysis to consider this possibility. I consider bidders who bid in both 
locked and unlocked auctions and have won pallets in unlocked auctions, leading to a relatively 
small sample. I correlate their average bidder willingness-to-pay against the number of times 
they won in locked or unlocked auctions, excluding Verizon iPhone 5 auctions where there is no 
risk of tampering. I find that the average price (bid) for locked phones is relatively steady over 
time. In contrast, bidders who win multiple unlocked phones tend to submit higher bids over 
time. This upward trajectory of bids may potentially be explained by bidders initially 
overestimating the potential losses associated with jailbroken phones but learning over time by 
winning. In my rough analyses, I find that bidders tend to bid higher for unlocked phones after 
their fourth win. These analyses are available upon request. I leave a more rigorous examination 
of these dynamics from winning auctions on adverse selection to future research.  
While it is plausible that Verizon’s policy change was done without much consideration 
of its (shown) salubrious effects on secondary market valuations, the primary message of this 
essay – namely, the interconnectedness of primary and secondary markets and the ability of 





changes in the primary market to positively impact secondary market prices in the presence of 
adverse selection concerns – is strategically acted upon in a wide range of industry settings. For 
example, the diamond industry has adopted blockchain certification in the primary market in the 
hopes of providing valuable information to customers regarding the product’s origin, thereby 
positively influencing resale values further downstream (Sumkin et al. 2020). The blockchain 
certification acts as a “single, tamper-proof digital record for diamonds” (Krawitz 2019) to 
ameliorate concerns surrounding ‘blood diamonds’ and other unconscionable supply chain 
practices. Within the IT industry more specifically, hardware producers are often concerned with 
the risks of malicious circuitry (hardware Trojans) in chip design. To counter these risks, and 
enhance the current as well as future performance of the hardware (and as a result, their future 
resale value), chip designers have explored a range of methods to identify ‘backdoor’ entry 
points and fortify them from attack.13 These initiatives in the primary market help enhance resale 
in the secondary markets by ruling out the possibility for tampering.  
While the above examples describe situations where steps have already been taken to 
tamper-proof products in the primary market, thereby helping in the secondary market, I believe 
there are many opportunities where more can be done. As the need to reduce the environmental 
effects of e-waste becomes more pressing, it will be necessary to consider strategies that help 
keep older technologies around for longer than otherwise expected. Interestingly, even 
governments are participating in these efforts; the French Government, for instance, is requiring 
technology makers like Apple and Microsoft to provide a “repairability score” for products that 
can then be used to extend the life of these products (Beres 2021). Similarly, Google is 
implementing the notion of “circularity” in their servers and devices, ensuring that these used 
technologies can re-enter the secondary market with adequate quality and performance 





assurances.14 These initiatives are designed to ensure that secondary markets for these products 
have more complete information so as to enhance their efficiency. These links between primary 
and secondary markets can thus be used to enhance value in both markets – my work here 
provides evidence for such an effect but within the context of jailbreaking of iPhones. 
This essay is subject to certain limitations. First, while I theorize about jailbreaking-to-
unlock, I do not directly observe phones that are jailbroken. Nevertheless, the changes in prices I 
observe from the exogenous policy change across multiple analyses are fully consistent with 
expectations of jailbreaking. Second, strategic decisions by sellers could play a role in the prices 
I observe. However, I do not have the visibility into seller data to identify why they choose to 
auction locked versus unlocked phone pallets. Third, I study iPhones, arguably the most well-
specified mobile device in the IT industry. Although other brands (e.g. Samsung) may be 
perceived differently by bidders, I believe that my work provides some directions to how firm 
policies in the primary market could lead address adverse selection in the B2B secondary market. 
There are several managerial implications that emerge from this essay. For policy-makers 
considering sustainable reverse logistics programs in the IT industry, I show the value of 
forward-looking policies that can benefit both primary and secondary markets. For carriers like 
T-Mobile and AT&T that sell locked and unlocked devices, it is useful to consider the 
downstream implications of factory unlocking as they design strategies in the primary market 
(Lee and Whang 2002; Guide and Li 2010). For secondary market auctioneers, I show that 
withholding information, whether intentionally or by omission, has a negative effect on prices. I 
quantify such adverse selection costs that are borne by sellers in the market. Knowing these costs 
is useful since it places an upper bound on how much sellers may be willing to invest in 
remedying this quality uncertainty, in terms of investing in “factory-unlocking” devices before 





placing them on the auction site. As mobile devices become increasingly more durable, they 
remain longer in circulation (Pilehvar et al. 2017), making the efficient functioning of secondary 
markets a desirable objective. From a market efficiency perspective, this essay thus calls for a 













Chapter 3: Impressionable or Immune? On Examining The Influence of 
Marquee Sellers in B2B Secondary Market Platforms for IT Products 
3.1. Introduction 
“The participation of “marquee users” can be especially important for attracting participants to the 
other side of the network.” 
(Eisenmann et al. 2006, p6) 
 
“The basic strategy for credibility building is to attract a marquee platform contributor.” 
(Edelman 2015, p7) 
 
Double-sided digital platforms are increasingly ubiquitous in the economy today, giving rise to a 
body of literature enhancing our understanding of how they operate, and the drivers of 
performance (Eisenmann et al. 2011, Farrell and Klemperer 2007, Rochet and Tirole 2003, 
Wilbur 2008, Evans 2009). The influence of network effects, and their implications for switching 
costs and pricing continue to be highly relevant within much of this work (Zhu et al. 2019). 
However, there are specific aspects on competitive behavior on platforms discussed in the 
theoretical or managerial literature that remain relatively untested empirically. Amongst these, 
one recurring theme pertains to building same-side and cross-side networks through the 
acquisition of marquee players (Eisenmann et al. 2006, Edelman 2015). Stated plainly, platform 
owners can benefit by attracting high-visibility, high-quality sellers or buyers, since they increase 
same-side participation on the platform while also attracting greater cross-side participation 
through network effects. However, the economic impact of adding marquee sellers or buyers to 
the platform has not been clearly established – I address this particular gap in this essay. 
Specifically, I study how the addition of a marquee seller on a two-sided platform affects prices 




The impact of adding sellers to a platform has been shown to reduce prices on average on 
platforms (Wright 2004, Chandra and Collard-Wexler 2009, Zhu et al. 2019) through the 
increase in competition and the associated increase in supply. New entry of sellers can also 
kickstart negative same-side network effects, leading to lower prices, to the point where sellers 
potentially leave the market entirely (Rochet and Tirole 2003, Caillaud and Jullien 2003, Chen 
and Tse 2008). However, the addition of a marquee seller may spur different dynamics on the 
platform. First, marquee sellers may better attract users (or consumers) on the cross-side of the 
platform, thereby offsetting the increase in supply, and reducing the extent to which prices fall 
on the platform (Eisenmann et al. 2006). Second, absent any price externality effects, they may 
attract additional high-quality sellers to the platform who, by offering higher-quality products 
that command a higher price, increase the average price of a product sold on the platform. 
Finally, in the presence of price externality effects, they may induce higher valuations for 
products sold on the platform by virtue of reference price effects, since they provide a new set of 
price and quality anchors for users on the platform (Monroe 1973, Rao and Monroa 1989). That 
is, all else equal, marquee sellers may raise prices for other sellers on the platform, thus 
increasing value for platform owners.  
 In this essay, I argue and show that prices faced by other sellers increase for similar 
products after the entry of a highly visible marquee seller who commands high prices for its 
products. While supply does increase upon entry, I do not observe a concurrent increase in the 
number of buyers associated with the observed higher prices. Similarly, I do not observe new 
sellers entering the platform either. Thus, through a series of tests, I show that the effect of the 




suggesting that beyond network effects, it is important to consider how price anchors and 
reference prices are also influential in platform settings.   
 I locate this study of marquee sellers in the context of business-to-business (B2B) 
secondary market auctions for IT products, specifically mobile devices. The B2B secondary 
market is one form of secondary markets in which pallets of equipment are sold to pre-registered 
business buyers through an online auction portal. These markets process the resale of products 
that have passed through the primary market in some form, either as customer returns, unsold 
inventory, or from buyback programs where old devices are turned in for discounts on newer 
devices (Lee and Whang 2002, Tibben-Lembke 2004, Elmaghraby et al. 2018). For this essay, I 
use data from a leading online intermediary platform that specializes in running online auctions 
for big-box retailers, thereby allowing them to liquidate their excess inventory through 
independent and specifically created retailer storefronts. In this context, the research site is the 
platform provider, connecting big-box retailers on the one side, to B2B buyers/bidders on the 
other side. These B2B bidders are themselves resellers, including flea market operators and 
independent stores that vary in bidding activity and purchase volumes. Consistent with the 
literature, the platform provider has worked towards adding more retailers to the platform, since 
this encourages growth on the buyer side (Eisenmann et al. 2006, Bakos and Katsamakas 2008). 
The addition of one such marquee retailer forms the basis of this study. 
Specifically, I exploit the exogenous entry of AT&T, a marquee seller in the mobile 
industry, to the platform as a seller of iPhone devices, to study prices obtained by other sellers of 
comparable products. I focus on auctioned pallets of iPhone mobile devices in the analysis. The 
sample contains auction data of iPhone pallets spanning the period from January 2014 to July 




contains data of 21,284 bids in 3,605 unique auctions and includes 1,241 unique B2B bidders. As 
a starting point, I first establish that the prices obtained by AT&T’s pallets, all else equal, are 
higher than those obtained by others, thereby indicating that there is a premium attached to the 
retailer. Subsequently, I consider prices for other sellers of mobile phone pallets, using a 
differences-in-differences approach, and see clear evidence of reference price effects, i.e. the 
higher prices associated with comparable AT&T auctions act as price anchors and lead to 
increased prices for other sellers post-entry.  
Beyond this direct effect, I also consider heterogeneity in terms of where and how these 
reference price effects manifest. Specifically, I consider two moderating influences. First, I 
consider the role of multi-homing bidders, i.e. those bidders who bid for pallets in multiple 
retailer storefronts versus those who participate in only one particular retailer’s site. Prior 
research shows that multi-homing consumers manifest different behavior relative to single-
homers (Gabszewicz and Wauthy 2004, Landsman and Stremersch 2011). Relative to single-
homers, multi-homers are exposed to a wider range of prices on the platform, and therefore the 
addition of a single new price anchor, even from a marquee seller, may have a smaller or no 
effect. Second, I consider the impact of involvement on multi-homers (Petty and Cacioppo 1979), 
i.e. when multi-homing bidders bid on AT&T auctions. Prior work argues that involvement with 
a task can reduce the extent to which the new anchor is assimilated. Therefore, bidders who 
actively bid across multiple retailer storefronts, including AT&T auctions, may not be as readily 
influenced by AT&T’s prices. I see clear evidence for the moderating role of involved multi-
homing in the analysis.  
 This essay contributes to the literature in multiple ways. First and foremost, I address the 




focus here on the cross-side price effects of such sellers. Using a reference prices framework, I 
show how marquee sellers can affect prices, while controlling for increased supply and demand. 
Second, I highlight the role of multi-homing and involvement, in terms of their moderating 
effects. The results go beyond the implications of adding users per se in two-sided platforms. I 
show that adding new sellers to the platform can have more nuanced effects on prices obtained 
on the platform.  
This essay also contributes, albeit not directly, to research on secondary markets for 
durable IT products (Elmaghraby et al. 2018). Secondary markets for IT products are important 
from a societal perspective since they help reduce e-waste (Tibben-Lembke 2004), direct supply 
of durable computing equipment to lesser-served parts of the economy, and help extract greater 
value from functional and usable IT equipment. 
3.2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
This essay is positioned at the intersection of three streams of research. The first stream studies 
online two-sided platform markets while the second pertains to research studying the effects of 
reference prices on consumers’ willingness to pay. The third stream focuses on how involvement 
affects bidder behavior. I review these streams of work next. 
3.2.1. Two-Sided Platforms and Marquee Participants  
Two-sided platforms involve two distinct types of users, each of whom obtains value from 
interacting with users of the opposite type (Rochet and Tirole 2003, Parker and Van Alstyne 
2005). In recent years, a significant body of literature has sought to understand the strategies 
required for digital platforms to scale and compete, including studying optimal pricing strategies 




interactions among competing platforms (Koh and Fichman 2014, Niculescu et al. 2018, Song et 
al. 2018), matching efficiency between buyers and sellers (Hong and Pavlou 2017), multi-
homing across competing platforms (Rochet and Tirole 2003, Eisenmann et al. 2006, Li and Zhu 
2019), platforms’ investment decisions (Anderson et al. 2014), and competition with new 
entrants to a platform (Wright 2004, Chandra and Collard-Wexler 2009, Zhu et al. 2019).  
 One factor that has often been suggested to allow a platform to gain traction has pertained 
to the presence of so-called marquee participants. The effect of marquee participants is based on 
the observation that “all users of two-sided networks are not created equal. The participation of 
“marquee users” can be especially important for attracting participants to the other side of the 
network”, (Eisenmann et al. 2006, p6). More recently, Edelman (2015) argues that the presence 
of a marquee seller signals credibility to buyers, thereby enhancing cross-side effects. To the 
extent that a marquee seller could be convinced to exclusively operate on the platform, the 
platform would benefit but would need to compensate the seller for any losses of revenues from 
joining other platforms. Thus, the platform’s value from a marquee seller is more nuanced, since 
the benefits in terms of cross-side effects may not outweigh the costs of compensating the seller.  
 How does the presence of a marquee seller influence prices and buyer behavior on the 
cross-side? This remains relatively under-explored in the research literature. Prior work has 
argued that the addition of any sellers on the platform can induce, through same-side effects, 
greater supply on the seller side (Zhang et al. 2020), which tends to reduce average prices 
(Chandra and Collard-Wexler 2009). Through cross-side effects, adding sellers to the platform 
can attract more buyers, but the presence of lower transaction costs and low switching costs 
within the platform environment can reduce prices. Thus, the entry of new sellers and the 




Tirole 2003, Caillaud and Jullien 2003, Chen and Tse 2008). When a marquee seller joins, the 
positive network effects kick in across the platform, since this signals credibility and makes the 
platform more appealing to buyers (Edelman 2015).  
However, beyond new buyers entering the platform and changing demand, I argue that 
the higher prices that marquee players are likely to generate can have yet another effect on other 
sellers in the short term. An immediate effect of a marquee player’s entry pertains to the 
consequence of the marquee’s new (higher) price on the market at large. On platforms where 
there is considerable uncertainty about the underlying product, bidders or buyers are likely to 
condition their valuations on information gleaned from other concurrently sold products 
(Pilehvar et al. 2017). Thus, price information on other comparable products provide external 
information cues and operate as anchors, offering benchmark prices for the focal products 
(McGee and Sawyer 2003, Mazumdar et al. 2005). The marquee seller entering the platform, 
therefore, not only kickstarts positive cross-side network effects in the medium to long-term but 
immediately provides higher price anchors that can influence prices faced by other sellers 
already on the platform through the pathway of reference prices. I briefly describe reference 
prices next. 
3.2.2. Reference Prices and Bidders Heterogeneity 
Reference prices are benchmarks against which the price of a product is judged (Mazumdar et al. 
2005). They may be internal to the individual or externally observed in the broader environment. 
For products of a similar category, externally observed prices provide an alternative standard for 
the price of the product that is rooted in the specific context. Buyers make decisions by 




and Seiders 1998, Kamins et al. 2004, Elmaghraby et al. 2018). External reference prices become 
more influential when uncertainty is more salient (Simonson and Drolet 2004).  
 In the platforms context, auction prices for comparable products that are concurrently on 
sale can provide reasonable external reference prices for the focal product (Pilehvar et al. 2017). 
As marquee sellers often enjoy a price premium on their products, it is reasonable to expect that 
the set of reference prices available to buyers on the platform is likely to be higher. Whether the 
buyer conditions on the average of the comparable prices or the range of prices, I would expect 
the external reference prices to increase, thereby leading to higher prices for other sellers on the 
platform as well (Kamins et al. 2004).  
In the B2B secondary market context where I focus this study, buyers face significant 
uncertainty about the actual contents of the pallets for which they bid (Elmaghraby et al. 2018). 
In the presence of such uncertainty, bidders are more likely to depend on external information 
sources, such as the prices observed across the platform for similar products (McGee and Sawyer 
2003, Pilehvar et al. 2017). In an auction setting, individual bids made by bidders in the presence 
of a marquee seller are therefore expected to be higher than they would be, prior to the entry of 
the marquee seller, since they provide viable price anchors. In the platform I study, I exploit the 
entry of AT&T – a company with a strong brand name in the mobile phone industry. Upon 
joining the platform, AT&T’s auction prices are higher, as expected of marquee sellers with 
significant brands (Rao and Monroa 1989, Teas and Agarwal 2000). As these prices are also 
incorporated into the external reference prices for bidders, other sellers of comparable products 
gain. Therefore, I propose:   
H1. The reference price effect from the entry of AT&T positively impacts prices in other 





While H1 argues for an overall effect of AT&T’s entry at the level of an individual 
product (pallet in this case), I now consider how the marquee seller influences individual bids by 
bidders, in addition to final prices. Bidders on platforms are heterogeneous with respect to their 
multi-homing activity (Koh and Fichman 2004); they vary in terms of the number of individual 
retailer marketplaces in which they are registered. I can thus segment bidders into single-homers, 
i.e., those who operate in one retailer’s marketplace only, and multi-homers, i.e. those who 
participate in multiple retailer marketplaces on the platform. I note that this definition of multi-
homing varies slightly from the one commonly observed in the literature. I refer to multi-homers 
as those who choose to bid in auctions offered on different retailer storefronts, while the 
definition adopted in the literature pertains to users operating on different platforms (Armstrong 
2006, Eisenmann et al. 2006, Landsman and Stremersch 2011). Since each retailer operates 
independently and bidders are expected to register separately for each retailer, I adopt the notion 
of multi-homing, while acknowledging the nuanced differences (Zhu et al. 2019).  
 In this setting, therefore, I define single-homers as B2B bidders who register and 
participate (i.e. bid) in the marketplace operated by a single retailer, i.e. all their bids are issued 
on auctions posted by a single seller (retailer) on the B2B platform. By virtue of registering on a 
seller’s marketplace on the platform, bidders are able to issue bids and receive instant updates 
(via email) about the focal and concurrent auctions (e.g. current prices, number of placed bids) 
offered by that retailer only. As a result, they only observe the price dynamics of various 
auctions in their home marketplace. These single-homers may also passively observe prices in 
other marketplaces in which they are not registered (see Figure 3.1) but do not receive email 




access this information for other marketplaces manually through the typical search processes 
offered by most platforms.15 
Multi-homers, on the other hand, register at and participate (i.e. bid) in more than one 
seller’s marketplace, thereby receiving updates and bid information from each of these individual 
marketplaces. An advantage of multi-homing is that bidders observe a wider range of prices on 
the platform for concurrent and similar products with little incremental effort, and so are more 
aware of prices from multiple sellers’ marketplaces relative to single-homers. Reference price 
effects on individuals exposed to price anchors from multiple marketplaces tend to be aggregate 
effects, which have greater inertia (Rajendran and Tellis 1994). Hence, the marginal impact of 
AT&T’s entry and the higher reference prices observable, would be lower for multi-homers than 
single-homers. Hence, I hypothesize: 
H2. The reference price effect on bidders’ willingness-to-pay is greater for single-homers 
than passive multi-homers. 
3.2.3. Bidders Involvement 
To what extent does bidding on AT&T auctions influence the reference price effects I 
hypothesized about above? I consider this source of heterogeneity here. I classify bidders by 
virtue of their participation in auctions offered by AT&T, and study how they are affected in 
terms of their bids in their home markets. I classify bidders in two categories: The first set of 
bidders never participate (i.e. bid on a pallet) in a single AT&T auction, i.e. they passively 
observe prices from the marquee seller without any further involvement. This category of bidders 
can include both single-homers and multi-homers. The second set of bidders includes multi-
homers who actively participate in AT&T auctions and, thus, are more aware of the prices and 
                                                
15	Individual marketplaces provide general information regarding product offerings and prices to unregistered 




the product types sold by the marquee seller. I refer to the first set of bidders as passive bidders, 
while the second set of bidders are referred to as active bidders. Figure 3.2 illustrates these 
different bidder types in the dataset (Sellers A and B and AT&T).  
 To understand how participation in AT&T auctions may influence how bidders 
incorporate the potential reference prices set by AT&T auctions in the bids submitted in their 
home markets, I invoke prior work in involvement theory (Lee et al. 1999, Chandrashekaran and 
Grewal 2003, Lo et al. 2013). Recall that reference prices represent price anchors for bidders as 
they consider suitable bids for the focal pallet – while these external reference prices are easily 
available, they may not be fully representative of the appropriate value that bidders should 
ascribe to the focal product. In other words, external reference prices may not necessarily 
represent the “true” value for focal product (Nunes and Boatwright 2004). Products sold by 
marquee sellers may include a significant premium for the brand, all else being equal, which 
need not apply to products sold by non-marquee sellers. Involvement in auctions posted by the 
marquee seller can, interestingly, lessen the extent to which these price anchors are influential on 
bidders.  
 Research shows that involvement can positively influence decision makers' susceptibility 
to a variety of common judgment and decision biases (Lee et al. 1999, Chandrashekaran and 
Grewal 2003, Lo et al. 2013). Involvement here is defined as the degree of personal relevance 
arising from the underlying task, such as a purchase decision. Thus, the act of making a 
deliberate purchase decision can induce involvement, which can lead to greater reasoned and 
deliberative decision making and less bias (Petty et al. 1983, Zaichkowsky 1985). Applying this 
logic, I argue that participating (i.e. bidding) in AT&T auctions influences bidders by inducing 




Petty 1979, Richins et al. 1992, Meyers-Levy and Peracchio 1996). Those who do not participate 
in these auctions are more likely to use simple heuristics in applying these price anchors in their 
home markets, leading to a more pronounced reference price effect (Chandrasekaran and Grewal 
2003).  
High-involvement (also referred to as involved) individuals, on the other hand, scrutinize 
the information and process central aspects of the price anchors more diligently, specifically 
evaluating how and why reference prices may vary from their own willingness to pay and bids. 
In contrast, uninvolved individuals tend to process the same information less rigorously, 
depending upon superficial aspects, e.g. the mere presence of a reference price and other 
contextual and semantic cues (Chandrashekaran and Grewal 2003). These active bidders are 
more likely to evoke central processing and to scrutinize the reference prices from AT&T 
auctions, making them less susceptible to the reference price effects. Furthermore, I expect that 
this scrutiny applied to references prices will grow in discernment over time, as these bidders 
continue to remain active. I thus hypothesize: 
H3A. The reference price effect on bidders’ willingness-to-pay is greater for passive 
bidders, relative to active bidders. 
H3B. The reference price effect on willingness-to-pay is mitigated sooner for active 
bidders, relative to passive bidders. 
3.3. Research Context 
This essay is set in the B2B liquidation market auctions for pallets of mobile devices, specifically 
iPhone models. The research site is a leading online intermediary platform effectively acts as a 
market-maker, hosting a platform on which big-box retailers create their own independent 
auction markets to liquidate their excess inventory. In contrast to prior research in secondary 




site only hosts and manages the auction process. Retailers who operate on the auction platform 
create their own virtual “shopfronts” where the auctions are hosted. Each pallet contains a bundle 
of products that are typically of the same category (e.g. mobile phones, laptops, etc.), but not 
necessarily identical. Depending on the retailer, the pallet composition can vary with respect to 
the category and number of items included. Neither the research site nor the bidder determines 
what goes into a pallet. Retailers typically form the pallets and list them online for an auction as 
rapidly as possible, so as liquidate their excess inventory as soon as possible (Pilehvar et al 
2017). 
In the specific case of mobile phones, pallets are typically formed of devices that are of 
the same operating system, brand, and generation (for instance, Android, Samsung, Galaxy) with 
occasional exceptions. Since I focus on iPhones, pallets are typically formed of a number of 
iPhones of the same generation (e.g. iPhone 6 or iPhone 7), but with varying feature sets.  
In order to maintain a consistent look and feel for the platform’s bidders, the auction site, 
i.e., the shopfront, for different retailers are generated using a consistent user interface. While the 
information is provided similarly across different retailers’ sites, information attributes may vary 
from one auction to another based on the information available to the retailer. All auctions use 
the second-price auction format, where winners pay the second-highest bid plus a bid increment 
(Pilehvar et al. 2017). To prevent sniping, the platform automatically extends the end time of the 
auction if they receive a last-minute bid, i.e. popcorn bidding rule. All bidders are business 
buyers who must pass through a separate registration process for each auction site in which they 
wish to bid, while staying on the same underlying platform. They can register across multiple 
retailer sites; no restrictions are placed on their bidding activities therein. Furthermore, the 




quantity; hence, there should be no effect on final prices or the decision to bid with respect to 
reserve prices. This also indicates that supply on the platform is completely exogenous. 
In order to ensure some homogeneity as well as retain parsimony in the analysis, I study 
the two largest independent sellers on the platform in which all multi-homers in the sample have 
participated; Seller A and Seller B (I do not disclose names on request from the research site). 
Focusing on two of the largest retailers, outside of the marquee seller (AT&T), allows me to 
measure multi-homing behavior more accurately. While there are more sellers on the platform, 
they rarely offer pallets of iPhones, compared to Sellers A and B. In the time-period of the study, 
over 85% of the iPhone pallets offered on the platform came from these two retailers, while other 
retailers made up the remaining collectively. Therefore, I focus my attention on Sellers A and B, 
in addition to AT&T as the marquee seller. In robustness tests reported later, I expand the 
analysis to all retailers, with no substantive change in the results. The specific details of the 
dataset used for the analyses are described next. 
3.4. Data and Methodology 
I use a proprietary dataset obtained through a formal research collaboration with the platform 
provider. I focus only on pure pallets of iPhones so as to minimize extraneous variation in the 
pallets and concentrate on the specific effects of interest around the entry of AT&T. The pallets 
typically carry one specific generation of iPhone devices, although individual models can vary. 
However, there is variation across pallets in terms of the physical condition of the phones, 
generation, and other attributes of the devices (such as memory size and carrier). This 
information is provided, albeit in a condensed and non-specific manner, in the auction page for 




the bidder to evaluate the value of the pallet and bid accordingly. It is here that external price 
anchors are influential.  
My dataset includes 21,284 bids issued in 3,605 unique auctions for iPhones pallets 
across the time period January 2014 to July 2017. As mentioned earlier, these auctions are hosted 
by two retailers, Sellers A and B, with each retailer hosting its own shopfront on the platform, 
and include 1,241 unique bidders.16 For each auction, I collect information pertaining to the 
retailer offering the pallet, the number of units in each pallet, the final price of the auction, the 
number of bidders who participated in the auction, and the date and time of the auction. 
Additional information on the products in the pallet included physical condition of the devices, 
device models and memory sizes, and the network carrier associated with the device. A 
description of the variables in the dataset as well as summary statistics and correlation tables are 
provided in the Appendix in Tables A3.1–A3.4. 
My identification strategy is offered by the exogenous entry of AT&T as the marquee 
seller to the platform. The platform introduced AT&T as a new seller in January 2017 and started 
hosting auctions for AT&T iPhone pallets. Auction final prices for AT&T pallets were clearly 
higher than observed on the platform for the two other retailers, as would be expected by virtue 
of AT&T’s marquee status. Since my focus is not on AT&T auctions, but prices obtained for 
auctions offered by Sellers A and B, for these retailers, the entry of AT&T can clearly be viewed 
as exogenous (entry of retailers on the platform site is the result of private negotiations between 
the interested parties and is typically not revealed to other sellers). Therefore, in the analysis, I 
                                                
16	The original sample contains eight different sellers, excluding AT&T. I elect to include two sellers only for the 
following reasons. First, Sellers A and B account for the majority of auctions for iPhone devices on the platform, 
i.e., 85% of the auctions. Second, in order to test my hypotheses, the sellers must contain bidders that are both single 
and multi-homers, with a subset of multi-homers being involved in AT&T auctions. Sellers A and B provide me 
with this requirement, whereas the other sellers have inconsistency with respect to single and multi-homers, i.e., one 




restrict the sample only to Sellers A and B auctions, while excluding AT&T auctions. I conduct 
the analysis in stages, as described below.  
As a first step, I aim to address the baseline research question – does the entry of AT&T 
lead to higher prices for comparable Sellers A and B auctions, all else being equal? Recall that in 
this analysis, I control for same-side network effects, since there are no other new retailers 
joining the platform as a seller during my observation window. I use the auction as the unit of 
analysis here, while the dependent variable of interest is the auction final price, normalized by 
the number of devices in the pallet, i.e., final price per unit, consistent with prior work (Pilehvar 
et al. 2017, Elmaghraby et al. 2018). The main independent variable is the entry of AT&T, 
captured as a binary variable. The average final price per unit in the sample is $175 (sd = $125). 
The average pallet has 73 devices (sd = 125) suggesting significant variation in the number of 
devices across pallets.  
 After I establish the baseline results, I then move to testing my hypotheses pertaining to 
how individual bidders may response to the marquee seller. These analyses are performed at the 
bid-level for individual bidders. The bid-level analysis quantifies the difference in the magnitude 
of the effects among different populations of bidders based on their multi-homing and 
participation activities, thereby addressing H2 and H3. The dependent variable is the value of 
each bidder’s final submitted bid in an auction. The main independent variables are whether a 
bidder is single-homer or multi-homer, and whether s/he is an active or passive bidder. Recall 
that I define active bidders as multi-homers that participate in AT&T auctions. The total number 
of single-homers in the sample is 530, while multi-homers number 711.17 Of these multi-homers, 
115 have participated in AT&T auctions and are classified as active bidders (Figure 3.3). To 
                                                
17	In order to maintain a clear distinction between single- and multi-homers, I remove six bidders from the sample 
who changed their status from single-homers to multi-homers after the entry of AT&T. As a robustness check, I run 




further establish that these bidders continue to bid on AT&T’s site, i.e., to ensure their active 
status, I track their bid activity on AT&T auctions for the seven months post-entry in my 
observation period. The proportion of bidders who remain active by bidding in auctions on a 
monthly basis on AT&T’s site remains high (approximately 80%), as shown in Figure A3.1 in 
the Appendix. All active bidders continue to bid on AT&T auctions for multiple months after 
their first observed bid, thereby ensuring their involvement with the AT&T marketplace.18 
Although excluded from the sample, AT&T initiated 946 unique auctions in the period from 
January to July of 2017, i.e., an average of 135 auctions per month. 
I first start with some model-free evidence to examine how final prices behave for iPhone 
pallets, before and after AT&T’s entry. Figure 3.4 shows average final prices per unit in Sellers 
A and B marketplaces, and as is evident, there is a clear uptick in average prices that result from 
AT&T’s entry. Figure 3.5 further shows differences in average prices between single- and multi-
homers. I see that the difference in average prices between single- and multi-homers is small in 
the period before AT&T’s entry. Post-entry, however, there exists a clear difference in average 
prices with single-homers showing relatively higher average prices. Recall that in auctions, the 
final prices are a function of bidder willingness to pay, so these prices reflect underlying 
valuations of individual bidders. Both graphs provide evidence indicating that the differences in 
final prices are not random but likely associated with the exogenous entry of the marquee seller. 
In the next section, I delve into more formal econometric models to examine these effects. 
                                                
18	There may be cases where bidders register with AT&T on the platform but never issue a bid. I, however, do not 
have visibility into such data and therefore classify these bidders as passive. In robustness tests described later, I 





3.5. Results and Discussion 
3.5.1. Baseline Results 
I start with proposing an econometric model to capture the effect of AT&T’s entry on prices 
obtained by Sellers A and B on the platform, at the auction level. I model the final prices per 
unit, with the auction as the unit of analysis, as shown below: 
                                             𝐹𝑃!" = 𝛿! + 𝛿!𝐴𝑡𝑡_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦!" + 𝛾𝑋!" + 𝛼! +  𝜆! + 𝜖!"                                 (1) 
In equation (1), FPij is the final price per unit of auction i in marketplace j, j={A,B}. The 
main independent variable is Att_entry, and is a dummy variable representing the period after the 
entry of AT&T. I also include 𝑋!" as a vector of control variables such as the number of bidders 
in the auction, number of iPhones (units) in the pallet, the physical condition, generation, carrier 
and memory capacity of the phones. To account for the possible unobserved heterogeneity 
among sellers, I include marketplace fixed effects (𝜆!). I also control for seasonality by including 
time fixed effects in the model (𝛼!). Finally, 𝜖!" are independent and identically distributed 
random errors. I would expect that the coefficient of Att_entry is positive and significant, 
showing that there is a systematic increase in average prices post-entry. These results are shown 
in Table 3.1.  
Column 1 of Table 3.1 shows that there is indeed a positive effect on final prices obtained 
after the entry of AT&T to the platform (33.63, p<0.01). Post-entry, final prices in both Sellers A 
and B auctions increased, on average, by $33.6 per unit, ceteris paribus. To establish this as 
being a result of the reference price effect, I need to rule out the possible confounding effects of 
changing supply of pallets in the two marketplaces, i.e., are there fewer or more pallets listed on 
the platform by Seller A or B as a result of AT&T’s entry? In addition, the entry of a new seller 




network, resulting in a possible demand increase on the platform. The increase in the number of 
bidders on the platform could further lead to a rise in within-auction competition among bidders, 
resulting in higher auction prices. I test for these confounding effects below. 
First, I consider the effects of changing supply offered by Sellers A and B on the 
platform. I compare the monthly supply of pallets for 7 months prior to the entry of AT&T to 
supply in the 7 months post-entry. On average, the monthly supply pre-entry was 140 pallets 
while post-entry was roughly 190, across both retailers. I run an ANOVA, where the dependent 
variable is the monthly supply for each firm while the independent variable is the AT&T entry 
dummy variable. The analysis shows that the differences in the pre- and post-entry period are 
marginally significant (p=0.07), with post-entry supply being higher than pre-entry. Thus, the 
marginally higher supply of pallets, when combined with the increased supply from AT&T, 
should reduce prices (Bapna et al. 2009, Pilehvar et al. 2017) rather than increase prices.   
I now consider the possibility of new bidders joining the platform. The total number of 
unique bidders who bid on auctions hosted by Sellers A and B on the platform before and after 
AT&T’s entry does not change significantly, i.e., there are 486 unique bidders in the 7-month 
pre-entry period, and 435 unique bidders in the 7-month post period, of which 89.7% 
participated in the 7-month pre entry period. Furthermore, I consider the ratio of supply to 
demand on the platform for Sellers A and B iPhone pallets before and after entry. Supply here is 
the number of pallets while demand is the total number of unique participating bidders on these 
auctions. While there are many buyers registered on the platform, I am most interested in those 
buyers who actively pursue iPhone pallets. In the 7 months prior to entry, the supply to demand 
ratio is 66.7 while the post-entry period ratio is 75.4. This increase is due to the increased 




given the increased supply relative to demand, I would expect final prices to reduce and not 
increase, as observed in simultaneous auctions (Pilehvar et al. 2017, Bapna et al. 2009).  
I further run two separate regressions to assess whether there is increased competition 
within an auction post-entry that may drive prices up. Within-auction competitive dynamics have 
been observed to increase willingness to pay in experimental settings (Haubl and Popkowski 
Leszczyc 2019). I first examine if there is a difference in the number of bidders per auction 
before and after entry. In column 1 of Table 3.2, the dependent variable is the number of bidders 
issuing bids in an auction, where the auction is the unit of analysis. The results show that, on 
average, the number of bidders in an auction marginally decreased post AT&T’s entry (–0.842, 
p<0.1). The decrease in the number of bidders is consistent with increased supply of pallets, 
which leads to fewer bids per auction (Bapna et al. 2009, Pilehvar et al. 2017) and is typically 
associated with lower final prices (Pilehvar et al. 2017) rather than higher final prices I observe 
here.  In column (2), I test for whether the number of submitted bids, rather than bidders, has 
changed in the period post-entry, reflecting an increase in the within-auction competition among 
bidders which may induce bidders to bid multiple times in an auction. Thus, the dependent 
variable is the number of submitted bids in an auction. As evident, the number of submitted bids 
does not change after AT&T’s entry (1.586, ns), indicating no systematic differences in 
competitive intensity within an auction that affect final prices.  
Furthermore, I look at how bidders may change their bidding behavior post-entry by 
plotting when they submit a bid. The timing of bids in an auction can influence willingness to 
pay by arousing competitive instincts in bidders, especially when bids are compressed in time 
(Adam et al. 2015, Haubl and Popkowski Leszczyc 2019). Alternatively called “auction fever”, 




respond quickly. I plot bid timing on Sellers A and B auctions before and after AT&T’s entry to 
see if there are any systematic changes in this competitive intensity. Figure 3.6 shows the 
proportion of issued bids, on average, through the three-day period of the typical auction. I see 
bidders tend to bid heavily in the first day, and then again on the third day. More to the point, 
these trends are similar before and after AT&T’s entry. I also consider bidding behavior on the 
third day to look for changes in sniping behavior, as shown in Figure 3.7 and see no differences 
in the rate at which bids are issued. In summary, these analyses show no systematic and 
significant differences in supply, demand, or within-auction competition, supporting my thesis 
that the increased willingness to pay is associated with reference price effects from AT&T.  
 I finally consider the impact of AT&T’s entry on individual bidders, rather than at the 
auction level. If the reference price argument holds true, then these effects should be manifest in 
individual bids, which in turn leads to the increase in auction final prices. I thus examine how 
AT&T’s entry impacts individual bidders’ willingness-to-pay. To accommodate bidder-level 
variation, I include two additional control variables here. First, I include a variable to capture the 
order of the submitted bid, i.e., whether the bid was the first, second, and so on, in the auction. 
Arguably, later bids in the auction are likely to be higher in value (Pilehvar et al. 2017). Second, 
I include a dummy variable capturing whether the bidder is a single-homer or a multi-homer, as 
described in the previous section. I also include bidder-specific fixed effects to capture individual 
heterogeneity across bidders. These results are shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.1, which 
show a positive effect on bidders’ willingness-to-pay after the entry of AT&T, adding robustness 




3.5.2. Bidder Heterogeneity – Multihoming and Active Bidders 
I now turn to testing the effects of multi-homing and involvement, pertaining to H2 and H3. 
Recall that single-homers and multi-homers are based on whether bidders are observed to 
participate only in their home markets versus multiple markets. Therefore, I divide bidders based 
on their observed behavior prior to the entry of AT&T. Similarly, active bidders are those multi-
homers who bid in AT&T auctions post-entry, while passive bidders do not bid in AT&T 
auctions. To understand the effect of reference prices from AT&T on these bidders, I conduct 
subsample analyses for single- and multi-homers as well as active and passive bidders so as to 
ease interpretation of the results. I adopt a difference in difference specification (Bertrand et al. 
2004), as shown below: 
             𝐵𝑖𝑑!"# = 𝜆! 𝐴𝑡𝑡_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦!"# + 𝜆! 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒_ℎ!"# + 𝜆! 𝐴𝑡𝑡_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦!"#× 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒_ℎ!"# + 𝜗𝑋!"# +
                                                                     𝛼! +  𝜏! + 𝜋! + 𝜂!"#                                                                    (2A)      
𝐵𝑖𝑑!"# = 𝛿! 𝐴𝑡𝑡_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦!"# + 𝛿! 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒!"# + 𝛿! 𝐴𝑡𝑡_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦!"#× 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒!"# + 𝜃𝑋!"# + 𝛼! +
                                                                      𝜏! + 𝜋! + 𝜂!"#                                                                             (2B) 
 
For this analysis, I use the full sample of 21,284 individual bids. In Equation (2), the 
dependent variable Bidsijk is the highest bid submitted by bidder i in auction j at marketplace k 
(i.e., home market). The independent variable Att_entryijk indicates the period after AT&T’s 
entry. My main interest is in the interaction between AT&T’s entry and bidder status as single-
homers or active bidders, respectively. To simplify the interpretation of the findings, however, I 
run separate regressions for each population of bidders. I include 𝑋!"# as a vector of control 
variables. I also use individual-bidder and marketplace fixed effects to account for the possible 
unobserved heterogeneity (𝛼! and 𝜋!), and time fixed effects to account for seasonality (𝜏!).  The 




As shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.3, the coefficient of Att_entry is positive and 
significant for both single- and multi-homers (33.74 and 22.60, p<0.01), indicating that AT&T’s 
entry has impacted the bidding behavior of both populations of bidders. However, the magnitude 
of the effects varies, with the reference price effect on single-homers being greater than that on 
multi-homers. As argued earlier, this difference in willingness-to-pay may be attributed to the 
fact that multi-homers observe a wider range of price anchors on the platform, since they operate 
on multiple retailer sites. Thus, I receive support for H2. 
To create a clearer distinction between both populations, I further examine the 
differences between active and passive bidders, shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.3. The 
marginal effect of AT&T’s entry on willingness-to-pay is higher for passive than active bidders 
(25.61 and 14.17, p<0.01). This difference in magnitude indicates that involvement in AT&T 
auctions moderates the reference price effect obtained after AT&T’s entry to the platform, 
thereby showing support for H3A. Since passive bidders may be single-homers or multi-homers, 
the results in Column 3 show a slight difference in willingness-to-pay between single-homers 
and passive multi-homers (2.713, p<0.05), with single-homers bidding higher. This difference is 
consistent with the broader result showing that multi-homers are less influenced by reference 
prices from the marquee seller, all else being equal (Rajendran and Tellis 1994).  
While I see that active bidders are less influenced, on average, by prices observed on 
AT&T auctions, I test for whether there is a decay in the reference price across active and 
passive bidders. For this analysis, I only consider the period after AT&T’s entry (7 months). To 
examine the monthly change in bids, I include a linear spline, with the knot of the spline set at 
the point when AT&T entered the platform (Greenwood et al. 2017). The spline (Time), captures 




linear spline shows a small and marginally significant decay over time for passive bidders (-
1.886, p<0.10). The interaction term for single-homers is not significant, showing no discernible 
difference between single-homers and multi-homers within the passive set of bidders. In other 
words, I see no evidence of a significant downward trend in bids by passive bidders post-entry of 
AT&T.  
In contrast, Column 3 of Table 3.4 shows the effect of the spline for active bidders, i.e., 
those bidders who compete for pallets offered by the marquee seller. Arguably, these bidders 
should see a significant decay in their bids since their continuing involvement over time reduces 
the reference price effect. As evident, the coefficient of the spline is significant and larger in 
magnitude (–6.658, p<0.01). By virtue of participating in AT&T auctions, active bidders are 
more likely to evoke central processing and to scrutinize the prices from AT&T auctions more 
deliberatively, making them less susceptible to the reference price effect over time. In other 
words, the reference price effect on willingness-to-pay depletes through bidders’ involvement. 
It is worth asking if prices on AT&T auctions also experience the same level of decay as 
seen in the case of active bidders – if so, it could be argued that active bidders are still influenced 
by these decaying AT&T prices and that the reference price effect remains intact. I therefore 
conduct a similar analysis but only for AT&T auctions. These results, shown in Column 4 of 
Table 3.4, show a very small decay in bids for AT&T auctions (–0.835, p<0.1), indicating that 
the price premium for the marquee seller remains largely in place. In Column 5 of Table 3.4, I 
consider only the bids on AT&T auctions issued by active bidders, i.e., those who actively bid on 
AT&T as well as Seller A/Seller B auctions – these bids do not experience a significant decay 
over time (–1.103, p<0.1). Thus, while competing in AT&T auctions require higher bids to 




pre-entry levels, thereby mitigating the reference price effects in their home markets. In 
summary, I see support for Hypotheses 3A and 3B. 
3.5.3 Robustness checks 
In this section, I report the results of additional robustness tests that were conducted to establish 
the validity of the results reported above. First, I examine whether there exist differences 
between active bidders who bid in AT&T auctions and those that actually win AT&T auctions. 
Prior work suggests that win experience matters in auctions (Wilcox 2000). Therefore, I check if 
the lower willingness-to-pay in active bidders manifested in the previous results is associated 
with winning and not just participating. In Table 3.5, I use two groups of active bidders. The first 
group contains bidders who won at least one AT&T auction in the first two months after 
AT&T’s entry. The second group contains bidders who never won an AT&T auction up until the 
last month in the data set. I then study the period in between, i.e., from March to June of 2017 
(T= 4 months), to examine any differences in their bidding behavior.  
The results in Column 1 show a small but significant difference in willingness-to-pay (at 
home) between active bidders who win AT&T auctions and those who bid but did not win (–
3.633, p<0.05). Consistent with prior literature, bidders tend to change their behavior after 
winning an auction (Elmaghraby et al. 2018). However, the interaction with the linear spline, 
shown in Column 2, indicates no significant difference in the decay of willingness-to-pay 
between the two groups over time. The results show that the decay in willingness to pay, 
representing the effects of reference prices, is not conditioned on active bidders winning AT&T 
auctions per se.  
I note that in the prior analyses, I defined a bidder as active if they submit a bid in an 




of the bidders labeled as active officially registered and joined AT&T’s marketplace later during 
my observation window (in the third month post-entry, for instance). In such cases, these bidders 
would start off as passive and then transition to active during the observation window. In this 
robustness test, I modify the definition of active bidders as follows – I change the status of a 
bidder to active only after their first bid is observed on AT&T auctions, post-entry. Fortunately, 
this set of bidders who change status is small: 21 bidders change their status during and after the 
second month post-entry. These bidders issued a total of 67 bids in their home markets in the 
period after AT&T entered the platform, but before they bid on their first AT&T auction. I 
aggregate the bids across the passive and active bids from Table 3.4 (4278 + 868 individual bids) 
and estimate a model where active bidders are defined based on this new definition. 
 As shown in Table 3.6, the results corroborate those observed earlier. Active bidders 
issue lower bids in their home markets relative to passive bidders (–13.79, p<0.01). Active 
bidders also reduce their bids faster than passive bidders, as shown by the interaction with the 
linear spline (–6.773, p<0.01). This finding further supports the proposed underlying mechanism 
that involved bidders tend to scrutinize the reference prices from AT&T auctions, rendering them 
less susceptible to the reference price effects. 
3.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Two-sided platforms are prominent in today’s economy, and have generated consistent interest 
in the IS literature for several reasons. Platforms play a significant role throughout the economy, 
as they minimize transactions costs between market sides. They also appear to be one of the most 
powerful business models in the digital economy due to their adaptability to business needs, 
rapid scale-up, and value capture. Airbnb, eBay, Uber, and Google are remarkable success 




valuations. Scholars have shown significant interests by studying multiple factors that impact 
prices on two-sided platforms, including competition with network effects and switching costs 
(Rochet and Tirole 2003, Eisenmann et al. 2011), optimal business models (Parker et al. 2017, 
Tian et al. 2018), interactions among competing platforms (Koh and Fichman 2014, Niculescu et 
al. 2018, Song et al. 2018), and competition with new entrants to a platform (Wright 2004, 
Chandra and Collard-Wexler 2009, Zhu et al. 2019).  
In this essay, I investigate how the entry of a new seller with a marquee brand name 
could impact prices of other sellers for comparable products on the platform. I study this 
question in the context of B2B secondary market auction platforms for IT products, specifically 
mobile devices. I am able to observe the exogenous addition of a high-visibility and high-quality 
marquee seller to the platform and evaluate its effects on other sellers in the platform. In 
particular, I exploit the exogenous entry of AT&T, a marquee seller, on the platform as a seller 
of iPhone devices, and study how this entry affects prices obtained by other sellers. The use of 
proprietary data, combined with an identification strategy made possible by the entry of AT&T, 
allows me to provide clear evidence for how reference prices and the level of bidder-involvement 
could influence bidders’ willingness to pay in two-sided platforms. 
This essay is subject to certain limitations. First, I conjecture that the underlying 
difference in the magnitude of the effects between single- and multi-homers is due to the amount 
of price information bidders observe on the platform. However, due to the available data in the 
market, I cannot directly measure how much information bidders are observing on the platform. 
Second, I do not have the visibility into seller data in the subsequent resale market to understand 
how demand in the B2C market could impact their willingness-to-pay in the B2B auctions. 




active bidders by definition since they receive all auction information and price dynamics vis-à-
vis AT&T auctions. However, I do not have visibility into such data and, therefore, cannot move 
these bidders from the passive to active group, if they exist. I hope to address these limitations in 
future work, potentially through field experiments. 
This essay contributes to the literature in multiple ways. First, I extend the literature 
studying the two-sided platform models (Armstrong 2002, Rochet & Tirole 2003, Parker and 
Van Alstyne 2005). By relying on reference prices theory, I show that the entry of marquee 
sellers can positively impact prices of other sellers for comparable products on the platform. I 
argue and provide evidence that bidders on the platform view AT&T prices as new external 
anchors that positively impact their willingness-to-pay, resulting in higher auction prices on the 
platform. I also show that the price effects resulting from the entry of AT&T vary based upon 
bidders multi-homing activity on the platform. Relying on involvement theory, I further show 
that by virtue of participating in AT&T’s auctions, i.e., the source of the effect, bidders are 
relatively less prone to the reference price effects. The literature on platforms has argued for the 
effects of network effects in terms of bringing consumers and sellers to the platform, but there is 
little work considering the role of price dynamics on the platform as a result of reference prices. 
Beyond network effects resulting for the addition of new users to one side of the 
platform, this essay extends this literature by showing that the value of new users depends on 
their brand quality, which can have a significantly positive impact on prices of other users on the 
platform. The findings can be extended to other industries as well. For instance, in the lodging 
industry sharing economy, Airbnb has officially opened up its platform for hotel distribution by 
allowing hotels to list on its site.19 When a hotel with a marquee brand name lists on the site, 
local or lower quality hosts could view the hotel’s prices as new external anchors on the 





platform. These hosts would potentially increase their prices closer to the new hotel’s prices, 
resulting in an overall price increase on the platform. These dynamics have significant 
implications for both the platform owner as well as other local hotels that may now see 
interesting externalities in their prices from the marquee seller.  
Second, this essay contributes to the context of secondary markets for durable IT 
products (Tibben-Lembke 2004, Elmaghraby et al. 2018). Enhancing the effectiveness of 
secondary markets for these products is desirable since they retain value, but also understanding 
the price dynamics of the B2B market is critical in ensuring the long-run efficiency of secondary 
markets for durable IT products. Furthermore, efficient and viable secondary markets for IT 
products have ecological and market value. From an ecological perspective, E-waste that ends up 
in landfills causes significant environmental damage, which can be avoided by extending the life 
of these products (Elmaghraby et al. 2018). The IT industry is renowned for its ability to 
produce, market and sell IT equipment, which have justifiably led to significant economic value. 
However, the ecological implications of these developments have only started to receive 
attention in recent years (Tibben-Lembke 2004). If the benefits offered by digital platforms can 
help mitigate some of the high transaction costs that exist in secondary markets for IT products, 
the payoff for the environment would be significant. My work contributes by highlighting how 
the recruitment of marquee sellers into the secondary market platform can be used to enhance the 
efficiency of these platforms, thereby helping the environment as well. A deeper dive into the 
link between secondary markets and the environment is out of the scope of this essay, but 
interested readers are referred to the 2019 Sustainability Report issued by the Consumer 
Technology Association. 20 





There are several managerial implications that emerge from this essay as well. For 
secondary market platform providers, I show that the entry of a seller with a “marquee” brand 
name has a positive impact on prices of other sellers on the platform. It is imperative for the 
platform’s provider to understand such price effects to create guidance when targeting new 
sellers to join the platform. In other words, it is essential to understand how the entry of a major 
seller could impact average prices on the entire platform. This essay suggests that platform 
owners should consider and target sellers with marquee brand names as they can result in a 
“sugar rush” for prices of other sellers on the platform. As the overall prices increase on the 
platform, platform owners can benefit by generating higher revenue gains. On the opposite side, 
adding a relatively cheaper seller could negatively pull prices down on the platform. However, 
these effects can also be mitigated over time through the twin forces of involvement and multi-
homing. Therefore, the advice to recruit marquee sellers has to be viewed keeping these 
opposing dynamics in mind. Beyond the network effects per se, intra-platform pricing dynamics 
continue to be challenging for platform owners, since the decentralized model of double-sided 
platforms tend to take many of these decisions away from platform owners. Being aware of these 
dynamics, manifesting through reference prices and their dissipation over time, is critical in 
ensuring that sellers and buyers are appropriately recruited and managed on the platform. I hope 
that this essay sparks off more work on studying pricing dynamics on platforms, in addition to 






Chapter 4: Doubling Down on Cannibalization: The Use of Green 
Nudges in Used Mobile Phone Markets 
4.1. Introduction 
The tension between the primary and secondary markets has been of great interest to both 
researchers and managers in the last two decades. Many scholars have explored the cannibalistic 
impacts of secondary markets on products in the primary markets (Ghose 2006, Chen et al. 
2013). The general consensus is that used product sales cannibalize new product sales and, 
consequently, are harmful to suppliers (Ghose 2005, Atasu et al. 2010). In particular, sellers of 
new products firmly believe that a used or remanufactured version of a product is potentially 
harmful since it cannibalizes market share from new products (Atasu et al. 2010). In the context 
of IT equipment, the literature shows firms or OEMs attempting to limit the impact of the 
secondary market by adopting various mechanisms such as charging high licensing fees or 
buying back their own equipment (Oraiopoulos et al 2012, Li et al. 2019). For example, to 
prevent cannibalization between new and remanufactured/ used products, Apple has 
implemented a disassembly and recycling strategy for used products collected through its reuse/ 
recycling program (Li et al. 2019).  
The average consumer’s desire for new devices with faster and newer state-of-the art 
technology has lead to a continuous expansion of the electronic market for new products and to 
shortened innovation cycles for electronic goods (Mendelson and Pillai 1999). In the context of 
smartphones, the number of used mobile phones is expected to rise in the next couple of years. 
Experts are anticipating that there will be a boost to the secondary market in the next couple of 
years by virtue of the move to the 5G technology as it becomes available in more markets.21 





Consumers then could sell back today’s flagship devices for tomorrow’s 5G enabled devices. 
What then is to become of these older devices? 
Secondary markets exist for products with a lifespan that extends beyond their possession 
by their first user (Lee and Whang 2002, Elmaghraby et al. 2018). The efficient functioning of 
these markets is desirable for several reasons. First, these markets handle products that are 
functional, robust, and can continue to provide value in many contexts (Pilehvar et al. 2017). 
Second, their second life prevents them from ending up in landfills where they can cause 
environmental damage (Tibben-Lembke 2004).  
While secondary markets for IT products exist, they often struggle since they are 
competing with new products in the primary market, as discussed in the literature studying the 
spillovers that exist from secondary markets to primary markets, and vice versa (Ghose et al. 
2005, Oraiopoulos et al. 2012). Despite the negative cannibalization effects presented in prior 
work, other research has argued that the sale of used products, from consumer perspective, 
increases consumer surplus and social welfare (Ghose et al. 2006, Guide et al. 2010). In addition, 
some level of secondary market cannibalization, from ecological perspective, is beneficial in 
preventing IT products from ending up in landfills. E-waste is a health and environmental hazard 
because it contains toxic additives or hazardous substances that, if dumped in landfills, could 
result in negative environmental externalities. Research has shown that extending the lifespan of 
smartphones, for example, by just one year can save as much carbon emissions as taking two 
million cars off the road each year (Middleton 2019). Therefore, every device that can have 
another life means less damage caused to our planet, and a device put in the hands of someone 
who otherwise would simply not be able to afford it (Nair 2020). Hence, are there ways by which 




of corresponding new products, so as to promote social welfare and reduce environmental 
degradation? This is the broad research question I address in this essay. 
In order to first understand how used products may be rendered more attractive to the 
average consumer, I start by considering factors that influence their sale. The literature shows 
that there are different attributes that could impact the sale of secondhand products, such as 
consumer preferences (Kim et al. 2005, Agrawal et al. 2015), quality uncertainty and search 
costs (Tibben-Lembke 2004, Kuruzovich et al. 2008), and prices (Ghose 2009, Elmaghraby et al. 
2018). In the specific context of smartphones, the main attributes that shape consumer purchase 
decision are product features and functions, brand name and loyalty, and social influence 
(Guleria 2015, Rahim et al. 2016, Kim et al. 2020). Other influential factors are related to 
durability, external appearance and intrinsic consumer characteristics. In this essay, I introduce a 
new dimension that may possibly influence consumer decisions and enhance the appeal of used 
smartphones – behavioral interventions that highlight environmental factors associated with used 
smartphones.  
To the extent that durable electronic products in the market still have life and can provide 
perfectly good service, there is potentially value in being able to sell them in a convincing 
manner while highlighting the beneficial values of recycling and the negative effects of e-waste. 
Therefore, the primary research question I study here is – how can IT products in the secondary 
market be made more attractive relative to new products by making e-waste and its effects more 
salient? In other words, within the realm of used smartphones, can sellers enhance the odds that a 
consumer will choose to purchase the used smartphone rather than a new phone by virtue of 




A nudge is generally interpreted as a change in any aspect of the choice architecture that 
alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their economic incentives (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). The concept of nudging has also 
been used in the context of environmental policy, viz., green nudges. A green nudge is a nudge 
that helps reduce environmental negative externalities, without significantly changing economic 
incentives (Carlsson et al. 2019). While the literature has shown how nudges can alter consumer 
behavior in different markets, there is no work that demonstrates whether using behavioral 
interventions (i.e. nudges) can help alter consumer preferences towards lightly used electronics 
in the secondary market, relative to new products. This question has yet to be answered in the 
literature, and its importance lies in the implications and environmental externalities of e-waste 
(Carlsson et al 2019).  
Most green nudges discussed in the literature target the quantity and quality of people’s 
energy consumption, with the goal of energy conservation. In some instances, these nudges have 
proved highly effective relative to alternative mechanisms such as incentives, education 
campaigns, or moral suasion (Schubert 2017). In my context, I examine the efficacy of green 
nudges on products for which consumers may already have specific preferences. Framing the 
choice in this manner, in the presence of a green nudge, may significantly enhance the odds of 
the consumer being willing to purchasing a used phone in lieu of a new phone. In terms of 
devising potential green nudges, I consider sources of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. In terms 
of extrinsic motivation, I consider the impact of conspicuous conservation (Sexton and Sexton 
2014), while for intrinsic motivation, I consider the role of empathy in devising the nudges.  
Conspicuous conservation theory (Sexton and Sexton 2014), related to conspicuous 




concern about environmental protection (external motivation). The theory’s main premise is that 
society awards superior status to those who undertake pro-environmental actions, provided those 
actions are conspicuously visible. Through the demonstration of austerity that minimizes the 
environmental impact of consumption, individuals would gain a social status with respect to 
environmental protection. Hence, I argue that using a nudge that highlights conspicuous 
conservation may lead to an increase in the willingness to purchase a used phone, relative to a 
new phone. 
The second intrinsic mechanism relates to the role of empathy, defined as the presence of 
a prosocial emotion that includes awareness of another’s suffering and affective participation in 
the other’s feelings (Huber and MacDonald 2012). The literature has demonstrated that empathy 
is associated with more sustainable behavior, and individuals with a high level of empathy 
towards a natural object are found to display stronger environmental attitudes and behavior 
(Ericson et al. 2014, Berenguer 2007). Hence, empathy plays an important role in moving 
individuals toward pro-environmental and conservation behavior. It is, therefore, plausible that 
the use of an empathy-evoking nudge in this context could effectively increase consumers’ pro-
environmental behavior, resulting in consumers electing to purchase used technology products 
over new ones for the advocated cause, viz., reducing e-waste. Hence, the use of an empathy-
evoking green nudge would increase the likelihood of a used technology product being 
purchased in the secondary market.  
In order to test for the effectiveness of the two forms of green nudges in terms of 
enhancing the willingness to buy used products, I conduct a set of behavioral experiments where 
consumers are presented with two alternatives – a used phone and a similar new phone, and 




presence of the nudge, as well as price points for the used phone, I am able to identify the 
specific impact of the nudge as well as moderating influences of prices and other individual 
characteristics on the willingness to purchase the used phone versus the new phone. The use of 
experimental techniques allows me to provide causal evidence linking the presence of the nudges 
to the perceptions of individual subjects. 
My analyses provide three main results that are of particular interest to practitioners and 
researchers in secondary markets for IT products. First, I observe that the nudge based on 
conspicuous conservation provides a clear treatment effect on the willingness to buy used 
phones, all else equal. While the baseline willingness to purchase a used phone displays a U-
shaped relationship with price, with low and high prices of the used phone showing higher 
willingness to purchase used phones, the presence of the nudge leads to a clear and significant 
increase in the propensity to purchase used devices across prices.  
Second, the direct effect of empathy is notably absent in terms of enhancing the appeal of 
used phones. This intriguing result is contrary to prior work. However, I note that empathy is 
influential in increasing the willingness to buy in specific subsamples – women and older 
subjects are more likely to respond positively to empathy-based nudges. In interaction analyses, I 
observe that interactions of the treatment with gender and age are significant and positive. The 
interactions with price do not provide any significant results. 
Finally, I conduct a series of post-hoc analyses where I consider the role of the Big Five 
personality traits (Goldberg 1992), in order to examine if these traits may moderate the effects of 
the nudges. Interestingly, I find that specific personality traits do significantly moderate the 
impact of the nudges, suggesting that the efficacy of these nudges are likely to be clearly 




resellers in terms of selecting which nudges to use, the use of latent personality traits are more 
difficult to use by managers in assessing the efficacy of nudges. However, the presence of 
specific heterogeneities associated with traits like Extroversion and Neuroticism suggest the need 
for more work in this area.  
My essay contributes to the literature in multiple ways. First, I contribute to the literature 
studying how used IT products, especially common devices like smartphones, may be retained in 
the marketplace for longer durations by strategically enhancing the potential for cannibalization 
of new products (Ghose et al. 2005, Oraiopoulos et al. 2012). From an ecological perspective, 
keeping used smartphones in circulation keeps them from landfills for a longer time-period, 
while also increasing the general supply of phones that can be used in parts of the world where 
new devices can either not be purchased or supported. To the extent that these devices can be 
kept out of landfills for longer periods of time, the ecological damage done by them is reduced 
while also allowing for newer methods to be developed by which their impact may be 
minimized. In effect, the use of green nudges calls for more obvious cannibalization of new 
products, rather than less, as has been suggested in the literature on secondary markets. The 
implications of my experiments are towards finding strategies to increase social welfare by 
keeping used devices around for longer, while also potentially reducing environmental 
externalities by delaying their eventual disposal into landfills.  
Second, I contribute to the literature studying the use of behavioral interventions, i.e. 
nudges, and its implications on consumer behavior (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). I extend the 
literature by focusing on the implications of green nudges and how they could possibly alter 
consumer preferences in favor of used IT products. More importantly, I provide boundary 




effectively, based on specific attributes of the target audience. Little extant work has studied the 
use of green nudges in the specific context of re-using smartphones, a significant source of e-
waste. This essay addresses this gap in the literature. Furthermore, my results provide direct 
measures by which managers may be able to devise behavioral interventions at scale to make 
used products more attractive, especially when combined with pricing strategies. In the next 
section, I discuss the theoretical arguments underlying green nudges in more detail. 
4.2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
This essay draws from several streams of research. First, I explore the literature studying 
cannibalism in the marketplace. Second, I draw on literature on secondary markets and the 
implications of e-waste. Third, I focus on the literature studying behavioral interventions in the 
form of nudges and their impacts on individual’s behavior. Last, I draw on research studying the 
role of conspicuous conservation (external motivation) and emotion (internal motivation) in 
enhancing individual’s pro-environmental behavior. 
4.2.1 Cannibalization Effect 
Cannibalization is an economic phenomenon that has been of interest for many scholars in the 
past decades. It is defined as a reduction in sales volume, sales revenue, or market share of a 
product after introducing a newer product by the same company (Moorthy and Png 1992). 
Cannibalization effects materialize when a consumer’s interest for a product shifts after an 
alternative product is introduced (Copulsky 1976). They occur from close identification of a new 
product with the launching company’s older products. Scholars have examined the notion of 
cannibalization for a wide variety of products, companies, and industries – e.g., cigarettes 




2006). Cannibalization is usually analyzed in relation to a company’s product (Chandy and Tellis 
1998) or technology innovations (Cravens et al. 2002) – rendering existing products or 
technologies uncompetitive and obsolete (Atasu et al. 2010).  
The notion of cannibalization has occurred within and across both the primary and 
secondary markets. Within the primary market, for instance, scholars have examined 
cannibalization among products within a product line and develop different mechanisms to 
mitigate it (Fruchter et al. 2006). The literature also illustrations that cannibalization occurs when 
a company produces a product with two different qualities and applies price discrimination to 
high and low type consumers (Desai 2001). Recent research further shows how different forms 
of the same product would result in cannibalization. In specific, Lee et al. (2020) provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the economic impacts of eBooks on the existing print book 
channel by studying how the introduction of an eBook cannibalizes the sales of its printed 
version. 
 The cannibalization literature also demonstrates the cannibalization effects between new 
and used products. Scholars have argued that the secondary market creates a substitution effect 
from the fact that new goods face competition from used goods, which results in some new good 
consumers shifting to the used good market (Waldman 1997, Ghose et al. 2005). For example, 
Ghose et al. (2006) study the degree to which used books cannibalize sales of new books. Other 
scholars study different mechanisms and strategies that firms adopt in order to eliminate or limit 
the cannibalistic effects of used products in secondary markets (Oraiopoulos et al. 2012, Li et al. 
2019). The literature also shows that there exists a subtle relationship between consumer 
preferences and the cannibalistic effects of used products (Chen et al. 2013). In specific, when 




eliminate the cannibalization effects. In my context, there are different reasons for why a 
consumer would prefer to purchase a new smartphone from the primary market over used one 
from the secondary market. 
 Secondary markets of electronic goods are characterized by uncertainty about product 
quality (Ghose 2009). Such quality uncertainty can be a hindrance in moving used products to 
the hand of new users. For example, it is reasonable for a person with high willingness to pay to 
elect purchasing a brand new phone while having the option to purchase a similar secondhand 
mobile phone due to their inherent quality uncertainty. Aside from quality uncertainty, 
consumers may choose to buy a new smartphone over a used one from an older generation 
simply for the new features and functions smartphone companies like to bring to market.22 
However, to the extent that smartphones in the market are durable, still have life and can provide 
perfectly good service, there is potentially economic as well as ecological value in being able to 
resell them in the secondary market, while highlighting the beneficial values of recycling and the 
negative externalities of e-waste. 
4.2.2. Secondary Markets and E-waste 
The need to better understand what motivates people to adopt pro-environmental behaviors has 
taken a new urgency with the increasing emphasis on sustainability. Electronic waste (e-waste) – 
defined as all broken, obsolete, or out of fashion products containing a circuit board that reach 
the waste stream – has received limited attention in spite of being the fastest growing segment of 
household waste (Dao et al. 2011, Saphoresa et al. 2012). In 2019, less than 18% of the 53.6 
million metric tons of generated e-waste was recycled, threatening the environment and the well 
being of individuals since it contains toxic additives and hazardous substances (Reuters 2020). 






The exponential growth of e-waste may further be compounded by a reduction of the useful life 
of existing devices driven by the rapid pace of development and release of electronic products 
with new features (Mendelson and Pillai 1999, Saphoresa et al. 2012). From an ecological 
perspective, increasing the lifetime of electronic goods could potentially reduce the amount of e-
waste dumped in landfills today. One economically promising solution is to send these electronic 
secondhand products to the secondary market. 
 In industries composed of products with short life cycles, used or end-of-lease products 
are collected by resellers and distributed in secondary markets either in an as-new condition or 
an as-is condition (Robotis et al. 2005). The literature shows that there are different factors that 
could impact the sale of secondhand products, such as consumer preferences (Cestre and Darmon 
1998, Kim et al. 2005, Agrawal et al. 2015), quality uncertainty and search costs (Tibben-
Lembke 2004, Kuruzovich et al. 2008), and price (Chou et al. 2013, Ghose 2009, Elmaghraby et 
al. 2018). For example, consumers could elect to buy a new model over an older generation of 
used mobile phones merely for the new features they provide (Kim et al. 2005). Furthermore, the 
inherent quality uncertainty of used products could impact the decision of consumers towards 
purchasing new products (Hendel and Lizzeri 1999, Ghose 2009). Nevertheless, prior work has 
also explored the cannibalistic impacts of secondary markets on products in the primary market. 
The literature shows that, from consumer perspective, used products increase consumer surplus 
and social welfare (Ghose et al. 2006, Guide et al. 2010). From retailer perspective, the general 
consensus is that used product sales cannibalize new product sales and, consequently, are 
harmful to suppliers (Ghose et al. 2005). In my context, I argue that some level of secondary 
market cannibalization, from an ecological perspective, is beneficial in increasing the lifetime of 




potential mechanism to induce the sale of used electronics is through the use of behavioral 
interventions, i.e. nudges. 
4.2.3. Nudges and Green Nudges 
Recent years have seen a keen interest in the use of behavioral interventions “nudges” – defined 
as methods that steer people in particular directions, but that also allow them to go their own way 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2008, Thaler 2016, Cadario and Chandon 2020). In daily life, an “app” that 
tells people how many calories they consumed during the previous day is an example of a nudge; 
so is a text message, informing customers that a bill is due or that an appointment is scheduled 
for the next day. In government, nudges span an exceptionally wide range. They include graphic 
warnings for cigarettes (Klein et al. 2017), labels containing information about energy efficiency 
or fuel economy (Brandon et al. 2018), “nutrition facts” panels on food (Cadario and Chandon 
2020), texts and email messages (Yeung and Nguyen-Hoang 2020), and even the design of 
government websites, which list certain items before others and in large fonts (Krug 2014).  
 The IS literature has explored the use of digital interventions, particularly mobile 
messaging, to influence user behavior (Luo et al. 2014, Ghose et al. 2015, Sun et al. 2019). A 
number of studies have examined the moderating effect of user geographic location (Ghose et al. 
2013, Fang et al. 2015), shopping path (Ghose et al. 2015), timing (Luo et al. 2014), and weather 
(Li et al. 2017) on the response of customers to digital messages. This strand of research has 
established the effectiveness of digital messages in influencing user behavior, such as clicking on 
ads (Andrews et al. 2016), purchasing tickets (Luo et al. 2014), and encouraging prosocial 
activities (Sun et al. 2019). In these cases, and many others, nudges work by altering the “choice 




 The concept of nudging has also been found in the realm of environmental policy, i.e., 
green nudges. A green nudge is a change in any aspect of the choice architecture that is intended 
to alter people’s behavior in a predictable way and result in a reduction of a negative external 
effect without forbidding any options or significantly changing the economic incentives 
(Carlsson et al. 2019). It aims at promoting environmentally responsible behavior to reduce 
negative externalities. Most green nudges discussed in the literature target the quantity and 
quality of people’s energy consumption, hence aiming at energy conservation. In some instances, 
nudges of this kind have proved highly effective relative to potential alternatives, such as 
incentives, education campaigns, or moral suasion (Schubert 2017). Examples of green nudges 
are found in the eco-labeling of products (Schubert 2017), small posters advertising the 
importance of buying an environmentally responsible product (Becchetti et al 2018), restaurants’ 
menu order and presentation (Kurz 2018), plate size in restaurants (Kallbekken and Saelen 
2013), financial rewards and goal attainments (Pellerano et al. 2017, Loock et al. 2013). The 
literature has shown that green nudges tend to increase pro-environmental behavior of 
individuals. In particular, green nudges can make pro-environmental attitudes more salient and 
increase the probability of willingness to pay something for the sake of environmental protection 
(Carlsson et al. 2019). It further reminds people of what they are losing, i.e. the environment and 
quality of life. Hence, in my context, it is reasonable to assume that the use of green nudges 
could possibly alter consumer behaviors and preferences towards purchasing used over new 





4.2.4. Conspicuous Conservation and Empathy 
For several decades, social and psychology scientists have investigated the motivations of 
individuals to gaining a detailed understanding of why individuals undertake pro-environmental 
behavior (Clark et al. 2003, Graves et al. 2013). Many studies have established that individual 
decisions are based on a specific definition of rational self-interest (Stern et al. 1993, Ryan and 
Deci 2002, Clark et al. 2003). Much of the psychology research on pro-environmental behavior 
tends to focus on the relationship between internal and external motivations or factors with 
behavioral intentions (Fransson and Garling1999, provide a full review). Internal motivations 
involve performing an activity because it is inherently interesting or derives spontaneous 
satisfaction from the activity itself (Gagne and Deci 2005). External motivations, in contrast, 
require a means between the activity and some independent consequences such as tangible or 
verbal rewards; hence, satisfaction comes not from the activity itself but rather from the extrinsic 
consequences to which the activity leads (Clark et al. 2003, Gagne and Deci 2005). They involve 
pursuing an activity because of external contingencies (e.g., pay, approval, or threat of 
punishment). 
One important external driver of human behavior is the desire for prestige, success 
relative to others, and esteem. There is extensive empirical evidence that people care about their 
status and relative consumption (Frank 1985, Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002). Sexton and 
Sexton (2014) use the term “conspicuous conservation” to describe consumption that signals pro-
environmental action and generates green status. This theory stems from the notion of 
conspicuous consumption, which explains, “in order to gain and hold the esteem of man it is not 
sufficient merely to possess wealth or power. The wealth or power must be put in evidence, for 




explored the concept of conspicuous consumption and its implications in various settings, with 
particular focus on purchases that signal prestige, luxury and exclusivity (Braun and Wicklund 
1989, Ireland 1998, Wiedmann et al. 2009).  
Following this concept, conspicuous conservation is a phenomenon related to 
conspicuous consumption in which individuals seek status through displays of austerity amid 
growing concern about environmental protection. For instance, ownership of luxurious estates, 
automobiles, and fashion surely still affords a certain social status today. However, amid 
growing concern about environmental damage and global climate change, an evolution of social 
norms suggests that status is increasingly conferred upon demonstration of austerity rather than 
ostentation – particularly austerity that minimizes the environmental impact of consumption. 
Consumers may, therefore, undertake costly actions in order to exhibit prosocial behavior with 
respect to environmental protection, i.e., paying a higher price for, while making visible, an 
energy efficient home heating and cooling technologies or a hybrid and electric-powered 
vehicles (Sexton and Sexton 2014, Sachdeva et al. 2015, Schubert 2017). Adopting this theory in 
my context, I presume that consumers may seek social status by electing to buy a used 
technology product over a new one for the intrinsic cause of the purchase, i.e., reducing e-waste. 
Through the demonstration of austerity that minimizes the environmental impact of 
consumption, individuals would gain social status with respect to environmental protection. 
Hence, I hypothesize: 
H1: Conspicuous conservation nudging increases the likelihood of consumers purchasing 
secondhand electronic products in the B2C secondary market. 
 
The role of emotion in prosocial action, i.e. an internal motivation, has been a topic of 




empathy. Indeed, the idea that empathy is a major determinant of prosocial and altruistic 
responding has been widely accepted among psychologists (Eisenberg and Miller 1987).  There 
are numerous descriptions and definitions of empathy in the literature. One common definition 
depicts empathy as a prosocial emotion that includes awareness of another’s suffering and 
affective participation in the other’s feelings (Huber and MacDonald 2012). The literature 
demonstrates that empathy is associated with more sustainable behavior (Ericson et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, several empirical studies show a link between empathy with the environment and 
self-reported environmental concern and attitude. For instance, Schultz et al. (2004) finds that the 
extent to which an individual believes that s/he is part of nature is positively associated with a 
biosphere-related concern. Similarly, individuals who demonstrate a high (as compared to low) 
empathy level towards a natural object are found to display stronger environmental attitudes and 
behavior (Berenguer 2007). Demonstrated in an experimental setting, individuals with higher 
environmental concerns are also found to more likely take environmental actions (Czap and 
Czap 2010). This evidence suggests that appealing to empathy is likely to positively affect 
conservation decisions. Hence, empathy plays a vital role in moving individuals toward pro-
environmental and conservation behavior. I, therefore, postulate: 
H2: Empathy nudging increases the likelihood of consumers purchasing secondhand 
electronic products in the B2C secondary market. 
4.2.5. Price and Perceived Quality 
The sale of used IT products and consumer purchase decisions in the secondary market are 
impacted by multiple different factors. Prior research has show that there are different attributes 
that could impact the sale of secondhand products, such as consumer preferences (Kim et al. 




Kuruzovich et al. 2008), and price (Ghose 2009, Elmaghraby et al. 2018). In specific, the price of 
a used relative to a new product could be an important factor when making a decision to 
purchase. Indeed, prices are shown in the literature to impact consumer decision and willingness-
to-pay in both the primary and secondary markets (PK Kannan 2001, Gupta et al. 2004, Seiler 
2013, Chou et al. 2013, Elmaghraby et al. 2018). Moreover, the price of a product can determine 
the period of which the product would stay on shelves. For example, used goods with higher 
prices are found to take longer time to sell in the market (Ghose 2009). Hence, higher prices can 
negatively impact the willingness to buy used IT products in the secondary market. 
 On the other hand, in the case of used products, the marketing literature shows that there 
is a positive relationship between price and perceived quality of a product whenever there is 
potential risk or uncertainty involved in its use (Peterson 1970, Gerstner 1985, Erdem et al. 
2008). In the situation where consumers have imperfect information with regards to used 
products, price can serve as a signal for a specific level of quality – a higher price signals higher 
quality of a product (Wolinsky 1983, Chang and Wildt 1994). The literature in marketing science 
further shows that a signal of higher quality can increase the purchase intention of consumers in 
markets where information asymmetry exists (Chang and Wildt 1994). Hence, prices can be a 
key factor in driving the decision to buy used IT products in the market, which could also 
possibly offset or moderate the effects, if any, of using green nudges. However, it is not clear 
how or in what direction a certain price would impact the efficacy of using green nudges in 
altering consumer preferences in favor of the used products. 
4.2.6. Consumer Characteristics 
The purchase behavior and product preferences for consumers can vary based upon different 




can differ based on gender, age and social class (Gupta et al. 2004, Bigne et al. 2005). 
Furthermore, using green nudges could display heterogeneous effects, if any, on different 
consumer characteristics. In particular, prior research has shown that men and women are 
motivated differently, and that gender plays an important role in shaping determinants of pro-
environmental behavior (Wymer and Samu 2002, Davis et al. 2014, Vicente-Molina et al. 2018, 
Briscoe et al. 2019). The literature also presents that there are generational differences when it 
comes to motivations and values, particularly with respect to taking pro-environmental actions 
such as recycling (Saphores et al. 2012, Acar 2014, Reese and Jacob 2015). Hence, observable 
consumer characteristics, such as age and gender, could moderate the efficacy of the green nudge 
in enhancing consumers’ willingness to buy used IT products. 
 Moving from the observables to the latent space of characteristics and traits, i.e., 
consumer personality, research in personality and individual differences has shown that 
personality affects various aspects of individual behavior, including job performance, academic 
motivation, and attitudes toward computer and information systems (Komarraju and Karau 2005, 
Devaraj et al. 2008). Focusing on consumer preferences, prior work has demonstrated that 
personality characteristics can predict whether people would be more likely to accept a suggested 
product or service (Hu and Pu 2011). Likewise, prior literature indicates that personality also 
affects the human decision-making process, such as consumers’ brand preferences and 
effectiveness of recommendation agents (Lin 2002, Adamopoulos and Todri 2015). Therefore, in 
my context, consumer latent characteristics could moderate the efficacy of using green nudges in 
altering consumer preferences towards used IT products. 
It is widely accepted today that there are five robust factors of personality that can serve 




influential taxonomy of personality attributes is admittedly the “Big Five” taxonomy, and it 
serves as a useful integrative framework for thinking about individual differences at a fairly high 
level of abstraction (Baumgartner 2002). The five-factor taxonomy proposes a comprehensive 
theoretical framework of five factors necessary and sufficient to represent human personality in 
terms of traits. It is a framework for distinguishing, ordering, and naming the behavioral, 
emotional, and experiential characteristics of individuals (John and Srivastava 1999).  
 The literature generally defines the latent personality dimensions as follows. The first 
dimension, i.e., Agreeableness, captures a person’s tendency to be compassionate and 
cooperative toward others. This factor is associated with altruism, cooperation, trustfulness, 
empathy, and compliance. The second dimension is Conscientiousness, which describes a 
person’s tendency to act in an organized or thoughtful way. Individuals characterized by high 
levels of Conscientiousness tend to be driven, deliberate, organized, persistent, and self-assured. 
The third dimension of the Big Five–factor model is the Extraversion dimension that refers to a 
person’s tendency to seek stimulation in the company of others. Extraversion consists of 
outgoingness, sociability, assertiveness, and excitement-seeking behaviors. The fourth dimension 
is emotional range (i.e., Neuroticism), which describes the extent to which a person’s emotions 
are sensitive to the individual’s environment. The tendency of an individual to be worried, 
depressed, self-conscious, and hedonistic is captured by the aforementioned dimension. Finally, 
the fifth dimension is that of Openness, which refers to the extent to which a person is open to 
experiencing a variety of activities. Adventurousness, intellect, creativity, and liberalism define 
the Openness to experience of individuals (see, John and Srivastava 1999, for more details). All 
these personality dimensions suggest different individual behavior that could manifest in 





I begin by discussing the design and procedure of my experiments. I then move to the results of 
the first stimulus, being a conspicuous conservation nudge (Study I). Finally, I discuss the results 
of the second stimulus, i.e., an empathy evoking-nudge (Study II).   
4.3.1. Designs and Procedure 
I conduct behavioral experiments using the Mechanical Turk online panel offered by Amazon 
(MTurk). MTurk has been successfully used in experimental research in several different fields 
(e.g. Capraro et al. 2019, Agrawal et al. 2015, Erat and Bhaskaran 2012, Chiou and Tucker 
2012). It matches the U.S. population more closely than college student subject pools or other 
Internet panels, i.e., a reasonable source of subjects for my study, and there is recent evidence 
that results obtained from it do not significantly differ from those found in laboratory settings 
(Paolacci et al. 2010). The experiment is restricted to participants based in the United States and 
each participant is paid $1. This payment is competitive with other studies on MTurk and is 
equivalent to $8/hr based on the average completion time of 7 minutes (Agrawal et al. 2015). 
Responses are obtained from 360 unique participants, with an average age between 35-44 years 
and 42% are female. In order to ensure reliability and high quality of responses, I use a screening 
condition where I restrict the pool of participants to those how have HIT approval rate of 90% 
and higher (Stewart et al. 2015). The HIT approval rate represents the proportion of completed 
tasks that are approved by requesters – a tool I leverage to direct my studies to experienced 
participants on MTurk. 23 
 In terms of design parameters, my main interest is in used technology products in the 
B2C secondary markets. Considering that small technology products are found to account for the 





largest share of the overall e-waste management market in 2019, especially those with 
continuously updating models and higher replacement rates (Meticulous Market Research 2020), 
I therefore focus on used smartphones, iPhones in specific. For the pricing model, I use posted 
prices due to the greater flexibility they provide me in studying consumers’ decisions between 
new and used smartphones (Einav et al. 2016).  
In order to effectively test for my hypotheses, I consider and control for possible 
heterogeneity that could have significant impacts on consumer behavior. For instance, the price 
of a used relative to a new product could be an important factor when making a decision to 
purchase. Indeed, prices are shown in the literature to impact consumer decision and willingness-
to-pay in both the primary and secondary markets (PK Kannan 2001, Gupta et al. 2004, Seiler 
2013, Chou et al. 2013, Elmaghraby et al. 2018). Hence, prices can be a key factor in driving the 
decision to buy for any of the offered products in the market, which could possibly offset the 
effect, if any, of using green nudges. I therefore consider three price points reflecting real market 
prices (Table 4.1).24 
Experiment Procedure. For each study in my experiment, I use a 3x3 between-subjects 
design, where each participant is randomly assigned to one of nine possible cells. First, each 
participant is assigned to one of three possible conditions: control, treatment 1, and treatment 2. 
Second, the participant receives one price point from three different options: low price, medium 
price, and high price. The diagram in Figure 4.1 depicts the flow of participants’ assignment in 
each cell. Finally, participants receive a set of choices between a new and used iPhone of the 
same generation. The subject is asked then to choose between the two phones in terms of 
willingness to buy. Each participant takes part in two such tasks, where the iPhone models on 
offer come from different generations. Thus, all participants receive two separate tasks of offers, 
                                                




one for a newer generation smartphone (iPhone 11) and the second for an older generation 
smartphone (iPhone XR), with the order of these offers being randomized across subjects. The 
reason for using two different iPhone generations is to account for potential generation effects, 
i.e. demand for older generations of smartphones may structurally vary from demand for the 
newer generation. Participants in the treated groups are provided with a green nudge embedded 
in the offer of the used iPhone. The type of green nudge remains the same for both tasks that 
participants receive, i.e. a subject receiving treatment 1 in the first task also receives treatment 1 
in the second task. There are no stimuli (green nudges) provided in the control group (Figure 
A4.2). All used phones offered to the participants have the same specifications and quality 
condition, i.e., Refurbished.25 
Before starting the experiments, all participants are provided instructions for the 
experiments followed by a short summary about the context of the lifecycle of smartphones 
(shown in Figure 4.2). Subsequently, participants are asked a set of 5-point scale statements as 
manipulation checks to ensure that my treatments hold (Table A4.1). After each task, participants 
who elect to buy the new iPhone are asked for the reasoning behind not considering the used 
iPhone (Table A4.3). At the end of the experiment, participants are asked to provide their 
demographics, such as age, gender, ethnicity, education, and marital status. 
To measure the big five personality traits of the participants, I use the lexical big five 
inventories, i.e., Goldberg's (1992) Big Five Factor Markers. During the experiment, participants 
are given 50 short statements or phrases that are randomly distributed throughout the experiment, 
consistent with the “Big-Five” taxonomy (Goldberg 1992). They were asked to agree or 
disagree, on a scale of 1 to 5, to each phrase. Based on their answers, the results show where 
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each participant falls on a spectrum for each trait (Goldberg 1992, Judge and Bono 2000). In 
order to have a reasonable measure for each personality trait, I run a confirmatory factor analysis 
to find the minimum set of independent linear combinations of responses that can explain as 
much variance as the original items for each personality trait. The factor analysis procedure 
provides factor loadings of these individual items on the underlying latent factors. Factor 
loadings are the correlation coefficients for the variable and latent factor. An item that is heavily 
associated with a certain latent factor will mostly have high loading on that factor (Ford et al. 
1986). Hence, following prior work in the literature, I use the score of 0.6 as the baseline for my 
factor loadings (Hair et al. 2011, Baistaman et al. 2020). I then use these factors in my main 
models. 
4.3.2. Preliminary Analysis of Nudges on Willingness to Buy 
Before I start my analysis, I ensure that randomizations with respect to participants’ 
demographics and the manipulation checks with respect to both treatments, i.e., whether the 
message of the treatment is delivered, hold. Using ANOVA to test for the difference in means 
between different demographics of participants in the treated and control groups, I find no 
significant difference in means between both groups with respect to age, gender, ethnicity and 
education (p>0.1). Furthermore, the Bartlett’s test for equal variances shows that there is no 
difference with respect to homogeneity of variances across both groups. I also examine the 
difference in means of participants’ responses to the manipulation check statements between 
both groups, and found that there is a significant difference in means between the treated and 
control groups (p<0.01); hence, the manipulation holds. 
 To examine my hypotheses with respect to the impact of the internal and external 




conduct logistic regressions with consumer decision to purchase a used iPhone as the dependent 
variable. The main independent variable in my model is the type of green nudge used, i.e. 
treatment 1 is the conspicuous conservation nudge and treatment 2 is the empathy nudge. I 
control for potential generation effects by including the generation of the offered iPhone. I also 
account for potential order effects by including a control variable accounting for which offer was 
presented first between iPhone 11 and iPhone XR (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). I further include 
participants’ demographics as controls (see Table 4.2 for details of variable operationalization).  
First, I start a preliminary analysis by using the full 3x3 model that includes both 
treatments in my logistic regression, while holding the control group as a base. The results are in 
Table 4.3. In column 1, the results show that the conspicuous conservation nudge has a positive 
and significant impact on the propensity of consumers purchasing the used iPhone (0.256, 
p<0.05). However, I find that the direct effect of the empathy nudge is absent (0.107, ns). 
Furthermore, in columns 2 and 3, the interactions between the newer model, i.e. iPhone11, with 
both treatments yield significant and positive impacts on participants willingness to buy used 
iPhones, indicating that the efficacy of the nudge is higher on newer iPhone generations. Using 
the low price point as a base, I find that the price level shows different impacts on participants’ 
willingness to buy. In specific, the middle price point shows a negative and significant impact 
relative to the low price, whereas the high price point shows a similar positive impact on the 
willingness to buy used iPhones, albeit insignificant. 
The preliminary analysis shows underlying treatment-level heterogeneities that need 
further attention. Therefore, in the following sections, I dive into the separate treatments in more 
detail by selecting the appropriate cells for each analysis. I first consider the conspicuous 




Subsequently, I focus on examining the second treatment in detail by selecting the cells 
pertaining to the Empathy nudge and the control group. 
4.3.3. Study I (Conspicuous Conservation Nudging) 
This section examines how the use of conspicuous conservation green nudges could impact the 
propensity of participants to purchase used electronic products, i.e., a pro-environmental action. 
Hence, participants in the treated group are presented with a green nudge that includes a pro-
environmental message with a default option of disclosing their purchase with friends on a social 
media platform to evoke conspicuous conservation (Figures 4.3). Using logistic regressions, the 
results in column 1 of Table 4.4 show that after adding the treatment, i.e., a conspicuous 
conservation green nudge, to the used iPhone offer, the propensity of participants to purchase 
used iPhones has significantly increased (0.271, p<0.05). The results show that allowing 
consumers to share their pro-environmental actions within their friends’ community (i.e., an 
external motivation) has positively impacted their preferences towards purchasing the used 
product by 31%, all else equal. Hence, H1 is supported. In column 2, the interaction between the 
treatment and iPhone 11 further shows that the impact of the green nudge is greater for the newer 
generation of iPhones (0.316, p<0.05). In specific, the green nudge shows a higher impact on 
participants’ willingness to buy the used iPhone 11 (the newer model) than the used iPhone XR 
(the older model) by 15%, ceteris paribus. This effect could be due to the fact that older 
generations have been in use for a longer period of time relative to newer generations of iPhones 
and, hence, they have relatively higher uncertainty with respect to their quality.26 In both 
columns 1 and 2, I see that price has a diverse impact on the willingness to buy a used iPhone 
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with, paradoxically, medium prices showing a higher negative impact relative to the other two 
price points (–0.463, p<0.01). 
I, therefore, explore how participants respond to the treatment given different prices for 
the used iPhone. By so doing, I examine the impact of the different price points on the efficacy 
of the green nudge. For better interpretations of the results, I stratify the sample into three 
different sub-populations based on each price point. In columns 3-5, I see that the treatment 
shows a different impact based on the price provided to the participants. I plot the predicted 
probabilities of purchasing a used iPhone for each price point (Figure 4.4).  
The results in Figure 4.4 produce a U-shaped effect of price on the likelihood to purchase 
a used phone, and this pattern exists for both the control and treated groups. The results suggest 
that participants are interpreting the price level as a signal of quality for the used iPhone. Indeed, 
the marketing literature shows that there is a positive relationship between price and perceived 
quality of a product whenever there is potential risk or uncertainty involved in its use (Peterson 
1970, Gerstner 1985, Erdem et al. 2008). Hence, the utility function of the participants is 
influenced by price and perceived quality. At a low price point, the price seems to dominate the 
decision and so becomes the most important factor, which results in increasing the participant’s 
utility. At the high price point, the price can signal a high quality for the used phones, thereby 
increasing the participant’s utility (Gerstner 1985). On the contrary, at the middle price point, 
disadvantage of the low price and high quality yields lowest utility to participants. This notion 
further explains the difference in magnitude for the effect of the green nudge at different price 
points, where a participant’s response to the treatment is relatively higher at the low and high 




To further verify my logic with respect to the impact of price, I ask the participants – 
particularly those who elected to purchase a new phone – at the end of each task for their 
reasoning behind not considering the used iPhone. The question consists of four choices: 1) the 
price of the used iPhone is too high, 2) I am concerned about the quality of the used iPhone, 3) I 
don’t buy used phones, and 4) Other. The responses indicate that participants are concerned the 
least about price at the low price point (37%) and quality at the high price point (32%), whereas 
the results are mixed at the middle point. I further explore participants’ open ended reasoning for 
not considering the used iPhone. The responses reflect my conjecture about price and quality. 
For instance, a participant who received a low price offer and decided to purchase the new 
phone, said: “I'd rather pay more for the new phone, more reliable.” Similar responses repeat at 
the low price level where the main concern of participants is quality. On the other hand, 
participants at the high price level express concerns with respect to price rather than quality. For 
example, one participant explained: “if I'm throwing down 500 dollars for a used phone, I might 
as well pay an extra 18% for a brand new one,” where another participant added: “High price 
point where the gap between refurbished and new isn't large enough for me to consider the 
saving potential.” The responses show a similar pattern to my hypothesis with respect to the 
effect of price and quality. Hence, the data provide me with further support to my logic for the 
difference in the efficacy of the treatment at different price levels. 
4.3.3.1. Conspicuous Conservation Nudging on Different Populations 
To better understand the impact of the conspicuous conservation nudge on different populations, 
I explore how participants respond to the treatment based on their gender and age. The literature 
shows that men and women are motivated differently, and that gender plays an important role in 




Vicente-Molina et al. 2018, Briscoe et al. 2019). The literature further shows that there are 
generational differences when it comes to motivations and values, particularly with respect to 
taking pro-environmental actions such as recycling (Saphores et al. 2012, Acar 2014, Reese and 
Jacob 2015). Therefore, I further examine how conspicuous conservation green nudging can 
impact different genders and generations with respect to purchasing used smartphones.  
Conspicuous conservation theory argues that individuals seek status through display of 
personal pro-environmental actions (Sexton and Sexton 2014). Research in social psychology 
and gender differences argues that men’s behaviors reflect a desire for social status relative to 
women (Baumeister and Sommer 1997, Anderson et al. 2001, Kwang et al. 2013). In particular, 
psychologists and social theorists have argued that status is relatively less important to women 
than to men (Anderson et al. 2001), and that “men are predicted to be higher in status striving 
than women” (Buss 1999, p. 43). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that men would have a 
relatively higher response to the conspicuous conservation nudge that women do. Therefore, I 
postulate that: 
H3A. Conspicuous conservation nudging has a higher impact on men’s behavior towards 
purchasing a used iPhone relative to women. 
 
Furthermore, research in generational differences show that younger people tend to be 
more social and have greater social networks relative to older people, and older people spend less 
time with others than younger people do (Lang and Baltes 1997, Marcum 2013). Other research 
in social and behavioral sciences shows that younger generation consumers respond better to 
social media marketing relative to older generations (Balakrishnan et al. 2014). For marketing 
campaigns, marketers tend to use different approaches to target older generation consumers 




H3B. Conspicuous conservation nudging has a higher impact on younger generations’ 
behavior towards purchasing a used iPhone relative to older generations.  
 
In Table 4.5, the baseline model in column 1, shows that, in general, there is no 
difference in purchasing a used iPhone between men and women (-0.0521, ns), and participants 
who are 45 years and older compared to the younger population (-0.139, ns); 45 is the median for 
the range of participants’ age in my sample. The results also reconfirm the positive effect of the 
treatment in increasing the willingness to buy used iPhones (0.244, p<0.05). I now examine the 
impact of the green nudge with respect to different gender and age. In column 2, I look at the 
interaction between men and my treatment. The results suggest that there are no gender 
differences when participants are externally motivated, via a green nudge, to purchase the used 
iPhone, i.e., gaining a social status by taking a pro-environmental action (-0.319, ns). In column 
3, the results show that there is a marginal significant generational effect when receiving the 
treatment (-0.220, p<0.1). In particular, participants who are 45 years and older are relatively less 
likely to purchase the used iPhone when provided the opportunity to share their purchase 
decision on a social media platform. Figure 4.5 plots the predicted probabilities of purchasing 
used iPhones for both generation participants. The figure shows a clear difference in the 
magnitude of the green nudge effect between both generations. In specific, I find that the 
willingness to buy a used iPhone for the older participants increases by approximately 5% after 
receiving the green nudge, whereas the propensity of buying a used iPhone increases by 28% for 
the younger participants after given the green nudge. 
As previously discussed, I find that the literature supports this behavior from the younger 
generation (Balakrishnan et al. 2014). Research conducted by a social media analytics platform 




posted anything on social media, whereas 12% of younger individuals have never posted on 
social media, indicating that younger individuals are more active on social media.27 In my 
context, I find that there exists a marginal difference between younger and older participants 
when receiving the conspicuous conservation green nudge. The younger participants tend to 
respond marginally higher to the treatment, which indicates that sharing the purchase with 
friends on social media is an appealing aspect of the purchase. On the other hand, this option is 
less appealing for the older participants to change their willingness to buy. In the next section, I 
expand my examination by studying to what extent a conspicuous conservation nudge could 
impact different participants based on their personality traits. 
4.3.3.2. Conspicuous Conservation Nudging and Personality Traits 
To gain deeper insights into the user’s characteristics that accentuate or attenuate the 
effectiveness of green nudges and extend the characteristics from the observable (e.g., gender 
and age) to the latent space of characteristics and traits (e.g., personality), I draw from 
established theories in psychology and social sciences to examine whether the personality traits 
of the participants attenuate or accentuate the effectiveness of green nudges.  
 Conspicuous conservation theory argues that socially responsible products, i.e., green 
products, provide a value to their consumers in social interactions (Iyer and Soberman 2016). 
This theory further argues that consumers have extrinsic social comparison preferences that are 
based on their meetings with others in social interactions. The frequency of these meetings is 
endogenous to the consumption choices of consumers. A consumer enjoys a social comparison 
benefit if her consumption decision is more socially responsible than the consumer that she 
meets in a social interaction, and a social comparison cost if it is less socially responsible (Iyer 
and Soberman 2016). Using the Big-Five taxonomy of personality traits in my context, I would 





expect that people who seek stimulation in the company of others (i.e., extraverted participants) 
would more likely choose to purchase the used iPhone after highlighting the environmental 
benefits of buying a used phone and sharing the purchase within their social milieu. I therefore 
postulate that participants with higher levels of Extraversion are more likely to purchase a used 
iPhone when given the conspicuous conservation nudge. 
Furthermore, research in psychology shows that individuals associated with higher levels 
of Neuroticism are young adults (Donnellan and Lucas 2008). As discussed earlier, younger 
adults tend to be more social and have greater social networks relative to older people (Lang and 
Baltes 1997, Marcum 2013). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that individual who scores 
higher on neuroticism are more likely to respond to the conspicuous conservation nudge. I then 
argue that participants with higher levels of Neuroticism are more likely to purchase a used 
iPhone when given the conspicuous conservation nudge. 
Measures and Results. To measure the big five personality traits of the participants, I use 
the lexical big five inventories, i.e., Goldberg's (1992) Big Five Factor Markers, combined with a 
confirmatory factor analysis in order to have a reasonable measure for each personality trait. I 
then use the resulting factors in my logistic regressions. The results are in Table 4.6. 
 The variable Extraversion in column 1 shows that participants who obtained higher 
scores on the Extraversion dimension are, on average, less likely to purchase a used smartphone 
(-1.689, p<0.01). However, the interaction in column 2 shows that using a conspicuous 
conservation nudge can significantly enhance the propensity of extraverted individuals to 
purchase a used iPhone (2.571, p<0.05). The results suggest that the social aspect of the nudge 




In column 3, I find that individuals who score higher on the Neuroticism factor are 
marginally more likely to purchase a used iPhone (0.977, p<0.1). However, their propensity to 
purchase a used iPhone significantly increases after given the treatment, column 4 (2.113, 
p<0.1). Beside the argument that Neuroticism is associated with younger individuals, people 
with higher scores on Neuroticism tend to be emotionally affected by their environment. The 
results suggest that sharing a positive message with friends delivers positive feelings to 
individuals with higher scores on Neuroticism and, hence, yields a higher propensity to purchase 
a used phone when given the conspicuous conservation nudge.  
The remaining three personality traits have no theoretical underpinning to show 
significant association with the conspicuous conservation nudge. For instance, individuals who 
obtain higher scores on Openness tend to be adventurous, intelligent, and creative (John and 
Srivastava 1999). Research shows that intelligent and creative people are more likely to be 
loners, and are not strongly motivated by social acceptance and conformity because of their 
interests and views on bigger ideas about which they care (Piketty 1998, Berman 2018). Hence, I 
theoretically assume that the conspicuous conservation nudge would not have a significant 
impact on this group of individuals.28 
4.3.4. Study II (Empathy Nudging) 
In this section, I focus on studying the impact of an internal and emotional motivation by 
examining to what extent the use of an empathy-evoking green nudge could impact the 
propensity of participants to purchase used smartphones. Participants in the treated group are 
presented with a green nudge that includes an empathy-evoking message that focuses on 
activating empathy feelings for the participants (Figures 4.6). The results for the main effect of 
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the treatment are shown in Table 4.7. In column 1, I find that adding an empathy-evoking green 
nudge has no significant impact on the willingness to buy a used iPhone (0.113, ns). The results 
suggest that, opposite to conspicuous conservation, using an internal motivating nudge does not 
significantly change consumer behaviors towards used electronics. 
I further examine whether the empathy treatment shows different effects based on 
different iPhone models, i.e. older versus newer generations. In column 2, the interaction 
between the treatment and the new generation of iPhones (i.e., iPhone 11) shows a marginally 
positive impact on participants’ behavior towards purchasing the used iPhone 11 (0.179, p<0.1). 
It is reasonable to assume that newer generations of used smartphones tend to have relatively less 
quality uncertainty compared to older generations due to the time for which they have been in 
use. The experimental data further support this premise. For example, 57% of participants who 
elected to purchase the new iPhone of the older generation (iPhone XR) show concerns about 
quality, relative to 44% for the newer generation (iPhone 11). Similarly, the open ended 
reasoning for not purchasing the used iPhone of the older generation indicates a higher level of 
quality concerns compared to the used iPhone of the newer generation. Participants share 
comments expressing the level of concerns about quality and generation, such as “older model to 
be bought used, risky,” and “I’d like to be more green, but might end up bearing the cost of older 
versions.” Therefore, the results imply that lower uncertainty with respect to the used phone 
could, to some extent, enhance the efficacy of the empathy-evoking nudge.  
I further explore how participants respond to the treatment given different prices for the 
used iPhone. Similar to study 1, I stratify the sample into three different sub-populations based 
on each price point. In columns 3-5, I see that the treatment shows a different impact based on 




significant and has a positive effect at the low price point (0.190, p<0.1). I plot the predicted 
probabilities of purchasing a used iPhone for each price point (Figure 4.7). 
Interestingly, the results in Figure 4.7 produce a U-shaped effect of price on the 
willingness to buy a used phone, similar to the effect in study 1 (Figure 4.4), suggesting that 
participants are interpreting the price level as a signal of quality for the used iPhone. I see that 
the empathy nudge is, relatively, more effective at the low price level, which indicates that a 
combination of a low price offer and an empathy nudge could, marginally, impact consumer 
behavior towards purchasing the used iPhone. 
Overall, the empathy green nudge seems to have less effectiveness in altering consumer 
behavior towards used smartphones. The literature in nudging and decision-making shows that 
individuals who felt confident in their ability to make good decisions about, for instance, healthy 
eating or spending money wisely were less comfortable about being nudged than those who 
knew they needed help (Felsen et al. 2013). The authors of this research work further argue that 
it is not the case where such individuals think that spending money wisely is a bad idea, but 
rather they are less amenable to giving up autonomy if they felt they could do it themselves. 
Following this logic, it is probable that a number of participants in the experiment are less 
comfortable about being nudged to contribute to the environment and well being of those living 
around e-waste, even when they agree with the action and cause. Nevertheless, it is plausible that 
the internal motivation of the empathy nudge could impact populations differently. In the next 
section, I examine the efficacy of the empathy treatment with respect to different age and gender 




4.3.4.1. Empathy Nudging on Different Populations 
As discussed in section 4.3.3.1, the literature focusing on gender differences indicates that 
individuals can be motivated differently based on their gender, and that gender plays an 
important role in shaping determinants of pro-environmental behavior (Davis et al. 2014, Briscoe 
et al. 2019). In addition, prior research shows that men tend to show lower levels of empathy 
than women do, and that women’s brains show more empathy when watching others suffering 
(Schieman and Van Gundy 2000, Toussaint and Webb 2005, Christov-Moore and Iacoboni 
2019). Hence, when provided with an empathy-evoking green nudge, I would assume women to 
have a higher response to the nudge relative to men. I then posit that:  
H4A. Empathy nudging has a higher impact on women’s behavior towards purchasing a 
used iPhone relative to men. 
 
The literature further shows that there are generational differences when it comes to 
motivations and values, particularly with respect to taking pro-environmental actions (Saphores 
et al. 2012, Acar 2014, Reese and Jacob 2015). Moreover, research in social psychology shows 
that the level of self-reported empathy varies between individuals based on their age, with higher 
levels of reported empathy among older adults (Schieman and Van Gundy 2000). Therefore, I 
posit that older generation adults tend to respond higher to the empathy nudge relative to the 
younger adults. 
H5B. Empathy nudging has a higher impact on older generations’ behavior towards 
purchasing a used iPhone relative to younger generations. 
  
In Table 4.8, I find that the main effect of the empathy green nudge remains insignificant 
in all three models. However, in column 2, the interaction between the treatment and Female is 




men are willing to change their purchase behaviors in favor of the used iPhones when provided 
with the empathy nudge. Consistent with prior literature, women respond positively to the 
treatment by showing more empathy towards the cause of the purchase. Likewise, in column 3, I 
find the interaction between the treatment and participants who are above the age of 45 is 
positive and significant, indicating that older generation individuals respond positively to the 
empathy nudge and have higher propensity to purchase the used iPhone (0.565, p<0.05). I plot 
the predicted probabilities of purchasing used iPhones for both gender and age for better 
visualizations of the results (Figures 4.8 and 4.9). 
Figure 4.8 shows the difference in probabilities between men and women. The propensity 
of women to purchase the used iPhone increases by 23.5% after receiving the empathy green 
nudge, whereas men do not significantly respond in the same direction. Similarly, in Figure 4.9, I 
find that older participants tend to positively respond to the empathy treatment through 
enhancing their propensity of purchasing the used iPhone by 20.4%. The younger generation, on 
the other hand, shows different behavior after receiving the empathy nudge. These two patterns 
by men and younger individuals are consistent with the premise that there are individuals who 
are less amenable or comfortable for being nudged to contribute to the environment and well 
being of those living around e-waste, even if they agree with the action and cause. In the next 
section, I further expand my investigation by studying how the empathy nudge impacts different 
participants based on their personality traits. 
4.3.4.2. Empathy Nudging and Personality Traits 
Using the big five taxonomy for personality traits (Goldberg 1981), I examine how an empathy-
evoking nudge would impact the decision of the participants based on their personality. One 




who are social and seek stimulation in the company of others. Prior literature in social sciences 
and networking shows that high levels of extraversion is correlated with high subjective well-
being, and further argues that empathy can be an intermediating variable between extraversion 
and subjective well-being (Kalpdor 2017, Chan 2014).29 Hence, I would assume that participants 
with higher levels of Extraversion are more likely to purchase a used iPhone when given the 
empathy nudge.  
Furthermore, another personality dimension is Agreeableness, which captures a person’s 
tendency to be compassionate and cooperative toward others. This factor is associated with 
altruism, cooperation, and empathy. Research in age differences and personality traits shows that 
agreeableness is positively associated with age, i.e., people in the post 50s show higher levels of 
Agreeableness (Donnellan and Lucas 2008). I also find earlier that age is positively associated 
with the empathy nudge. Hence, I posit that participants with higher levels of Agreeableness are 
more likely to purchase a used iPhone when given the empathy nudge. 
Furthermore, prior research in human psychology shows that empathy enhances 
emotional intelligence and boosts creativity, which, in turn, facilitates innovation and invention, 
rendering empathy positively associated with creativity (Carlozzi et al. 1995, Bergland 2021).  
Openness, as a personality dimension, refers to the extent to which a person is open to 
experiencing a variety of activities. Adventurousness, intellect, creativity, and liberalism define 
the Openness to experience of individuals. Henceforth, I conjecture that participants with higher 
levels of Openness are more likely to purchase a used iPhone when given the empathy nudge. 
Measures and Results. The results are shown in Table 4.9. Consistent with previous 
findings, the variable Extraversion in column 1 shows that participants who obtain higher scores 
on the Extraversion dimension are less likely to purchase a used smartphone (-1.487, p<0.01). 





However, the interaction in column 2 shows that using an empathy nudge can significantly 
enhance the propensity of extraverted individuals to purchase a used iPhone (2.571, p<0.05). The 
results indicate that an empathy-evoking nudge increases the willingness to buy of extraverted 
individuals to take a pro-environmental behavior with respect to used smartphones.  
In column 3, I find that individuals who score higher on the Agreeableness factor have a 
higher propensity to purchase a used iPhone (2.773, p<0.01). However, their tendency to 
purchase a used iPhone marginally increases after given the treatment, column 4 (1.019, p<0.1). 
This result can further support my pervious argument that some individuals who agree with the 
action or the cause, even if their personality is associated with empathy, may be less amenable or 
comfortable about being nudged for it. Finally, with respect to the relationship between creativity 
and empathy, the results in column 6 show that individuals who have higher scores on Openness 
are marginally responding to the treatment and, therefore, their decision to purchase a used 
product does not significantly change when given the empathy treatment (2.372, p<0.1).30 
4.4. Conclusion and Implications 
In this essay, I use behavioral experiments to investigate the effect of behavioral interventions in 
the form of green nudges in enhancing consumers’ willingness to buy used smartphones. I use 
two orthogonal motivations as nudges and examine their efficacy in altering consumer purchase 
behavior: 1) external motivation embedded in conspicuous conservation, and 2) internal 
motivation targeting consumers’ emotional empathy. 
 I find that using a conspicuous conservation green nudge has a positive impact in altering 
consumer behavior towards used smartphones. Individuals who receive this treatment show a 
higher propensity to purchase the used iPhone. The results from my first experimental study 
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suggest that the effect of the external motivation green nudge is consistent based on different 
individual characteristics, such as age and gender. However, the efficacy of the nudge varies 
based on different personality traits. I further find that the impact of the conspicuous 
conservation nudge varies based on the price and model of the used iPhone. I argue that this 
difference could be due to the perceived quality from low prices and older models of the used 
iPhone. 
 In my second experimental study, I find that the use of an internal motivation green 
nudge targeting emotional empathy can be effective conditional on certain individual 
demographics. In specific, women and older participants are willing to change their purchase 
behaviors in favor of the used iPhone when provided with an empathy-evoking green nudge. 
Furthermore, participants tend to respond differently to the treatment based on certain 
personality traits. I also find that the treatment is marginally more effective for the newer iPhone 
model, which I conjecture that this effect is due to the inherent higher quality uncertainty for the 
older model relative to the newer one. It is nevertheless important to note that, on average, the 
main effect of the empathy treatment is absent in my experiment. A potential explanation is that, 
when provided with an internal motivating green nudge such as emotional empathy, a number of 
individuals feel less amenable to giving up autonomy if they felt they could do it themselves 
(Felsen et al. 2013). In other words, they are less comfortable about being nudged to contribute 
to the environment and human well being, even when they agree with the action and cause. In 
sum, my study shows that the utility consumers derive from taking a pro-environmental action is 
relatively higher when the reward or motivation is external relative to internal. 
There are several imperative implications of this essay. First, my results have important 




how to manage the cannibalization impacts of secondary markets (Ghose et al. 2005, 
Oraiopoulos et al. 2012). I extend the literature by arguing that enhancing the used product’s 
cannibalization effect, from an ecological perspective, is beneficial. Enhancing the sale and 
increasing the lifetime of used IT products would eventually reduce the amount of e-waste 
dumped in landfills today and, therefore, the adverse effects of e-waste around the world.  
Furthermore, from an economic perspective, maintaining the viability and enhancing the 
efficiency of the secondary market could positively impact prices of new products in the primary 
market. In particular, the effect of the secondary market on product-line pricing manifests in that 
secondhand customers pay a relatively lower price for the second-generation product, whereas 
upgraders pay a higher price when secondhand markets exist (Zhao and Jagpal 2006). The 
relatively lower prices of the used products impact primary market consumers to pay higher 
prices for newer products with less quality uncertainty (Bester 1998). Also, prices of secondhand 
products are a percentage of the new product price, where the percent difference depends on 
quality (Stephenson 2005).  Hence, prices between primary and secondary markets are linked, 
with prices moving in the same direction. I show in this essay how the use of green nudges can 
significantly enhance sale of used IT products (i.e., smartphones) at a high price level. Enhancing 
the sale of higher used product prices, via the use of green nudges, can be used to support higher 
primary market prices. Retailers can, therefore, charge higher prices in the primary market for 
the brand new products. 
Second, this essay focuses on the implications of green nudges and how they could 
possibly alter consumer preferences in favor of used IT products. I demonstrate how mechanisms 
can be used as “nudges” to enhance the willingness to buy used electronics for the sake of 




motivations to perform pro-environmental behavior (Czap 2015). My contribution lies in 
showing the effectiveness of different types of green nudges and motivations in impacting 
consumers’ willingness to buy in the context of used and durable IT products.  
From managerial perspective, this essay provides guidance and proposes different 
methods for resellers to apply when creating their offers of used IT products in the B2C 
secondary market. It provides insights leading to actionable strategies for managers who would 
like to effectively utilize and design green nudges. In particular, I show how different types of 
nudges work on different individual demographics, such as age and gender. A conspicuous 
conservation green nudge shows a positive impact on almost all different populations of 
consumers, with a higher marginal impact on younger individuals. An internal motivation green 
nudge, i.e., an emotional empathy nudge, only works on certain groups of consumers such as 
female and older individuals. 
I conclude by discussing other future directions for research. I carried out experiments for 
two types of smartphone products (iPhone 11 and iPhone XR) and three different price points. 
As I see a possible impact of quality uncertainty with respect to older models and lower prices, 
more research is required to examine the green nudge effects I identify across different product 
categories and for a wider range of prices. Moreover, in unreported analysis, I find that the 
efficacy of the nudge with respect to the type of targeted motivation can vary across populations 
of different race. For instance, I find that Black or African American participants show a higher 
response to the conspicuous conservation nudge relative to individuals from other race, whereas 
Hispanic participants are more likely to purchase a used iPhone when they receive the empathy 




incentives for used IT products and secondary markets and whether there is a race component 








Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
The rapid pace of technological innovation and product development today has resulted in 
shorter product life cycles for electronic goods. This phenomenon has led to a plethora of IT 
product returns that are durable and can provide value for many years. According to IDC, the 
market for used smartphones, for instance, is anticipated to have a compound annual growth rate 
of 13.6% from 2018 to 2023, and a market value of $67 billion in 2023.31 This volume surge in 
IT product returns calls for scholars and practitioners to ensure higher levels of secondary market 
efficiency and enhance the sale of durable IT secondhand products for various beneficial reasons. 
First, from a consumer perspective, enhancing the sale of used products increases consumer 
surplus and social welfare. Every IT product that can have another life means less damage 
caused to our planet, and a product put in the hands of someone who otherwise would simply not 
be able to afford it. Second, from an economic perspective, there exists a significant relationship 
between primary and secondary market prices, with prices moving in the same direction. Hence, 
maintaining the viability and enhancing the efficiency of the secondary market can be used to 
support primary market prices. Last, from an ecological perspective, reducing the efficiency of 
the secondary market leads to critical threats to the environment that can have significant major 
adverse ecological effects. E-waste that ends up in landfills causes significant environmental 
damage, which can be avoided by extending the life of these products. Improving the sale of 
used IT products means less products being dumped in landfills and, therefore, less damage to 
the environment. Hence, my dissertation seeks to propose different mechanisms aimed at 
enhancing the efficiency of online secondary markets for durable IT products and the propensity 
of these products being purchased by other consumers. 





In the first two essays, I focus on different mechanisms to enhance the efficiency of the 
online secondary market for durable IT products. In my first essay, I study the extent to which 
product decisions by key players in the primary market reduce adverse selection in the secondary 
market for the same set of IT products. I find that policies implemented in the primary market 
can significantly impact residual uncertainty about products being sold, thereby reducing adverse 
selection. Even if such policies have not been specifically implemented for the benefit of 
secondary markets, they can provide benefits by capitalizing on the extent to which primary and 
secondary markets are interlinked. In my second essay, I show how the addition of a marquee, 
i.e., high-visibility and high-quality, seller on a two-sided platform in the secondary market can 
impact prices obtained by other existing sellers for similar products. I thus address a gap in the 
digital platforms literature pertaining to the ostensible effect of marquee sellers. My findings go 
beyond the implications of adding users in two-sided platforms. I show that adding new sellers to 
the platform can have more nuanced effects on prices obtained on the platform. In my third 
essay, I take a different approach by proposing a different mechanism aimed at increasing the 
propensity of used IT products being purchased in the market. In specific, I show how the use of 
behavioral interventions in the form of green nudges can impact consumer preferences towards 
purchasing used and durable IT products. I contribute to the literature studying the use of 
behavioral interventions and its implications on consumer behavior by demonstrating how 
mechanisms can be used as “nudges” to enhance the chance of used electronics being purchased, 
in attempt to reduce environmental externalities. 
Taken collectively, the findings of this dissertation provide valuable theoretical as well as 
practical insights about the effectiveness of different mechanisms for enhancing the efficiency of 




datasets, I am able to examine real time market decisions and quantify their economic effects in 
the secondary market for durable IT products. Second, by introducing randomness into the 
specifications of all three essays, I am able to mitigate many of the endogeneity problems in 
relative previous research, which allows me to make causal claims about the effects I observe. 
Third, this dissertation provides several managerial insights. For policy-makers considering 
sustainable reverse logistics programs in the IT industry, I show the value of forward-looking 
policies that can benefit both primary and secondary markets. For secondary market platform 
providers, I show that the entry of a seller with a “marquee” brand name has a positive impact on 
prices of other sellers on the platform. It is imperative for the platform’s provider to understand 
such price effects to create guidance when targeting new sellers to join the platform. Finally, for 
sellers in the secondary markets, I provide guidance and propose different methods to apply 
when creating their offers of used electronic products. Furthermore, I offer insights leading to 







Table 2.1. Sample of Auction Descriptions 
Auction Description Locked/Unlocked Status 
Apple iPhone 4, 16GB, AT&T, Unlocked, 35 Units, Grade B, Original Retail $5,000, Plainfield, IN Unlocked 
Apple iPhone 4, Black, 32GB, AT&T, Locked, 25 Units, A/B Condition, Carrollton, TX Locked 
Apple iPhone 4, 16GB, Verizon, Locked, 15 Units, Grade B, Loveland, CO Locked 
Apple iPhone 5, 32GB, T-Mobile, Unlocked - 100 Units - Grade B - Louisville, KY Unlocked 
Apple iPhone 5, 16GB, Verizon, Unlocked - 120 Units - Grade C - Louisville, KY Unlocked 
Apple iPhone 5, 16GB, AT&T, Unlocked, 10 Units, A/B Condition, Est. Original Retail $6,500, Palos Hills, IL Unlocked 
Apple iPhone 5, 16GB, AT&T - 50 Units - Grade B - Louisville, KY Undisclosed 
Apple iPhone 5, 32GB, Sprint - 80 Units - A/B Condition - Dallas, TX Undisclosed 
Apple iPhone 5, 16GB, Verizon - 80 Units - D Condition - Dallas, TX Undisclosed 
Apple iPhone 5, Black, 64GB, T-Mobile, 96 Units, A/B Condition - Dallas, TX Undisclosed 
 









1 if the status of the smartphones is locked in (auction i, seller j), 0 if unlocked 
Undisclosedij 1 if the seller j did not provide the status of the smartphones in auction i, 0 otherwise 
Model 5ij 1 if the pallet in (auction i, seller j) is for Model 5 iPhones, 0 otherwise 




The total number of bidders participated in (auction i, seller j) 
Unitsij The total number of units in (auction i, seller j) 
StartingPriceij The starting price in (auction i, seller j) 
Conditionij The average condition of the devices in (auction i, seller j). 
MemorySizeij The memory size of the smartphones in (auction i, seller j) (e.g. 32 GB, 64 GB) 
Sellerij The seller (retailer) j 
Dayij Vector of dummies indicating the day of the week for start of (auction i, seller j) 
Monthij Vector of dummies indicating the month of (auction i, seller j) 

















Table 2.3. The Effect of Status Disclosure on Final Prices 
  (1)    (2)     (3) 









 (0.0461) (0.0783) (0.0822) 
Verizon 0.435*** 0.321*** 0.168*** 
 (0.135) (0.0816) (0.0435) 
Model 5 0.848*** 0.839*** 0.679*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0816) (0.101) 
Bidders 0.0390*** 0.0379*** 0.0421*** 
 (0.00296) (0.00296) (0.00272) 
Units 0.0092*** 0.0091*** 0.0091*** 
 (0.00059) (0.00059) (0.00058) 
(Verizon x Undisclosed)  -0.262*** -0.381*** 
  (0.0803) (0.137) 
(Verizon x Model 5)  0.352*** 0.510*** 
  (0.0316) (0.163) 
(Undisclosed x Model 5)  -0.656*** -0.634*** 
  (0.0671) (0.0734) 
(Verizon x Model 5 x Undisclosed)   -0.458*** 
   (0.163) 
Constant 4.188*** 4.160*** 4.207*** 













Observations 8,179 8,179 8,179 
R-squared 0.743 0.747 0.749 
Adjusted-R2 0.741 0.744 0.746 
Note. Additional control variables included, such as the physical condition of phones, memory size, and auction starting 
price. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by auctions. ***p-value <0.01, **p-


















Table 2.4. The Effect of Disclosed Status (Locked versus Unlocked) on Final Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES iPhone 4  iPhone 5  Non-Verizon  Unlocked  Unlocked  
      
Locked 1.333*** -1.284*** 1.167***   
 (0.154) (0.0903) (0.0962)   
Verizon -0.128 0.122**  0.150*** 0.163** 
 (0.0877) (0.0508)  (0.0541) (0.0790) 
Bidders 0.0373** 0.0236*** 0.0216*** 0.0196*** 0.0197*** 
 (0.0154) (0.00287) (0.00298) (0.00289) (0.00290) 
Units 0.00137*** 0.00635*** 0.00877*** 0.00574*** 0.00573*** 
 (0.000150) (0.000278) (0.000273) (0.000321) (0.000323) 
Model 5    0.684*** 0.685*** 
    (0.0328) (0.0334) 
(Verizon x Model 5)     0.155*** 
     (0.00901) 
Constant 3.731*** 5.391*** 4.149*** 4.103*** 4.097*** 



















Observations 452 820 645 910 910 
R-squared 0.771 0.882 0.866 0. 886 0. 888 
Adjusted R2 0.764 0.872 0.854 0. 877 0. 879 
Note. Additional control variables are included in the models such as the physical condition of phones, memory 
size, and auction starting price. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by 
auctions. ***p-value <0.01, **p-value <0.05, *p-value <0.1. 
 
 
Table 2.5. The Effect of Disclosed Status for Verizon and non-Verizon Final Prices 









     
Undisclosed 0.224*** 0.221 0.540*** 0.486*** 
 (0.0756) (0.270) (0.0539) (0.0812) 
(Undisclosed x Model 5) -0.272* -0.306 -0.687*** -0.597*** 
 (0.164) (0.272) (0.176) (0.169) 
Model 5 1.223*** 1.256*** 1.012*** 0.986*** 
 (0.165) (0.271) (0.141) (0.0871) 
Constant 4.027*** 3.741*** 3.952*** 3.373*** 
















Observations 1,420 1,398 2,743 2,618 
R-squared 0.835 0.886 0.686 0.683 
Adjusted R-squared 0.829 0.882 0.677 0.674 
Note. This sample only contains Verizon auctions of both generations of iPhones. Additional control variables are 
included such as the physical condition of phones, memory size, and auction starting price. Standard errors (in 





Table 2.6. Placebo Analysis for Falsification (Based on Analyses Reported Earlier) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










      
Undisclosed_Rand 0.000786     
 (0.0171)     
Locked_Rand  -0.0744 0.0293   
  (0.0982) (0.0387)   
Verizon 0.454*** -0.232* 0.158*** 0.212*** 0.197*** 
 (0.129) (0.139) (0.0597) (0.0582) (0.0717) 
Model5 0.857***     
 (0.0181)     
Model5_Rand 
 
(Verizon x Model5_Rand) 





     (0.0894) 
Bidders 0.0429*** 0.0457** 0.0322*** 0.0276*** 0.0278*** 
 (0.00295) (0.0185) (0.00357) (0.00316) (0.00317) 
Units 0.00934*** 0.00194*** 0.00536*** 0.00929*** 0.00929*** 
 (0.000597) (0.000162) (0.000258) (0.000416) (0.000417) 
Constant 4.831*** 3.603*** 4.153*** 4.164*** 4.167*** 
 (0.0934) (0.437) (0.141) (0.125) (0.126) 



















R-squared 0.731 0.667 0.823 0.837 0.838 
Adjusted R-squared 0.728 0.542 0.809 0.825 0.826 
Note. Additional control variables are included in the models such as the physical condition of phones, memory size, and 
auction starting price. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by auctions. ***p-






















Table 2.7. The Effect of Status Disclosure on Bidders (Bids) Over Time (Verizon) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Three Months Jan 2016 May 2016 Nov 2016 
Undisclosed 0.531** 0.914*** -0.665*** 0.488*** 
 (0.247) (0.258) (0.0487) (0.0393) 
Verizon 0.204*** 0.269*** 0.229*** 0.189 
 (0.00556) (0.0481) (0.0421) (0.167) 
Model 5 1.730*** 1.739*** 0.919*** 0.873*** 
 (0.139) (0.215) (0.0267) (0.0413) 
Units 0.00184*** 0.00168*** 0.00122*** 0.00165*** 
 (0.000119) (0.000170) (0.000153) (0.000158) 
(Verizon x Undisclosed) -0.915*** -0.932*** -0.319*** -0.207*** 
 (0.0599) (0.300) (0.0609) (0.0245) 
(Verizon x Model 5) 0.407*** 0.498*** 0.401*** 0.187*** 
 (0.0861) (0.135) (0.0439) (0.0628) 
(Undisclosed x Model 5) -1.020*** -1.632*** -0.102** -0.719*** 
 (0.144) (0.264) (0.0417) (0.0497) 
(Verizon x Model 5 x Undisclosed) -0.533*** -1.265*** -0.260** -0.0125 
 (0.106) (0.350) (0.106) (0.297) 
Constant 4.538*** 5.410*** 4.724*** 4.283*** 











Observations 8,912 3,055 2,008 3,849 
R-Overall 0.652 0.635 0.757 0.732 
R-Within 0.645 0.624 0.720 0.712 
 
Table 2.8. The Effect of Status Disclosure on Bidders (Bids) Over Time (Non-Verizon) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Three Months Jan 2016 May 2016 Nov 2016 
Undisclosed  0.494*** -0.873*** -0.616*** 1.126*** 
 (0.155) (0.175) (0.115) (0.151) 
Non-Verizon -0.204*** -0.162*** -0.295*** -0.292*** 
 (0.00556) (0.0571) (0.0160) (0.0192) 
Model 5 1.734*** 1.549***  0.874*** 0.651*** 
 (0.140) (0.135) (0.0375) (0.0584) 
Units 0.00185*** 0.00167*** 0.00124*** 0.00162*** 
 (0.000121) (0.000166) (0.000151) (0.000163) 
(Non-Verizon x Undisclosed) -0.100** -0.263*** -0.527*** -0.506*** 
 (0.0407) (0.0253) (0.115) (0.100) 
(Non-Verizon x Model 5) 0.226***  0.292*** 0.231*** 0.215*** 
 (0.0556) (0.0182) (0.0252) (0.0412) 
(Undisclosed x Model 5) -1.025*** -1.148*** -0.296*** -0.761*** 
 (0.146) (0. 240) (0.116) (0.152) 
(Non-Verizon x Model 5 x Undisclosed) -0.993*** -1.168*** -0.404*** -0.845*** 
 (0.0971) (0.268) (0.121) (0.105) 
Constant 4.144*** 5.981*** 5.323*** 4.625*** 











Observations 8,912 3,055 2,008 3,849 
R-Overall 0.658 0.767 0.744 0.749 
R-Within 0.651 0.731 0.723 0.704 
Note. Additional control variables included (physical condition of phones, memory size, bid order). Standard errors (in 




Table 3.1. Analysis of the Impact of AT&T entry on Final Prices 







    
Att_entry 33.63*** 23.89*** 23.75*** 
 (5.293) (3.447) (2.865) 
Units -0.0928*** -0.148*** -0.164*** 
 (0.0142) (0.00744) (0.0102) 
Bidders 0.609**   
 (0.279)   
Single_h  3.868*** 2.255** 
  (1.333) (1.141) 
Bid_order  2.382*** 2.444*** 
  (0.0422) (0.0998) 
Constant 157.6*** 211.6*** 224.2*** 
 (7.768) (11.22) (11.10) 
    

















Adjusted R2 0.905 0.757  
R-Overall   0.756 
Note. Additional control variables are included in the models such as the physical condition of the 
device, model, carrier, memory size, unlocked status, auction starting price and pallet location. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 3.2. The Impact of AT&T’s entry on Demand and Within-auction Competition 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES DV: Bidders DV: Number of Bids 
   
Att_Entry -0.842* 1.586 
 (0.448) (2.389) 
Bidders  3.034*** 
  (0.0700) 
Units 0.00221*** 0.0339*** 
 (0.000743) (0.00336) 
Constant 1.402*** 7.036*** 
 (0.396) (1.595) 
   










Adjusted R-squared 0.388 0.462 
Note. Additional control variables are included in the models such as the physical condition of 
the device, model, carrier, memory size, unlocked status, auction starting price and pallet 




Table 3.3. Analysis of the Impact of AT&T entry on Bidders Behavior 









     
Att_entry 33.74*** 22.60*** 25.61*** 14.17*** 
 (6.442) (3.538) (2.944) (4.84) 
Units -0.218*** -0.151*** -0.168*** -0.112*** 
 (0.0243) (0.00972) (0.0107) (0.0227) 
Bid_order 2.822*** 2.349*** 2.474*** 2.331*** 
 (0.164) (0.0844) (0.0996) (0.204) 
Single_h   2.713**  
   (1.190)  
Constant 206.1*** 224.3*** 223.6*** 161.5*** 
 (13.59) (11.55) (11.45) (29.62) 
     





















R-Overall 0.718 0.772 0.755 0.778 
Note. Additional control variables are included in the models such as the physical condition of the device, model, carrier, 




























Table 3.4. Analysis of the Impact of AT&T entry on Individual Bids 












      
Single_h 2.94** 2.63**  -4.97***  
 (1.453) (1.244)  (1.56)  
Time -1.886* -1.584* -6.658*** -0.835* -1.103* 
 (1.052) (0.915) (1.249) (0.476) (0.594) 
(Single_h x Time)  -0.862    
  (0.993)    
Bid_order 2.769*** 2.767*** 2.331*** 2.412*** 2.556*** 
 (0.133) (0.133) (0.204) (0.199) (0.194) 
Units -0.392*** -0.392*** -0.122*** -0.115*** -0.113*** 
 (0.0364) (0.0363) (0.0227) (0.0029) (0.0022) 
Constant 176.5*** 175.5*** 145.8*** 149.34*** 153.69*** 































R-Within 0.820 0.821 0.765 0.877 0.858 
Note. Additional control variables are included in the models such as the physical condition of the device, model, carrier, 


















Table 3.5. Analysis of the Impact of AT&T entry on active bidders behavior 





WonAT&T -3.633** -3.364* 
 (1.554) (1.918) 
Time -5.278*** -5.162*** 
 (1.244) (1.122) 
(WonAT&T x Time)  -4.988 
  (3.823) 
Bid_order 3.368*** 3.307*** 
 (0.304) (0.303) 
Units -0.672*** -0.667*** 
 (0.145) (0.144) 
Constant 158.5*** 168.4*** 
 (16.57) (23.81) 










R-Within 0.759 0.761 
Note. Additional control variables are included in the models such as the physical condition 
of the device, model, carrier, memory size, unlocked status, and pallet location. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 3.6. The Impact of AT&T’ entry on bidders’ behavior – Changes in Status 





Active -13.79*** -12.55*** 
 (3.131) (4.28) 
Time 
 













 (0.0125) (0.0124) 
Bid_order 2.872*** 2.869*** 
 (0.129) (0.128) 
Constant 166.7*** 165.8*** 
 (10.75) (10.92) 










R-Overall 0.762 0.764 
Note. Additional control variables are included in the models such as the physical 
condition of the device, model, carrier, memory size, unlocked status, and pallet 






Table 4.1. Market Prices for Used iPhones of Two Different Generations 
Price Point Product Type $ Dollar Product Type $ Dollar 
Low Price iPhone 11 $427 iPhone XR $320 
Medium Price iPhone 11 $460 iPhone XR $339 
High Price iPhone 11 $429 iPhone XR $359 
 









1 if participant i receives an offer for iPhone j containing a green nudge evoking 
conspicuous conservationism 





1 if participant i receives an offer for iPhone 11, 0 if iPhone XR 
Price_Lowi 1 if participant i receives an offer of a low price iPhone 
Price_Medi 1 if participant i receives an offer of a Medium price iPhone 
Price_Highi 1 if participant i receives an offer of a High price iPhone 
Order_11i 1 if participant i receives an offer for an iPhone 11 first, 0 if iPhone XR is first 
Malei 1 if participant i is male, 0 if female 
Age45i 1 if participant i is 45 year or older, 0 if younger 
Educationi 
Agei 
Vector of dummies indicating the level of education for participant i 
Vector of dummies indicating the age range for participant i 






















Table 4.3. The Impact of Green Nudges on the Decision to Buy Used iPhones 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Used_iPhones Logit Logit Logit 
    
CConservation 0.256** 0.113** 0.256** 
 (0.115) (0.054) (0.115) 
Empathy 0.107 0.107 0.0713 
 (0.208) (0.208) (0.216) 
iPhone11 0.0856* 0.0790* 0.0818* 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) 
CConservation x iPhone11  0.291**  
  (0.124)  
Empathy x iPhone11   0.191* 
   (0.098) 
Price_Med -0.483** -0.483** -0.483** 
 (0.204) (0.204) (0.204) 
Price_High 0.0322 0.0332 0.0321 
 (0.199) (0.199) (0.199) 
Order_11 -0.210** -0.211** -0.210** 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) 
Constant 0.296** 0.334** 0.299** 
 (0.128) (0.138) (0.129) 
    
Observations 700 700 700 
Pseudo-R 0.0926 0.0930 0.0928 
Log-Likelihood -435.3 -435.1 -435.3 
Chi-squared 75.60 76.10 75.62 
Prob Wald 4.33e-08 7.01e-08 8.38e-08 
Note. Additional control variables for the participants are included in the models such as age, 
gender, level of education, and ethnicity. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, 






















Table 4.4. The Effect of Conspicuous Conservation Green Nudging on Decision to Buy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






      
CConservation 0.271** 0.091* 0.348** 0.143* 0.329** 
 (0.120) (0.048) (0.187) (0.079) (0.152) 
iPhone11 0.0792* 0.0770* 0.0974* 0.0651 0.0833 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.054) (0.124) (0.131) 
CConservation x iPhone11  0.316**    
  (0.126)    
Price_Med -0.463*** -0.461***    
 (0.147) (0.147)    
Price_High -0.188 -0.187    
 (0.247) (0.247)    
Order_11 -0.441** -0.443** -0.578*** -0.296* -0.367** 
 (0.209) (0.210) (0.218) (0.165) (0.174) 
Constant 0.582** 0.662** 0.679** 0.467* 0.564* 
 (0.256) (0.265) (0.268) (0.239) (0.280) 
      
Observations 464 464 152 158 154 
Pseudo-R 0.122 0.123 0.114 0.142 0.156 
Log-Likelihood -279.5 -279.2 -174.2 -173.5 -165.2 
Chi-squared 70.97 71.54 54.96 51.03 62.34 
Prob Wald 6.34e-08 1.02e-07 1.69e-06 4.11e-06 2.10e-07 
Note. Additional control variables for the participants are included in the models such as age, gender, level of education, 
























Table 4.5. The Effect of Green Nudging with Respect to Consumer Demographics 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Used_iPhone Logit Logit Logit 
    
CConservation 0.244** 0.312** 0.345** 
 (0.102) (0.138) (0.140) 
iPhone11 0.0806* 0.0819* 0.0808* 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0. 045) 
Price_Med -0.422*** -0.425*** -0.405*** 
 (0.152) (0.152) (0.153) 
Price_High -0.145 -0.145 -0.130 
 (0.244) (0.245) (0.246) 
Male -0.0521 0.145 -0.0573 
 (0.121) (0.196) (0.120) 
CConservation x Male  -0.319  
  (0.326)  
Age45 -0.139 -0.186 -0.131 
 (0.256) (0.257) (0.250) 
CConservation x Age45   -0.220* 
   (0.118) 
Order_11 -0.475** -0.481** -0.476** 
 (0.204) (0.205) (0.204) 
Constant 0.317** 0.240** 0.237** 
 (0.132) (0.106) (0.097) 
    
Observations 464 464 464 
Pseudo-R 0.109 0.110 0.112 
Log-Likelihood -284.9 -284.6 -284.1 
Chi-squared 64.39 66.26 67.27 
Prob Wald 4.37e-08 4.47e-08 2.98e-08 
Note. Additional control variables for the participants are included in the models such as level of 





















Table 4.6. The Effect of Conspicuous Conservation Nudging Based on Consumer Personality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Logit Logit Logit Logit 
     
CConservation 0.276** 0.143** 0.264** 0.161** 
 (0.112) (0.064) (0.110) (0.070) 
iPhone11 0.0840* 0.0847* 0.0823* 0.0829* 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) 
Price_Med -0.635*** -0.634*** -0.646*** -0.652*** 
 (0.218) (0.218) (0.220) (0.221) 
Price_High -0.160 -0.165 -0.145 -0.154 
 (0.247) (0.248) (0.250) (0.251) 
Order_11 -0.491** -0.482** -0.510** -0.476** 
 (0.216) (0.219) (0.215) (0.217) 
Extraversion -1.689*** -1.982***   
 (0.565) (0.619)   
CConservation x Extraversion  2.571**   
  (1.136)   
Neuroticism   0.977* 0.00668 
   (0.523) (0.683) 
CConservation x Neuroticism    2.113** 
    (1.066) 
Constant 1.676*** 2.289*** 1.181** 0.672** 
 (0.571) (0.669) (0.516) (0.293) 
     
Observations 464 464 464 464 
Pseudo-R 0.136 0.141 0.128 0.134 
Log-Likelihood -275.1 -273.5 -277.7 -275.6 
Chi-squared 78.65 82.78 72.65 71.76 
Prob Wald 6.65e-09 2.75e-09 6.68e-08 1.83e-07 
Note. Additional control variables for the participants are included in the models such as age, gender, level of 



















Table 4.7. The Effect of Empathy Nudging on Decision to Buy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






      
Empathy 0.113 0.0757 0.190* 0.0916 0.0582 
 (0.209) (0.228) (0.102) (0.232) (0.211) 
iPhone11 0.0879* 0.0880* 0.0973* 0.0847* 0.0723 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.047) (0.057) 
Empathy x iPhone11  0.179*    
  (0.097)    
Price_Med -0.360** -0.357**    
 (0.156) (0.155)    
Price_High 0.106 0.106    
 (0.247) (0.247)    
Order_11 -0.187*** -0.188*** -0.237** -0.160** -0.194** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.104) (0.068) (0.083) 
Constant 0.390* 0.244* 0.439* 0.392** 0.181* 
 (0.219) (0.133) (0.235) (0.174) (0.091) 
      
Observations 470 470 160 154 156 
Pseudo-R 0.100 0.100 0.165 0.109 0.136 
Log-Likelihood -288.2 -288.1 -165.4 -194.7 -185.3 
Chi-squared 56.40 56.51 65.10 43.62 53.49 
Prob Wald 2.53e-05 4.24e-05 3.28e-08 0.000389 1.19e-05 
Note. Additional control variables for the participants are included in the models such as age, gender, level of education, 
























Table 4.8. The Effect of Empathy Nudging Based on Consumer Demographics 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Used_iPhone Logit Logit Logit 
    
Empathy 0.132 0.121 0.125 
 (0.204) (0.230) (0.231) 
iPhone11 0.0868* 0.0868* 0.0869* 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Price_Med -0.377** -0.381** -0.399** 
 (0.161) (0.162) (0.163) 
Price_High 0.110 0.109 0.0887 
 (0.242) (0.242) (0.241) 
Female -0.185* -0.294 -0.186* 
 (0.105) (0.170) (0.105) 
Empathy x Female  0.189**  
  (0.087)  
Age45 0.630** 0.631** 0.343 
 (0.248) (0.248) (0.244) 
Empathy x Age45   0.565** 
   (0.237) 
Order_11 -0.160*** -0.162*** -0.151*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) 
Constant 0.261* 0.299* 0.286* 
 (0.137) (0.143) (0.140) 
    
Observations 470 470 470 
Pseudo-R 0.0948 0.0950 0.0980 
Log-Likelihood -283.1 -282.8 -282.4 
Chi-squared 53.55 55.41 56.42 
Prob Wald 2.30e-05 2.41e-05 2.69e-05 
Note. Additional control variables for the participants are included in the models such as level of 





















Table 4.9. The Effect of Empathy Nudging Based on Consumer Personality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
       
Empathy 0.311 1.142* 0.260 0.443* 0.208 1.883* 
 (0.223) (0.639) (0.221) (0.253) (0.216) (1.049) 
Price_Med -0.375** -0.396** -0.274** -0.281** -0.339** -0.362** 
 (0.157) (0.159) (0.128) (0.128) (0.156) (0.157) 
Price_High 0.120 0.128 0.135 0.137 0.164 0.165 
 (0.247) (0.248) (0.252) (0.253) (0.247) (0.248) 
Order_11 -0.160** -0.144** -0.153** -0.155** -0.158** -0.140** 
 (0.072) (0.068) (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.067) 
Extraversion -1.487*** -2.317***     
 (0.537) (0.743)     
Empathy x Extraversion  1.782**     
  (0.921)     
Agreeableness   2.773*** 2.218**   
   (0.612) (0.899)   
Empathy x Agreeableness    1.019*   
    (0.517)   
Openness     -0.276 -1.602* 
     (0.677) (0.929) 
Empathy x Openness      2.372* 
      (1.305) 
Constant 1.135* 1.679** 1.663** 1.274** 1.367** 1.411** 
 (0.619) (0.712) (0.650) (0.588) (0.641) (0.647) 
       
Observations 470 470 470 470 470 470 
Pseudo-R 0.112 0.116 0.135 0.136 0.100 0.106 
Log-Likelihood -284.5 -283.1 -277.1 -276.7 -288.1 -286.4 
Chi-squared 64.96 68.83 71.93 73.76 56.23 60.41 
Prob Wald 2.21e-06 1.01e-06 1.72e-07 1.67e-07 4.67e-05 1.94e-05 
Note. Additional control variables for the participants are included in the models such as iPhone model, participant’s 









Figure 2.1. Quality Classifications 
 
 












Figure 2.2.B. Auction Page for Unlocked Mobile Phone Pallet  
  


















Figure 2.6. Beta Coefficients from Placebo Analysis (Table 6, Column 1) 
















Figure 2.7. Beta Coefficients from Placebo Analysis (Table 6, Column 2) 





Figure 2.8. Beta Coefficients from Placebo Analysis (Table 6, Column 3) 












Figure 2.9. Beta Coefficients from Placebo Analysis (Table 6, Column 5) 






Figure 2.10. Predicted Bids (Bidder-level Analysis) for Undisclosed iPhone 5 Pallets:  




















































Figure 3.1. Auction Information Presented on Seller’s Site 
 







Figure 3.3. Populations of Single-Homers, Passive Multi-Homers, and Active Multi-Homers 
 
Figure 3.4. Market Average Prices 
 
































































































Table A2.1. Summary Statistics 
Variables # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
FPij 8,179 116.0096 68.79865 
Undisclosedij 8,179 0.8444798 0.3623999 
Lockedij 1,272 0.2845912 0.4512195 
Model 5 ij 8,179 0.6686637 0.4706937 
Verizonij 8,179 0.3961364 0.4890934 
Biddersij 8,179 6.301626 3.156915 
Unitsij 8,179 74.84844 126.9718 
Starting_Priceij 8,179 4022.29 7690.07 
 
 
Table A2.2. Correlation Matrix (Status Disclosure Analysis) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) FP  1.000 
(2) Undisclosed -0.123*  1.000 
(3) Verizon -0.013  0.132*  1.000 
(4) Model_5  0.017 -0.071* -0.093*  1.000 
(5) Bidders -0.009 -0.039*  0.019*  0.103*  1.000 
(6) Starting_Price  0.912* -0.110* -0.019*  0.027* -0.172*  1.000 
(7) Units  0.844*  0.105* -0.033* -0.064* -0.066*  0.846* 1.000 
 
* significant at the .05 level  
 
 
Table A2.3. Correlation Matrix (Locked and Unlocked Analysis) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) FP  1.000 
(2) Locked  0.191*  1.000 
(3) Verizon -0.013 -0.168*  1.000 
(4) Model_5  0.017  0.529* -0.093*  1.000 
(5) Bidders -0.009  0.205*  0.019*  0.103*  1.000 
(6) Starting_Price  0.912*  0.045 -0.019*  0.027* -0.172*  1.000 
(7) Units  0.844*  0.089* -0.033* -0.064* -0.066*  0.846*  1.000 
 














The final price of auction i in marketplace j.  




A binary variable representing the period in which AT&T entered the 
platform for auction i in marketplace j. 
Single_hijk If the bidder i is a single-homer bidding in auction j at marketplace k. 
Passiveijk If the bidder i is a passive single- or multi-homer bidding in auction j at 
marketplace k. 





The total number of bidders participated in auction i and marketplace j. 
Unitsij The total number of units in auction i and marketplace j. 
Start_priceij The starting price in auction i and marketplace j. 
Conditionij The average condition of the devices in auction i and marketplace j (e.g. 








The memory size of the smartphones in auction i and marketplace j (e.g. 
32 GB, 64 GB). 
 
The model of the auctioned phones in auction i and marketplace j (e.g. 
iPhones of model 6). 
 
If the main carrier in auction i and marketplace j is Verizon, AT&T, T-




The seller j who is auctioning the devices. 
 
The order of a submitted bid by bidder i in auction j at marketplace k 
 
Monthij Vector of dummies indicating the month in which auction i started in 
marketplace j. 










Table A3.2. Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev 
FPij 21,284 174.9149 124.667 
Single_Hijk 21,284 0.1620749 0.3685282 
Multi_Hijk 21,284 0.8379251 0.3685282 
Att_entryijk 21,284 0.2409841 0.4276907 
Passiveijk 21,284 0.9444315 0.229092 
Activeijk 21,284 0.0555685 0.229092 
Unitsijk 21,284 72.98082 76.93273 
Biddersij 3,605 8.138594 3.139924 
 
 
Table A3.3. Correlation Matrix 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
(1) FP 1.000 
(2) Att_entry 0.297 1.000 
(3) Single_h 0.186 0.015 1.000 
(4) Active -0.221 0.285 -0.007 1.000 
(5) Marketplace -0.017 0.225 0.137 0.038 1.000 
(6) Bidders 0.089 0.014 -0.033 0.008 0.049 1.000 
(7) Bid_order 0.321 -0.002 -0.008 0.013 0.023 0.293 1.000 
(8) Start_price 0.195 0.090 0.072 -0.036 0.255 -0.187 0.073 1.000 




Table A3.4(A). Individual Summary Statistics for single-homers 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Final Price 3,442 182.2764 134.9377 28.7 727.5 
Starting Price 3,442 67.53978 93.71203 3.9 558.5 
Units 3,442 109.3351 204.2633 2 2831 
Bids 3,442 3.892175 2.073953 1 29 
Winning 3,442 0.4190723 0.2269939 0 1 
 
 
Table A3.4(B). Individual Summary Statistics for passive multi-homers 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Final Price 16,654 174.9235 126.7206 18.4 715.3 
Starting Price 16,654 65.36438 77.19309 1.5 554.5106 
Units 16,654 83.9092 129.164 2 2831 
Bids 16,654 3.322285 1.820361 1 27 









Table A3.4(C). Individual Summary Statistics for active multi-homers 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Final Price 1,188 176.8204 135.4606 30.2 720 
Starting Price 1,188 71.03612 76.76112 2.8 533.3 
Units 1,188 116.1131 215.1759 3 2400 
Bids 1,188 3.43687 1.935667 1 17 
Winning 1,188 0.3823003 0.1777349 0 1 
 
 
Figure A3.1. Active Bidders Involvement in AT&T Auctions Over Time 
 
Note. 76% of the total 115 multi-homers who became active, i.e. participated in AT&T for the first time, started 
bidding on AT&T auctions during the first month post-entry. By the second month, 87% of these bidders had bid at 
least once in AT&T auctions. Most bidders who participated in AT&T auctions continued to stay active in this 
market over the duration of my study, as shown by the proportion of bidders who remain active towards the end of 
the observation window (approximately 80%). All bidders remained active across multiple months during the 











Table A4.1. Manipulation Checks to Ensure the Delivery of the Treatment’s Message 
Treatment Statement 
Conspicuous Conservation Sharing with my friends was an appealing aspect of purchasing the used phone. 
Conspicuous Conservation Purchasing a used iPhone can help reduce e-waste around the globe. 
Empathy The negative effects on people living near e-waste impacts my purchase decisions. 
Empathy Purchasing a used iPhone can help reduce the adverse effects of e-waste around the world. 
 
Figure A4.2. Set of Offers for iPhone 11 (Control Group) 
 
 
Table A4.3. Set of Offers for iPhone 11 (Control Group) 
Question Why did you choose to not purchase the used iPhone? 
1 The price of the used iPhone is too high 
2 I am concerned about the quality of the used iPhone 
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